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Abstract 
  
Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) is a recent philosophy that is highly influential in 
medicine. EBM is centred on the notion that medical practice should be supported by 
rigorous clinical research. This thesis explores a “dimensional” framework of 
knowledge and argues EBM results in the exclusion of certain non-scientific knowledge 
forms. Since these knowledge forms are essential to the realisation of medicine’s goals, 
EBM is holding medicine back. 
 
I frame the primary goal of medicine as to attend to suffering. There is a tendency to 
view the goal of medicine as the treatment of disease, but this fails to account for much 
of what occurs in practice. Suffering incorporates disease and also other humanistic 
aspects of medicine that may not be investigable in a scientific manner. Medical 
knowledge determines medical practice, so medicine must have knowledge of what 
suffering is to effectively attend to suffering. I propose a dimensional theory of 
knowledge that includes explicit, tacit, general and particular forms of knowledge.  
Explicated general knowledge includes the knowledge of science. Tacit knowledge is 
more readily enacted than articulated. Particular knowledge is knowledge that is 
applicable to specific circumstances and individuals. The existence of tacit and 
particular knowledge moderates the possibility and need for scientific justification and 
also means knowledge exists within the knower and not exclusively in abstracted forms.  
 
EBM’s philosophical framework excludes tacit and particular knowledge in its selective 
recognition of explicit-generalised “evidence”. This means that EBM’s conception of 
knowledge is incomplete and is philosophically inadequate. Though EBM makes useful 
contributions to clinical research appraisal, its normative assertions of “what counts as 
knowing” in medicine obscures human suffering and so might harm practice. This thesis 
presents the foundations for an alternative philosophy to EBM that would see “EBM” 
reframed as “clinical epidemiology” as a remedy for EBM’s normative restriction of 
medical knowledge. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
	  
This thesis is about medical philosophy, conceptions of medical knowledge and their 
relevance to the goals of medicine. Medicine uses knowledge to achieve its goals. I will 
put forward a model for understanding medical knowledge and the various forms of 
knowledge that exist in practice. I will then use this model to critique Evidence Based 
Medicine (EBM), an influential philosophy in medical practice. EBM advocates the use 
of research evidence to guide medical practice. Although research evidence is a 
necessary form of medical knowledge, EBM’s claims rest on conceptualisations of 
knowledge that exclude certain other forms of knowledge that are also necessary to 
medical practice, which may be described as “subjective”. The model of knowledge I 
put forward is an attempt to unify what have been called “subjective” and “objective” 
knowledge under a single framework that can account for the importance of both.1 From 
this perspective, it becomes clear that the philosophy of EBM is not suitable for 
medicine. 
	  
Philosophy is sometimes regarded as being irrelevant to practical medicine, which is 
about knowing what works and getting the job done. I maintain that a sound 
philosophical understanding of the nature and purpose of medicine is just as necessary 
to success in medicine as technology. This is because fundamental to the achievement 
of medicine’s practical goals is knowing the job at hand and what determines if it is 
being done well. In chapter two I argue that the fundamental goal of medical practice is 
to relieve the suffering caused by sickness. Though medicine is highly diverse 
(compare, for example the different roles of a general practitioner, a surgeon, a public 
health specialist and so on), these apparently dissimilar professions are in united by the 
desire to relieve suffering. All of medicine can be reduced to this fundamental aim. That 
which is not concerned with human suffering is not medicine. Technological 
development may have caused a shift in focus from suffering to disease, and though the 
treatment of disease often results in the amelioration of suffering, disease and suffering 
are distinct. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although I refer here to “subjective” and “objective” knowledge, the model of knowledge I will 
advocate rejects the possibility of objective knowledge (in the mind independent sense). This will be 
explained in chapter three. 
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Having established that the goal of medicine is to relieve suffering, it follows that to 
achieve its goal, medicine requires knowledge of suffering, i.e. how it is caused and 
how it can be relieved. Chapter three explores the nature of knowledge, and proposes 
two polar dimensions of knowledge. The first dimension draws from Polanyi’s 
description of Personal Knowledge,2 and his distinction between  “explicit” and “tacit” 
knowledge. The second dimension is between “generalised” and “particular” 
knowledge. The resulting framework of knowledge unifies “objective” aspects of 
medical knowledge (e.g. that from clinical research) with aspects that are considered 
“subjective”, such as the wishes of individual patients, and shows how each have a role 
in determining medical decisions. The nature of scientific knowledge as something that 
is highly explicit and generalised is then explored along with examples of the kinds of 
knowledge important in medical practice and suffering. 
	  
An implication of the framework just outlined is that knowledge is “personal” and 
cannot exist independently of the knower, who must possess knowledge before they can 
use it. This feature of knowledge highlights the importance of the people who practice 
and know medicine. In chapter four I discuss how medical practice can be viewed as a 
discourse of knowledge, based on the ideas discussed in chapters two and three. This 
discourse includes four participants: the patient, the physician, clinical authorities and 
biomedical science.  
	  
Chapters five and six will specifically discuss EBM. The Evidence Based Medicine 
Working Group (EBMWG) introduced EBM in the 1992 paper, Evidence Based 
Medicine – A New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, where they outlined 
their philosophy, claiming it would usher in a “NEW paradigm for medical practice”.3 
Since its inception, EBM has cemented itself within almost all aspects of medicine. Its 
influence is undeniable, and many at this time would find it hard to imagine any kind of 
legitimate medicine that is not “evidence-based”.  
	  
EBM highly values objective ideals of knowledge and emphasises the use of clinical 
research in guiding medical decisions. Chapter five will explore EBM as a philosophy 
with an inherent theory of knowledge. This theory will be elucidated and compared to 
the theory proposed in chapter three with the conclusion that EBM’s excludes both tacit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Polanyi, M. (1958).  
3 EBMWG (1992). 
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and particular knowledge. Alongside EBM other philosophies have emerged that 
emphasise “subjective” factors in medicine, such as Patient Centred Medicine4 and 
Narrative Medicine5. In response to these philosophies and criticisms, changes have 
been announced to EBM that appear to address original weaknesses. In my view, these 
changes are superficial and indicate that EBM is in crisis. In light of this, I argue 
“Evidence Based Medicine” is an inadequate model of clinical practice. 
	  
This argument for a shift away from Evidence Based Medicine is fully set out in chapter 
six, where I investigate how EBM plays out in practice through the practical framework 
in chapter four. EBM affects all those who participate in medical practice, particularly 
with respect to the kinds of knowledge that are considered legitimate. Specific 
consequences will be explored related to the primacy of “evidence” and the exclusion of 
tacit and particular knowledge forms. These suggest EBM is not aligned with 
medicine’s goal of ameliorating suffering and its discourse should be discontinued in 
the clinic, journals, policy rooms and the lecture theatre. Medical practice would be 
improved by the adoption of a framework of knowledge that is able to account for its 
tacit and particular nature and those aspects that are explicit and generalised, such as the 
one in this thesis. “EBM” as “clinical epidemiology” would resolve many issues EBM 
causes in practice, allowing it to make useful contributions related to clinical research 
appraisal without normative connotations of the nature of knowledge in medicine. In 
chapter seven I conclude by briefly recounting the overall discussion and indicating 
areas where it might be extended or developed through further inquiry. 
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Stewart et al. (2003).  
5 Charon, R., P. Wyer and N. W. Grp (2008). 
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Chapter 2: Medicine as the Amelioration of Suffering 
	  
This chapter addresses philosophical aspects of medicine as a practical activity with its 
own ends. Medicine is about the care and good of the sick person, whatever that may 
involve. This in mind, medical practices can be evaluated as “good” or “bad” in terms 
of this end. Two ways of viewing the sick person will be discussed: (i) through the lens 
of disease and (ii) through the lens of suffering. Disease is a primarily scientific 
concept, explicitly defined and generalised in nature, but perhaps not an appropriate 
concept to frame a medical morality, as it excludes “subjective” elements of the 
patient’s predicament and their experience of care. Suffering is experiential and 
incorporates factors relevant to disease but also those concerned with “the good of the 
patient” that are excluded by a disease framework. This thesis holds that “good” 
practices in medicine are those that lead to the amelioration of patient suffering.6 
	  
The therapeutic and technological success of modern biomedical science may have 
caused a shift in the focus of medicine from the suffering of the individual sick person 
to the treatment of disease, which may be seen as separate to the person. This shift 
distances medicine from its true goals. EBM is based on the perceived superiority of 
“objective” forms of knowledge and contributes to this shift.  
	  
2.1 The Primacy of Praxis 
	  
Philosophy may be seen as something of little value to medicine. It is often perceived as 
predominantly metaphysical, using formal logic to deduce a priori truths. Medicine is 
different from philosophy (seen in this way) as it is inherently practical, and so 
philosophy may be dismissed as a flight of fancy. Medicine has its own system of 
knowledge, but its value comes not from having this knowledge but from its ability to 
restore health in real-world people. 
	  
A theoretical explanation legitimately strengthens our confidence in a given 
clinical procedure, but there is always more to timely, well-judged clinical 
practice than scientific theory can explain. What directly demonstrates its value 
is not its scientific foundation, but the record of its clinical performance. We 
may understand why it works in theory, but what matters is that it works in 
practice.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Other possible ends exist that could be used to frame medicine’s goals. The point is that suffering 
incorporates the personal and experiential aspects that are excluded by a disease framework. 
7 Toulmin, S. (1997). 
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Toulmin investigates the role of postmodernism in medical philosophy by discussing a 
central theme in the early twentieth century, consisting of a series of critiques of 
Cartesian rationalism. Simplified, Cartesian rationalism attempts to establish 
comprehensive systems of knowledge based on permanent, universal systems of 
overarching principles.8 Part of this was the de-emphasis of “human” factors. A central 
project was the establishment of “necessary truths” by looking closely at the terms 
within propositions and their meanings. To reveal universal truths there must be 
universal meanings, so it was thought that propositions must be defined clearly in a way 
not open to interpretation (or “objectively”). Various methodologies were employed to 
do this, focussing on the logical structure of language. 
	  
In each case the unit of philosophical analysis – the unit of meaning – was not a 
local and timebound utterance, made at one place and time or another, in one 
situation or another, but a “proposition”: an abstract, timeless entity expressing 
in eternal terms the intellectual content of a statement or utterance… …The 
outcome was as theoretical view of philosophy as one could want, whose 
validity was independent of all historical times and places.9 
	  
Since the turn of the 20th century, there has been increasing awareness of the relevance 
of historical, political and social factors to philosophy. This represents a fundamental 
shift whereby philosophy was previously concerned with “de-situated” propositions but 
is now firmly “situated”, focussing on utterances made by people at certain times and 
places. As a result, the contexts of these utterances are inseparable from their meaning 
and become of interest to philosophy.10 Toulmin argues the philosophical programme 
initiated by Descartes saw philosophers seek out theoretical problems at the expense of 
practical wisdom. Postmodernism reverses this emphasis.  
	  
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle compares theoretical rationality, episteme, 
concerned with things that are universal and unchanging, with practical rationality, 
phronesis, which is concerned with the particularities of an individual circumstance. 
This contrast is similar to theory versus practice, medicine being one of the examples 
Aristotle and others have used to demonstrate phronesis.11, 12 
	  




11 Gatens-Robinson, E. (1986). 
12 Widdershoven-Heerding, I. (1987). 
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Medicine is primarily practical but is informed by the theories of biomedical science. 
Central to science is its dis-interest in human factors (e.g. value), the idea being that this 
allows science to be “objective”. Toulmin notes that in biomedical science, issues are 
framed by contrasting function and malfunction and that “however “factual” and 
“objective” the methods that physiologists employ, the core questions from which their 
research throws light have to do – evaluatively – with “good” or “bad” bodily 
functioning.”13 This feature helps to guide biomedical science to ensure it is useful for 
medicine, where these concerns are central. He also highlights that although 
physiological discoveries may be “objective” and “scientific”, their bearing on the 
clinical condition of any individual patient is a matter of judgement with reference to 
the particular set of circumstances present in the case and what is wrong with the 
patient. 
	  
Toulmin rejects Cartesian foundationalist ideals, and calls for a medical philosophy 
grounded in practice where “what is done” in medicine is what matters philosophically 
(not “why it is done”). He deemphasises the relevance of any theory of practice, as this 
would signal a return to the primacy of theory that predominated under the Cartesian 
paradigm. I agree that medical philosophy should focus on practice, however I also 
stipulate that a theoretical understanding of medicine’s fundamental goals is required to 
know whether practice is “good” or “bad”. 
	  
2.2 Importance of Telos 
	  
Pellegrino agrees with Toulmin14 that medical philosophy needs to focus on practice. 
However, he disagrees that medical philosophy should completely reject 
foundationalism and believes the practice-theory dichotomy is not clear-cut: 15 
	  
“Praxis without theory usually ends up conceptually impoverished and verges 
on empiricism; theory without practice has no anchor in reality and verges on 
flights of fancy.”16 
	  
Pellegrino advocates a medical philosophy grounded in praxis that is also informed by 
fundamental principles. Not Cartesian foundationalism where all knowledge can be 
derived axiomatically, but a “soft” foundationalism where some principles underpin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Toulmin, S. (1997).  
14 Ibid. 
15 Pellegrino, E. Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
	  
	   	   8	  
praxis (e.g. the sanctity of life). Pellegrino notes that praxis justified solely in practice 
risks becoming distorted, citing that genocide may be justified on the basis of 
utilitarianism if no foundational rules exist. Like Toulmin, Pellegrino draws on 
Aristotelian concepts: 
	  
As Plato, and Aristotle after him, repeatedly asserted, medicine is a techne. It is 
knowledge only realised when put into practice. It is a practice based not just on 
experience (the realm of the empiricist), but on understanding of the real nature 
of its object. A techne needs general rules and fixed knowledge. It differs from 
theory in always being linked to concrete practices. To the extent that there are 
generalisable rules for a techne, it has a theory, but not a theory in the sense of 
episteme or first philosophy.17 
	  
Pellegrino stresses theory in that the generalisable rules of the techne provide the 
framework for a theory of medicine where the rules define what is “good” and that 
medicine cannot be “good” without these rules. He advocates a philosophy grounded in 
telos – the statement of ends and goals – and that a philosophy of medicine can be 
derived a posteriori from the realities of the clinical encounter, the treatment of sick 
people. Telos is the desired endpoint of praxis, forming a reference from which praxis 
may be viewed outside of itself. This endpoint defines what is “good” thereby creating 
the alternative that is “bad”.18 In this manner telos shapes the foundational rules 
governing medicine’s practice. Wartofsky also emphasises telos in medicine.19 
	  
Medicine is a practice and while it may not be practically useful, or even possible, to 
completely define medicine - in the same way a theory of bicycles is not needed to ride 
one. It remains that medicine is not aimless and clinicians have at least some idea of 
what it means to be a “good” doctor. Because it has a purpose, “good” medicine can be 
framed in terms of whether its practice is aligned with its goals. This in mind, an 
understanding of what medicine sets out to achieve is crucial. The observation that 
something works is what matters (as opposed to why something works),20 but to know 
whether something works, we must first know what working is. This is telos and a lucid 
understanding of medicine’s aspirations is fundamental to any investigation of practice.  
	  
Medicine’s goals exist at a number of levels of generalisation and takes different forms 
depending on that level. Superficially, medicine aims to achieve specific goals, as is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid. - from Marx, W. (1953). 
18 Pellegrino, E. (1997).  
19 Wartofsky, M. Ibid. 
20 Toulmin, S. Ibid. 
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reflected in medicine’s diverse range of specialities. For example a goal of a surgeon is 
to perform operations that remove cancer. An analysis using such specific aspirations is 
not appropriate for this project’s attempt to examine the nature of knowledge within all 
of medicine. I am seeking a broad telos that ties medicine’s diversity under a single 
concept, allowing the evaluation of specific aspects against medicine’s overarching 
goal. The sections below will arrive at this broad principle that determines the goodness 
of medical practice. 
	  
2.3 Medicine as the Treatment of Disease? 
	  
Much of medicine is concerned with disease and its diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. 
Therefore disease is a potential conceptual foundation for medicine’s telos and 
attending to disease could be medicine’s primary goal.  
	  
2.3.1 The Nature of Disease 
	  
There are many ways of understanding disease, with each adding insights. A physician 
will likely frame it by the practically relevant features for its identification in patients 
(e.g. symptoms), however a public health specialist might think of social determinants 
of health in populations. Because of this, disease is a conceptual framework that proves 
very difficult to define completely.21  
	  
In medical practice, disease is primarily a scientific conceptualisation. For biomedical 
science, diseases are abstracted, generalised entities with specific features (e.g. 
prognosis) and causes (e.g. infection), with the result that diseases have specific 
therapies (e.g. drugs). Diseases are present in patients who are sick and they are the 
cause of sickness. This idea provides medicine with a taxonomy for classifying different 
kinds of sickness, allowing physicians to identify and treat specific diseases in patients 
and also for biomedical science, allowing its systematic investigation. 
	  
2.3.2 Why a Disease Framework Fails 
	  
If addressing disease is the fundamental goal of medical practice then all (good) aspects 
of medicine should be somehow related to this activity. Although much of medicine is 
about addressing disease, paradoxically there are circumstances where this may cause 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Hofmann, B. (2001). 
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patient harm, for example the aggressive treatment of terminal cancer. Palliative care 
recognises that sometimes it is best to leave disease untreated (in the continuation of 
non-therapeutic measures to maximise comfort).22 Additionally, bioethics tells medicine 
that patients have the right to be autonomous and refuse treatment if they wish. How 
could this be possibly “right” if attending to disease is fundamentally what defines good 
medicine (as it would if medicine’s telos was about disease)?23 
	  
There are things in medicine that the goal of attending to disease does not address. 
Subsequently, disease is not appropriate as a conceptual foundation for the medical 
telos. Understood as a purely scientific entity, diseases are value free (because science 
claims disinterest in value). The above examples demonstrate that it does not always 
follow that for a patient with disease, the “right thing to do” is to treat that disease.24 
The morality of medicine (i.e. its goodness/badness) is not determined by disease alone 
and there is another more fundamental concept that grounds the medical telos. 
Medicine’s aim of attending to disease fails when it causes patients to experience harm. 
Framed in this way, an alternative view is that the aim of medicine is fundamentally to 
address patient’s suffering. 
	  
2.4 Suffering: Medicine’s Real Goal 
	  
In The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, Cassell explores suffering and 
develops his conceptualisation of what it means to suffer given his conviction that:  
 
“The test of a system of medicine should be its adequacy in the face of 
suffering”25 
 
This is the medical telos in this thesis. Practices in medicine can be evaluated in terms 
of their utility in suffering and “good” medicine is conducive to the prevention, 
alleviation and palliation of suffering. Consequently that which does not address 
suffering, or is sub-optimal in this regard, is “bad” medicine. Attending to suffering is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Richmond, C. (2005). 
23 Another weakness is that sometimes medicine attends to patients who suffer from sickness where no 
disease can be found. Under a disease framework this may be subjugated by attaching a disease title to 
the patient in the absence of any concrete disease entity (e.g. psychosomatic pain). However is this 
measure for the “good” of the patient, who may be abandoned within a disease framework if disease 
remains elusive in the presence of suffering? 
24 Or that if there is no disease, then nothing should be done. 
25 Cassell, E. J. (2004). 
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the overarching principle sought in section 2.2 and grounds the specific goals of 
medicine routinely pursued in practice. 
 
2.4.1 The Nature of Suffering 
	  
Suffering is very complex. It is experienced by people, and just as every person is 
unique, so is every case of suffering. Suffering often follows disease however it is not 
confined to the physical symptoms of disease (e.g. pain). 26  Suffering transcends 
physical aspects that bear on experience. It is not confined to ourselves but also 
encompasses apprehensions regarding others (e.g. the burden of disability to a family), 
and it is not always possible to predict what will cause us to suffer – or even know what 
we are suffering from when we do.27 Why we suffer can be elusive, yet we know when 
we are suffering, just as we know when we are not. Cassell uses the following story to 
illustrate the various things that cause suffering in sickness: 
	  
A thirty-five-year-old sculptor with cancer of the breast that had spread widely 
was treated by competent physicians employing advanced knowledge and 
technology and acting out of kindness and true concern. At every stage, the 
treatment as well as the disease was a source of suffering to her. She was 
frightened and uncertain about her future but could get little information from 
her physicians, and what she was told was not always the truth. She was 
unaware, for example, that the radiation therapy to the breast (in lieu of 
mastectomy) might be so disfiguring. After her ovaries were removed and a 
regimen of medications that were masculinising, she became obese, grew facial 
and body hair of a male type, and her libido disappeared. When tumor invaded 
the nerves near her shoulder, she lost strength in the hand she used in sculpting 
and became profoundly depressed… …She felt isolated because she was not 
like the other people and could not do what other people did. She feared that 
her friends would stop visiting her. She was sure she would die.28 
	  
Cassell argues that although disease may be adequately addressed, medicine fails its 
patients in terms of their suffering. He makes three points:29 
	   	  
1. Suffering is experienced by persons. 
2. Suffering occurs when an impending destruction of the person is perceived 
and continues until the threat of disintegration has passed or the integrity 
of the person is restored in some other manner. 
3. Suffering can occur in relation to any aspect of the person. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This is illustrated by the suffering of a tetraplegic, who may be incapable of feeling physical pain. 
27 Hamilton, M. and G. Gillett (2012). 
28 Cassell, E. J. (2004). p. 29-30 
29 Ibid. p. 32 
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Cassell develops the idea of person, claiming that person represents a holistic 
conceptualisation of the individual with a rejection of Cartesian mind-body dualism. 
Person therefore consists of all aspects of an individual: mind, body, spirit, past, future, 
relationships, career, culture, appearance, duties, activities, capacity for independence 
and so on. The mind-body duality pervasive in medicine is unhelpful because suffering 
in sickness is related to the dynamic and inseparable relationship that exists between 
physical events in the body and the meanings associated to these events by the mind. 
Meaning here is used in two senses; the first is to do with “signification” in that an 
event might be taken to signal a certain consequence; the second is to do with the 
importance associated to that consequence.30 In the story presented above, the suffering 
caused by tumour growth leading to muscle weakness (bodily process) meant the 
woman could no longer sculpt (an association of consequence that is of value to her). 
The person is dynamic and changes over time as experience (who the person once was) 
shapes an individual in terms of who they are (activities, values, beliefs, relationships 
etc.) and who they intend to become (their aspirations). Unlike objects of science, the 
person cannot be reduced to its parts in order to understand them. The person is 
absolutely unique and will ascribe different value to different parts of itself.  
	  
People suffer when they perceive the impending destruction of their person. Suffering 
has a lot to do with meanings and like fear, it is related to perceptions of the future. 
	  
People in pain in pain frequently report suffering from pain when they feel out 
of control, when the pain is overwhelming, when the source of pain is 
unknown, when the meaning of pain is dire, or when the pain is apparently 
without end.31 
	  
The suffering caused by a crushing pain in the chest will be greater than the suffering 
due to the same pain in the thigh – because it could be a heart attack. Suffering stops 
once the threat has gone, for example after realising the pain was caused by indigestion. 
If the threat continues suffering may also be ameliorated if the person is able to restore 
him or herself in some other way. It is not possible to predict what will cause someone 
to suffer, any aspect of the person can cause suffering and unique persons value these 
aspects differently. An example of the effect of meaning would be the comparative 
suffering caused by a broken leg for a top athlete, days before an event, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid. p. 35-36 
31 Ibid. p. 35 
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suffering caused by the same injury to a person who enjoys movies and could do with 
some downtime.32 
	  
2.4.2 Suffering is Distinct to Disease 
	  
It is true that disease frequently results in suffering, and quite often, eradicating disease 
ameliorates suffering, however suffering is distinct from disease. Disease can sit 
dormantly and it may only be when it and its meanings are illuminated that suffering 
occurs (e.g. a pain in the side seen as a minor annoyance until it is found to arise from 
liver metastases). Disease excludes humanistic aspects of suffering and the ontological 
reality of disease is in question.33 Unlike disease, suffering is not confined to the 
conceptual realm of science but implicates the variety of consequences in the life of a 
unique individual who is sick. Suffering is primarily experiential in nature and people 
will suffer regardless of any conceptual framework for it. This is not true for disease, as 
although people would continue to be sick in the absence of disease theory, they would 
not have disease per se, because disease is defined by the presence of its conceptual 
indicators (i.e. symptoms, physical signs etc.). In contrast to disease, suffering cannot 
be physically isolated and is not totally reducible into scientifically measurable features. 
For this reason and others outlined in the following chapters, science is not suitable for 
the investigation of suffering (at least the kind of science advocated by EBM).34 Disease 
can be illuminated by science because it can be isolated to certain parts of people in 
independence of the whole person (e.g. cancer in the lung) and behaves in ways that are 
somewhat predictable. The suffering caused by disease is equivalent to disease plus the 
meanings of disease to the person, so addressing aspects of the patient’s disease (even if 
done optimally) does not necessarily equate to addressing their suffering - especially 
since addressing disease can cause suffering.35 Following this, with the good of the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This example is simplistic to illustrate the point. 
33 Simon, J. (2011). 
34 Cassell, E. J. (2004). p. 41 
35 Ibid. p. 29 
36 An argument for the irreducibility of suffering into disease is provided in the appendix. 
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2.5 Technological Success: The Suffering as Disease Illusion 
	  
Cassell and others37, 38 have observed that medicine in its zealous pursuit of scientific 
rigour and technology, may have lost sight of its more fundamental aspiration – the care 
of the sick person. Cassell believes that because of its technical success, medicine 
highly values scientific knowledge and “objective” aspects of the patient’s disease at the 
expense of the consideration of the person, who is “subjective” and cannot be 
understood scientifically.39 
	  
This section will discuss how the medical telos has been shaped over time. The sick 
person40 and the amelioration of their suffering has historically been the focus of 
medicine. Over recent history there has been a shift in focus away from the person and 
their suffering towards the use of technology and the treatment of disease.41 In doing 
this, medicine assumes that treating a patient’s disease also relieves suffering. But if 
suffering is not equivalent to disease, then medicine may have wrongly placed 
“objective” knowledge as superior to “subjective” knowledge forms.  
	  
2.5.1 Early Medicine: Emphasis of the Sick Person and Their Suffering 
	  
Modern medicine has its roots in ancient Greece. Hippocrates rejected sickness as a 
mystical punishment, instead advocating the naturalism of ill health. In Hippocrates’ 
era, humorism, the notion that diseases are caused by imbalances in fundamental 
elements predominated. Modern conceptualisations of disease (dictated by principles of 
pathology, physiology etc.) did not exist and there was no systematic programme of 
medical science. At this time the sick person’s story and complaints were front-centre as 
physicians did not have access to modern investigative technologies and had to rely 
solely on the patient’s own account to piece together what was going on (with a limited 
number of clinical signs). 
	  
Over time, by listening to patients’ histories and symptoms, physicians began to note 
patterns. They learnt that by doing certain things when a certain “type” of sickness 
presented itself, the physician could slow or even halt its course. In continuing with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Charon, R., P. Wyer and N. W. Grp (2008). 
38 Stewart, et al. (2003).  
39 Cassell, E. J. (2004). p. 41 
40 Not person in the sense of Cassell’s conceptualisation however there are parallels. 
41 Cassell, E. J. (2004). p. 41 
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notions of naturalism, the idea of sickness being caused by some-thing was established; 
along with the consequence that sickness may be affected if the cause of sickness is 
affected. Although the conceptual basis of medicine was expanding, physicians had to 
be highly attuned to the “subjective” story of their patients to generate their diagnoses. 
Their focus was firmly on the patient as a person, rather than a set of disease data 
gleaned by “objective” methods. 
	  
2.5.2 The Suffering as Disease Illusion 
	  
The scientific revolution (16th century, to the early 19th century) saw dramatic changes 
in the way the world was seen.42 Near the end of this period (in France early 1800s) 
modern conceptualisations of disease were developed.43 The idea emerged that sickness 
and the suffering associated with it is the result of diseases with specific features, 
allowing systematic investigation.44 
	  
Infective disease caused a huge burden on society before the discovery of microbes 
gave medicine an understanding of the processes involved. This heralded development 
in technologies like immunisation and antibiotics, two of medicine’s greatest 
achievements.45 Since the 1800s science and its derivative technologies have exploded, 
leading to great improvements in medicine’s ability to combat disease. There is no 
question as to the unprecedented therapeutic success of modern medicine arising from 
biomedical science. This success has been so great that medicine (and society) not only 
demands a treatment, but a “cure”, for the afflictions that prey on peoples’ wellbeing.46 
Disease was (and still is) something that could – in theory – be eradicated given 
sufficient volumes of research funding.47  
	  
Biomedical science’s therapeutic success has led medicine to believe that disease is the 
cause of suffering. It follows, that medicine will achieve its fundamental goal of 
attending to suffering primarily by emphasising the scientific approach and having a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Hall, A. R. (1962). p. xii 
43 Cassell, E. J. (2004). p. 6 
44 See section 2.3. 
45 Godlee, F. (2007).  
46 Antibiotics and vaccination delivered cures for some infective diseases and chemotherapy offered a 
glimpse of hope for a “cure” for cancer. 
47 This possibility is eroded with the rise of chronic disease and the realisation that the causes of disease 
are extremely complex (e.g. the accumulation of “lifestyle factors”), which cannot be eliminated by 
“magic bullets” as can occur when causes are simple and strong (e.g. antibiotics for bacterial infections). 
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highly technological focus. Before the scientific revolution, physicians relied on non-
technological measures to lessen the burden of sickness in patients (e.g. their 
compassion). These measures were targeted primarily at the patients suffering - science 
and new technology are directed at disease. 
	  
2.5.3 Disease, Not the Person as the Object of Medicine’s Gaze 
	  
Separately from therapeutic developments, investigative technologies have appeared 
that allow physicians to “see” disease in a way never before possible. Physicians no 
longer rely solely the patient’s history and a few clinical signs. Technology has allowed 
doctors to “rule in or out” instances of disease accurately and medicine can now quite 
readily “know what is wrong” with the patient with respect to their disease (e.g. by 
MRI).  
	  
Medicine, being influenced by scientific principles relishes the “objective”, shunning 
“subjectivity” as something that obscures the “truth” it strives towards. The reliability 
of investigative technologies means that medicine no longer relies on the patient’s 
account to make a diagnosis, so much that when the patient’s account is at odds with the 
“hard data”, the physician will side with technology. Continuing with this trend, 
physicians themselves are also “subjective”, so humanistic aspects of their practice (e.g. 
clinical experience) cannot be trusted over the “objectivity” of science. Technology has 
become what illuminates disease, and because disease has been equated to suffering, 
these technologies are what medicine uses to “see” suffering in patients. This is in 
contrast to paying careful attention to the patient’s account of their sickness, as was 
done in antiquity.  
	  
The above account of the teleological history of biomedicine illuminates its implicit 
argument: (i) disease is the cause of suffering in sick people and (ii) disease will 
eventually be cured by scientific and technological knowledge therefore (iii) medicine’s 
telos of attending to the suffering of its patients is best achieved by having a highly 
scientific and technological focus.48 It was discussed in section 2.4.2 that disease and 
suffering are not equivalent and that scientific methods are not adequate for illuminating 
suffering. The idea that suffering can be adequately addressed by focussing on disease 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This account is presented to make a point and is not intended to denote that all those who practice 
medicine hold this view.  
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alone is false and this misperception is likely to result in harm to patients (at the level of 
suffering). Science has taught medicine that subjectivity hinders the “method” by which 
it finds the “truth”. This viewpoint results in a framework of medical knowledge that 
prioritises “objectivity” as superior to “subjective” sources of knowledge, a framework 




This chapter has explored considerations of the praxis and telos of clinical medicine in 
order to find an overarching concept to evaluate it. Disease was a potential candidate, 
however medicine is not just about disease. Suffering is at a more fundamental level, 
medicine is also about attending to suffering, and treating disease does not necessarily 
lead to this. As a result, practices in medicine can be evaluated in terms of whether they 
lead to this goal.49 
	  
Over time, biomedical science’s therapeutic success may have resulted in the false 
assumption that suffering is best addressed through disease. Because disease can be 
investigated by science, medicine has come to believe the best kind of knowledge is 
“objective”. EBM provides a framework of medical knowledge that highly values 
objectivity.  
	  
The next step is to explore the kind of knowledge that is relevant to suffering. Scientific 
knowledge has been a successful template for technological development, however 
suffering cannot be studied by science in the same way as disease.50 If not exclusively 
scientific, what is the nature of medical knowledge? On superficial examination there 
are many kinds of knowledge that are practically important in medicine that are not 
scientific, such as physicians’ knowledge of surgical procedures, or the patient’s 
knowledge of their wishes. The telos of medicine is to attend to the suffering of patients 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Using suffering (as opposed to disease) as medicine’s endpoint has an additional benefit in that if the 
purpose of medicine is to attend to suffering, there is the implication that medicine has an inherent 
morality (which is compatible with the Hippocratic ethos). Disease, as a scientific entity, is supposedly 
objective and value free. Medicine founded in disease is also (without external intervention) amoral in 
that the goal of attending to disease has nothing to say as to whether this is a “good” thing to do for the 
patient. A system of medicine founded in suffering ameliorates the patient-physician conflict that can 
arise when a patient refuses medical treatment. Under a disease framework, physicians view their role 
primarily as one that attends to disease and they are being asked not to. There is no such conflict if the 
physician’s role is to attend to suffering (so long as the physician can see how treatment may result in 
more, not less, suffering). This results in a medical practice that is more aligned with ethical principles 
(such as autonomy) than a disease framework that has nothing to say about these issues.  
50 See section 2.4.2. and Appendix 
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and medical knowledge is that which helps medicine achieve this goal. The next chapter 
describes a theory of knowledge that accounts for the importance of knowledge other 
than scientific knowledge in medicine. This account will be used to critique aspects of 
EBM. 
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Chapter 3: The Dimensionality of Medical Knowledge 
	  
This chapter will outline the theory of knowledge guiding this thesis and indicate two 
features central in medical knowledge, viz: its explicit-tacitness and its general-
particularity. These characteristics of knowledge are not recognised by EBM, the kinds 
of knowledge EBM recognises will be discussed in chapter five.  
	  
One popular view of knowledge is as a “justified, true belief”.51 In science, where 
quantifiable evidence is required for the justification of scientific knowledge this may 
be apt, but it falls short in other areas of knowledge where justification may not be 
possible (tacit knowledge) or necessary (particular knowledge). It may also privilege 
scientific knowledge over other kinds of knowledge. This will be a broader 
characterisation of knowledge where scientific knowledge exists, alongside other 
inherently different kinds, a view that draws on Michael Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge, 
Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.52 The two non-quantifiable aspects of knowledge 
concern  (i) whether it is predominantly generalised or particular; and (ii) whether it is 
predominantly explicit or tacit. Knowledge therefore lies on a plane where the axes 
represent the variability of knowledge in terms of its general-particularity and explicit-
tacitness.54 
       
Figure	  1:	  The	  Dimensions	  of	  Knowledge	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Fine, G. (2003). 
52 Polanyi, M. (1958). 
54 Though this representation might suggest it, Personal knowledge is non-quantifiable as assigning 
numerical values is a form of explication and this cannot be accurately and completely done with tacit 
knowledge. These aspects are not absolute or fixed and explicit-tacit and general-particular features may 







	   	   20	  
All knowledge has explicit, tacit, general and particular aspects, however the 
importance of each dimension varies and can do so according to its use. Even 
mathematical knowledge, a very explicit form of knowledge, has tacit components that 
are vital for its understanding (e.g. knowing how to differentiate). Recognising these 
complexities is central to understanding the role of science and knowledge in medical 
practice.	  	  
	  
Knowledge and the knower are inseparable because a text is meaningless until the 
reader interprets it,55 and recorded knowledge is of little practical use until it is 
understood and enacted by people. Polanyi noted the explicit-tacit dimension56 to which 
I have added the particular-general dimension.57 The sections that follow will present 
these two dimensions and use them to discuss knowledge in biomedical science, 
medicine and suffering. 
	  
3.1 Personal Knowledge and Objectivity58 
	  
The definition of knowledge as “justified, true belief”59 enables a distinction between 
something that is both reasonable to believe and true, and something that is believed but 
either not true or not reasonable to believe. This definition entitles a subject to claim 
knowledge only if that claim can be justified. 
	  
3.1.1 Rejection of Objectivity 
	  
“Objective is subjective – but in a red dress”60 
	  
Objectivity is a fundamental aspiration of science in its quest to accumulate knowledge. 
This is tied to the view that the scientific method leads to the illumination of “objective 
truths” that are present in nature and awaiting discovery.61 Science strives for disinterest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 E.g. a formally stated mathematical axiom means nothing to a mathematical ignoramus. 
56 Polanyi, M. (1958). 
57 I am not aware of descriptions of this dimension of knowledge, however it may have been described 
elsewhere. 
58 Objectivity in this thesis is used in the mind-independent sense as strived for by “modern” scientific 
methodologies and espoused by Cartesian rationalism. The author is aware of post -”modern” accounts of 
objectivity (e.g. Personal Knowledge) that might not fall victim to the presented arguments. This is a 
criticism of scientific objectivity and not more sophisticated philosophical accounts that recognise the 
necessary personal aspects of knowledge. 
59 Fine, G. (2003). 
60 BJ Brooker (2014) – on the idea that nothing can be completely objective, we may try to objectify 
things (through criteria, procedures etc.), however everything of human significance must at some point 
involve the judgment of persons, which are necessarily “subjective”. 
61 This view is aligned with Cartesian ideals (see section 2.1) and is a hallmark of the “modern” era. 
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and employs methodologies designed to remove human factors due to the conviction 
that human “subjectivity” can lead to false belief, and it justifies blinding subjects and 
observers in randomised controlled trials (RCTs). A further example of the importance 
of objectivity in science is the Copernican revolution, where it was proposed that the 
Sun was the centre of our solar system,62 rather than the Earth (and man) being at the 
centre, as in the Ptolemaic model, a false belief system linked to the human subject’s 
position in the cosmos.63 
	  
Polanyi challenges the possibility of objectivity of the kind aspired to by science noting 
that, although the Ptolemaic model appealed to human self-importance, the Copernican 
model spoke to a different human need, the desire for greater intellectual satisfaction.64 
In his rejection of “modern” objectivity, Polanyi argues that science depends on 
“subjective” factors intrinsic to being human and exercising intelligence so that 
intelligent judgement is necessary for knowledge. This does not undermine the truth 
because what is thought true will be further investigated and validated in ways that have 
not been conceived at a given point. For example, centuries after Copernicus, astronauts 
observed the solar system outside of Earth and were able to “see the truth” in a way not 
previously possible. Polanyi argues that humans have a capacity to self-appraise their 
beliefs and also that there is a deep seated human dedication to reason (or intellectual 
beauty) that helps to ensure scientific integrity and truth, although science has and will 
continue to be wrong at times. The human commitment to rationality therefore bridges 
the supposed gap between subjectivity and objectivity.65  
	  
3.1.2 The Probabilistic Nature of Science 
	  
The conceptualisation of knowledge as a “justified, true belief” is not clear with respect 
to what can count as justification, and how much of it is required to justify something. 
This section and those that follow will argue that human judgement is necessary for 
these appraisals.  
	  
Karl Popper asserted that to be scientific, a theory must be falsifiable. This results from 
the fact that no number of positive observations can prove a generalised statement but a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Copernicus, N. (1965). 
63 This observation, and the appearance of the Earth as stationary. 
64 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 3-6 
65 Ibid. p. 63-65 
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single negative one may disprove it.66 In the exact sciences (e.g. astrophysics) it is 
conceivable that a theory could be absolutely falsified by an incongruent observation. 
This could be if a theory predicted an event (e.g. solar eclipse) that did not occur (with 
the assumption of no measurement errors or external factors not accounted for by the 
theory). In practice the necessity of measurement and associated errors make absolute 
falsification impossible – it is done probabilistically. In the inexact sciences, such as 
biomedical science, falsification is even less feasible because these sciences allow for a 
degree of freedom between observation and theory, and also because justification is 
done on the basis of probabilistic statements like the null hypothesis,67 rather than by 
strict contradiction.68 Because of the statistical nature of justification in science and the 
resultant impossibility of absolute falsification, Polanyi argues that scientific knowledge 
is knowledge that is known “with a very high likelihood” to be true.69 
	  
3.1.3 The Necessity of Judgement 
	  
In life, the degree we demand a statement to be justified is inversely proportional to 
how likely we believe it to be true. In our routine judgements we naturally gauge the 
evidence of something against our appraisal of how likely it is.70 For example, when I 
hear a loud bang in my North Dunedin flat, I think of a car backfiring and not a gunshot, 
which may be different if I were in Syria. 
	  
Appraisals related to probability are essential to our day-to-day interpretation of things 
and help us to make sense of the world. In science the scientist drawing conclusions 
appraises experimental evidence for a theory against how likely she thinks that theory is 
to be true, in effect judging whether or not a piece of data counts as knowledge or not. 
There must always be a judgement when using statistical methods because there is no 
universal cut-off point representing certainty.71 An example presenting extremes would 
be the relative justification required to support the conclusion that “people can change 
matter with their mind” (something believed to be untrue) compared to “paracetamol 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Popper, K. R. (1972). 
67 Fisher, R. A. S. (1935). 
68 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 20-24 
69 That observation is laden with theory and different observers can justifiably interpret the same data 
differently is an alternative argument against the possibility of objectivity - Hanson, N. R. (1958). 
70 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 24-48 
71 The null hypothesis is a method to aid the appraisal of whether a result occurred by chance (or if the 
data shows a true relationship). A low “p-value” suggests a true relationship and a high value suggests a 
result caused by chance. The degree of justification (in terms of p-value) required to qualify a result as 
knowledge is not an “objective” truth, but is assigned conventionally (p<0.05 in most circles). 
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reduces intracranial pressure” (a theory aligned with the current paradigm). Science 
cannot be considered truly objective because the appraisal of the scientist is required to 
qualify something as knowledge. This depends on the characteristics and personal 
knowledge of that person, which is “subjective” and is supposedly removed in 
“objective” knowledge. A rejection of scientific objectivity is not a rejection of truth, 
because inter-subjectivity and triangulation occurs. 72  “Subjective” individuals 
communicate and agree on things and although agreement might rationally lead you to 
believe they are true, this does not lead to “objectivity” (in the mind-independent sense). 
Inter-subjective agreement is conditional on each individual judgement and is therefore 
more reliable, but not “objective”. It is the human ability to make accurate judgements 
along with our commitment to rationality that help to ensure truth.  
	  
At (all) these points the act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal 
co-efficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the 
disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity. It implies the claim that man 
can transcend his own subjectivity by striving passionately to fulfil his personal 
obligations to universal standards.73 
	  
Science as the detached application of “the method” that provides a machinery for the 
creation of “objective” knowledge is a myth. Scientific knowledge depends on the 
scientist asking fruitful questions and interpreting the data accurately. This does not 
undermine claims to “truth” or the existence of a reality, because scientists have a 
personal commitment to rationality and the personal satisfaction that comes with 
enlightenment (so that mathematical solutions can be beautiful). Attempts to separate 
knowledge from the humans that create and use it are not helpful and rational passion 
plays a vital role.74 This passion is exemplified in individuals such as Einstein, who 
dedicate themselves to knowledge and are not satisfied by incomplete answers. Because 
judgement and assertion is required to qualify anything as knowledge, knowledge is 
personal in that it exists within people and not independent to the mind in abstract 
forms. It is true that much of knowledge can be written down and apparently de-
humanised,75 but recorded knowledge does not reside independently in texts but in their 
meaning, and meaning is created as a reader who knows how to read interprets them.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Davidson, D. (1982). 
73 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 17 
74 Ibid. p. 63-65 
75 This is explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge cannot be articulated. 
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3.2 The Explicit-Tacit Dimension of Knowledge 
	  
This section discusses the explicit-tacit dimension of knowledge. Explicit knowledge is 
knowledge that is readily explicated - i.e. spoken or written down in detail succinctly. 
Tacit knowledge cannot be made explicit completely, succinctly or in abstract terms. 
Factual knowledge, such as knowing the day of the week or the atomic number of 
platinum is explicit, but even the most abstracted and explicit forms of knowledge, like 
mathematics, have a degree of tacitness. This poses problems for knowledge as a 
“justified, true belief” as the existence of tacit knowledge – which cannot be defined – 
means that there are situations where it is possible to truthfully know without there 
being any explicit justification of this knowledge outside of the personal “hands on 
experience” of the knower. The focus here will be on tacit knowledge as it is less 
recognised, however this is not intended to imply any superiority over explicit 
knowledge. 
	  
3.2.1 Skilful Knowledge 
	  	  
Polanyi explores skills and connoisseurship, noting that they are superficially different 
to explicit knowledge but are used by people as a kind of knowledge. People “know” 
skills like how to swim or play guitar, just as some people do not “know” how to do 
these things. Skilful knowledge is acquired, just like scientific or factual knowledge, 
however the manner in which it done is not the same. Polanyi draws from Gestalt 
psychology noting that the execution of skilful knowledge (e.g. playing guitar) is done 
holistically (and by practice not formal intellect). When you skilfully play guitar you are 
doing just that, “playing guitar”, not focussing on where your hands are on the neck, the 
angle of your finger joints or the pressure required to sound a note. Using the example 
of the pianist, Polanyi observes that when the pianist thinks about the individual things 
that make up her performance (e.g. finger movements), it breaks down and fails. Just as 
if you try to focus on what happens with your legs when you walk.76 
	  
The use of tools is similar. When using a tool, like a scalpel, we are generally focally 
aware of only the act itself. There is a vast amount of sensory input essential to using a 
scalpel, such as seeing a 3D map of where we want to cut, along with the fine changes 
in pressure in the fingertips that guide cutting. When using a scalpel we are not focally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 49-63 
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aware of these things (i.e. not thinking about them), but to say we don’t know these 
things is false as they are essential to the task. Polanyi argues that when executing 
skilful knowledge we are subsidiarily aware77 of the “parts that make up the whole” and 
when using a tool we effectively assimilate the tool as an extension of our body. 
Because shifting awareness away from the whole to any of the parts results in the 
deterioration of the performance of a skill (as with the piano), it makes it impossible for 
the skilful knower to explicitly know the entirety of these parts that make up the 
skill.78,79 
	  
3.2.2 Communication of Skilful Knowledge 
	  
Because the skilful knower might not (and possibly cannot) be aware of the parts 
making up a skill, explicating (e.g. writing down) skilful knowledge is troublesome. 
The communication of skilful knowledge is different to factual knowledge, which can 
be more completely explicated in things like textbooks. It is possible to partially 
explicate skilful knowledge in, say, a manual for a helicopter. But the act of reading this 
manual does not translate into knowing how to fly a helicopter. Skills are learnt by 
doing and by observing. In this respect tacit knowledge is unlike explicit knowledge, 
which can be readily written down and transferred explicitly.80 
	  
3.2.3 The Role of Articulation and Language 
	  
Polanyi expands tacit knowledge by exploring the role of language in the articulation of 
knowledge. Language includes words and also other things that convey meaning, like 
maps and diagrams. Polanyi discusses inarticulate intelligence (i.e. tacit knowledge), 
citing the intelligent behaviour of pre-linguistic humans and experiments with animals 
that demonstrate their ability to learn tricks, read signs and execute higher tasks.81,82 
Inarticulate faculties of intelligence exist, and it follows that in some circumstances, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Subsidiary awareness refers to things we perceive (or know) that contribute to awareness but are not 
manifest (or articulable) at the focal level. 
78 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 49-63 
79	  Connoisseurship is like a skill, but the taster is subsidiarily aware of the qualities against which a 
decision of taste is being made – and cannot be totally aware of them. Judgement also is like this. Ibid. p. 
53-55	  	  	  
80 So long as there are readers who can (tacitly) understand the language. 
81 An experiment involving a baby chimpanzee that was reared with a human baby demonstrated that the 
chimpanzee kept up with the human baby in many aspects of intelligence up until the age of about 15-18 
months (when the mental development of the chimpanzee is nearing completion and the human’s is about 
to accelerate) - White, L. A. (1935). 
82 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 71-77 
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knowledge is used that is not founded in language – the knower has no words to speak 
of their knowledge. This feature of knowledge can be observed in suffering in medical 
settings and occurs when patients know that they are suffering, but not perhaps why.83  
	  
Comparing the intellectual abilities of humans and animals, Polanyi claims the principle 
cause of our superior intellectual abilities is our ability to use language to create formal 
frameworks of knowledge. Language allows us to clarify our thoughts, to condense 
information into manageable units (like in a map), and to communicate and record 
knowledge (a precursor to cultural evolution).84 Language greatly enhances our ability 
know and communicate aspects of experience, however there are functional features of 
language that means there is a necessary gap between what may be spoken of and 
experience.85 
	  
3.2.4 The Limits of Articulation 
	  
Experience never repeats itself in totality. A language containing words to denote every 
possible circumstance would be absurd as languages must be finite to be easily learnt 
and used. For this reason words are not highly specific. Within the meanings of words 
are generalisations about “things” that are considered constant for any instance of that 
“thing”. For example a car is a vehicle with four wheels, but there is no word for a “red 
car turning left” because this is too specific. Polanyi uses the example of a map, where 
its scale is analogous to the size of a vocabulary. Having a map the same size of the 
territory you navigate might be unhelpful because the map would be just as difficult to 
navigate as the region itself. Language must be sufficiently large to speak of the many 
things that exist, but sufficiently small to have any practical utility. Because of the 
necessary gap with experience this creates, there are things that cannot be spoken about, 
or at least not easily and succinctly.86  
	  
3.2.5 The Tacit Nature of Language 
	  
At an operational level using language is similar to using skilful knowledge, where the 
explicit part of language falls into subsidiary awareness, contributing to our focal and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Hamilton, M. and G. Gillett (2012).  
84 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 77-87 
85 This is also a feature of abstraction (which depends on language). Abstraction is the ability to isolate 
critical features from experience and make them the focus of attention – this is a requirement for 
scientific investigation. So science is also limited by language. 
86 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 77-87 
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holistic awareness of meaning. For example when reading this, you are aware of the 
meaning of the words and not the individual letters in the text (which your eyes see). I 
can write and I “know” how to manipulate words into sentences, however I cannot tell 
you how I am able to do this – I just can. When I write I am subsidiarily aware of my 
entire vocabulary, yet only the words that convey my intended meaning come into my 
focal awareness and are written. Even the meaning of a word is not concrete; meaning 
comes from our subsidiary awareness of the context of the situations we know a word 
has been used. Babies have no reference when learning to understand and speak words. 
Over time they learn the meaning and operational principles of language by 
contextualising the similarities and differences of the utterances of those who speak 
around them.87 This is like in medicine where medical terminology is alienating for 
outsiders, yet is learnt and becomes an essential tool for physicians. 
	  
Tacit features are also inherent in mathematics, possibly the most explicit form of 
knowledge. Mathematical knowledge is generally considered to consist of explicit 
theorems (e.g. Pythagoras’ theorem: a2 + b2 = c2). These equations contribute to 
mathematical knowledge, yet they are meaningless and practically useless without a 
tacit understanding of mathematics. Mathematics relies on symbols and operational 
rules that determine how they may be manipulated to “do maths”. The mathematician is 
aware of the meaning of the symbols and the manipulations available to them, and good 
mathematicians choose the right operations for the situation to solve the problem. This 
decision is not explicit, by a systematic review of all possible operations; it is done 
tacitly in a manner the mathematician may not be aware of. Tacit knowledge in 
mathematics is evident in the differences in human mathematical ability. Possible 
mathematical operations enter subsidiary awareness via the practice of mathematics. 
Many people cannot solve problems requiring partial differentiation, whereas those 
familiar with this operation may see the solution easily.88 
	  
If mathematics were completely explicit it would follow that anyone could grasp even 
the most difficult mathematical theories, which is clearly not the case. The arguments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Ibid. p. 104-117 
88 A parallel to judgement can be drawn here – judgement is a faculty that cannot be explicitly taught but 
one may learn to exercise it. In terms of the necessity of judgement in science (discussed in section 3.1.3), 
scientific judgement is a (partially) tacit capacity of the scientist. The tacit nature of this judgement 
illuminates the possibility that some judges are better than others, and judgement is something that is not 
necessarily an a priori explicit process. Judgements may be explicated and justified a posteriori, i.e. after 
the fact, however this may not reflect the actual cognitive process involved. 
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presented above apply specifically to mathematics, but similar arguments apply for all 
aspects of intelligence, ranging from science to the arts, to things in between – like 
medicine.89 Because aspects of medical knowledge are inarticulate, the requirement of 
explicit justification for knowledge that is primarily tacit may be counter productive. An 
example might be the use of detailed explicit and “objective” criteria for the assessment 
of interpersonal skills in medical education (e.g. an OSCE), where the assessor is likely 
to have a tacit impression of whether a candidate excelled well before they tally the 
score on the mark sheet. 
	  
3.2.6 The Persistence of Tacit Knowledge 
	  
Polanyi investigates the role of logic in discovery noting that: 
	  
The irreversible character of discovery suggests that no solution of a problem 
can be accredited as a discovery if it is achieved by a procedure following 
definite rules. For such a procedure would be reversible in the sense that it 
could be traced back stepwise to its beginning and repeated at will any number 
of times, like any arithmetical computation. Accordingly, any strictly 
formalised procedure would also be excluded as a means of achieving 
discovery.90 
	  
Because there is no explicit logical pathway from problem to solution in novel 
discovery, discovery is not purely logical and there is a “logical gap” that must be 
bridged by the discoverer. Polanyi believes discovery can be attributed to heuristic 
tension and resolution whereby the discoverer is “illuminated” and the solution becomes 
clear. He recognises the creativity inherent to any discovery, and the logical gap reflects 
aspects that are not conducive to formalisation and are therefore more aptly considered 
tacit.91 The genius is able to traverse this logical gap allowing them to find solutions 
that are not available to the “non-genius”, who is less creative and has more difficulty 
negotiating this impasse.92 
	  
Even in the most explicit realms, there are tacit elements required for knowledge to 
have any meaning or practical usage. It is not possible to have purely explicit 
knowledge, which could be considered “objective”, because knowledge requires our 
ability to make meanings, which is above explicit language and the ways we perceive it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The role of tacit knowledge in medicine will be explored following a description of the general-
particular dimension. 
90 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 123 
91 The same could be said of clinical judgment. 
92 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 117-124 
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While it might be possible to partially explicate the tacit, for example using a novel to 
describe aspects of being in love (if you are skilled at explication you may do it better), 
it is not possible to translate the myriad of experiential possibilities into words because 
we are not aware of everything we know (definitely not at any one time) and language 
is limited. As a result, any theory of knowledge that does not recognise knowledge 
forms that cannot be spoken of is incomplete. In medicine, frameworks may overlook 
the possibility of tacit knowledge, resulting in them placing undue emphasis on explicit 
justification (e.g. EBM). 
	  
3.3 The General-Particular Dimension of Knowledge 
	  
The general-particular dimension of knowledge recognises that knowledge varies in its 
generality, referring to all (or many) things of a certain kind, or to individuals or groups 
within a particular kind. Much of science is about forming general knowledge by 
investigating particular instances and making generalisations about them.93 Particular 
knowledge is closely related to day-to-day human experience in that a lot of our 
knowledge is highly specific to us. For example I know where I live, what foods I enjoy, 
and the names of my friends. 
	  
Like the explicit-tacit dimension, the general-particular dimension is variable, with the 
generalised theories of science (or normative ethics) at one end, and more specific 
knowledge at the other. Not all generalised knowledge is scientific; for example that 
murder is (to my knowledge) illegal all over the world.94 That “murder is illegal in New 
Zealand” is a slightly less generalised version of the previous statement. The degree 
knowledge is generalised is related to how much that knowledge relies on assumptions 
made, and what the knowledge claim is intended to encapsulate. For example the effects 
of a drug can be determined based on observations of a small sample, and many of the 
methodological constraints and statistical analyses have to do with making 
generalisations from this particular sample. Knowledge from observations would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 The presumption that the same mechanism exists in every particular case is inherent in Popperian 
falsifiability. If something can be demonstrated in a random selection of cases, it is possible to make 
generalisations from the limited number of “particulars” investigated. 
94 But whether a killing is a murder falls into a jurisprudential gap that will inevitably consider particular 
and possibly tacit aspects of the killing (e.g. malicious intent, which is likely to be appraised tacitly by a 
jury). 
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particular knowledge of that sample,95 but when the scientist makes a generalisation to 
encapsulate all humans, the knowledge becomes more general.  
	  
3.3.1 On the Need for Justification 
	  
In terms of knowledge as a “justified, true belief” the general-particular dimension 
poses a problem, as the extent to which knowledge must be justified is related to the 
degree of generalisation inherent in it. Where there is a high degree of generalisation 
like in science, justification is very important and maxims exist that stipulate standards 
of rigour and evidence. Particular knowledge is different in that one may stake a claim 
to particular knowledge on the basis of very little justification, which can be a single 
observation of a particular event. For example, because I saw ice on the path on my 
walk to the library this morning, I am entitled to say I know the (water) temperature on 
that particular occasion was below zero degrees Celsius.96  
	  
Generalisation in science requires an abstraction where characteristics of interest are 
isolated to establish relationships independently of other characteristics. In an RCT, the 
abstraction is framed by a small number of measured variables (e.g. blood pressure, age, 
etc.). There will be other variables (e.g. name, eye colour, favourite food etc.) that are 
excluded and attempts will be made to minimise confounding caused by them (e.g. the 
process of randomisation).97 Abstraction means generalised knowledge has a low level 
of detail, but is applicable to more instances of the thing(s) it refers to. This is in 
contrast to particular knowledge, which has a lot of detail because non-abstracted 
characteristics are not excluded, but it is not broadly applicable.  
	  
A problem related to the requirement of justification (in terms of “justified, true belief”) 
is this view can falsely lead to the impression that more justification is equivalent to 
better knowledge. Because of the general-particular dimension there is a differential in 
the need for justification. For example, alternative approaches (general vs. particular) of 
getting to know someone’s name would be to: refer to a survey and choose the most 
common name (a generalised approach); or you could ask their name, going about it in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 To the extent of the accuracy of measurement and the extent that abstractions represent the “real” 
situation. 
96 This deductive reasoning, where I have prior (general) knowledge of thermodynamic principles and the 
freezing point of water, which is applied to the particular situation. 
97 Those variables that are excluded from the abstraction are implicitly considered as less important than 
the abstraction defining variables. 
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a particular manner. Often, the justification required to “know” does not involve 
systematic surveys and rigorous methodologies, however frameworks may relegate 
particular knowledge where rigorous justification is prioritised.98 
 
3.4 Personal Knowledge and the Centrality of Expertise 
	  
That knowledge is personal and cannot exist independently of the knower has a 
consequence for the role of expertise. Some systems of knowledge that value 
“objectivity” (e.g. EBM) dismiss expert knowledge as unreliable because it is 
“subjective”.99 This thesis claims experts are the knowers of their field and should be 
valued as such. Experts are experts because they posses the relevant explicit knowledge 
from “objective” scientific studies, textbooks and what have you. They also have the 
tacit knowledge required of their discipline, which cannot readily be recorded or 
transferred explicitly. Because experts have tacit knowledge, they are able to know 
much more than can be recorded in abstract forms. What is more, experts are able to 
know things (tacitly) without any explicit justification for doing so. This is seen 
regularly in medicine where physicians make the right decisions in difficult 
circumstances based on their “gut feeling” or “intuition”. Since experts are potentially 
more knowledgeable than purely explicit knowledge forms, there is a central role for 
expert knowledge in medicine, the legitimation of which will be discussed in chapter 
six. 
	  
3.5 Knowledge in Biomedical Science 
	  
Fundamental to science is the importance of having a clear and explicit understanding 
of the subject matter. This is a requirement for the abstractions needed to make 
generalisations. The degree to which an entity (or phenomenon) may be investigated 
scientifically is directly related to how well that thing can be described in the language 
of science. Things that do not yield succinct, explicit characterisation (e.g. beauty) are 
less suited to scientific investigation than things that are inherently standardised (e.g. 
hydrogen atoms). As a result, scientific knowledge is inherently and completely explicit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Another situation where justification to the extent expected of science is not as necessary is where 
relationships are strong and direct (e.g. an extradural hematoma causing raised ICP and death). 
99 EBMWG (1992). 
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knowledge.100 Tacit knowledge does not yield to scientific investigation because it is 
less readily articulated and abstracted. 
	  
In terms of the general-particular dimension, science is predominantly generalised. In 
biomedical science, knowledge is restricted to the general largely as a result of the 
available investigative technologies – RCTs are not capable of detecting variations 
between individual subjects.101 Developments such as N of 1 studies and genomic 
investigations offer the possibility of developing and expanding particular knowledge in 
biomedical science, i.e. knowledge that is applicable to the individual patient.102  
	  
Qualitative studies provide a possible avenue to broaden the scope of scientific 
knowledge to include explicable, but non-quantifiable factors. This is unlike 
quantitative science, as qualitative investigation does not rely on the explicit 
measurement of variables to provide results. The implementation of qualitative studies 
is limited however, by perceptions of the need for epistemic rigor (which generally 
involves numerical calculation).103 
	  
3.6 Knowledge in Medicine 
	  
Tacit knowledge in medicine has been discussed elsewhere, 104 but often without the 
added consideration of particular knowledge. The role of tacit and particular knowledge 
in medicine is seen in medical education. The preceding section discussed that scientific 
knowledge is generalised and explicit so that, if medicine were about scientific 
knowledge only, it would follow that medical education would be purely theoretical. If 
this were the case, once students had passed their written exams only, they would be 
fully knowledgeable and competent physicians. This is not the reality of medical 
education. In New Zealand medical students undergo three initial years of dominantly 
theoretical studies (mainly explicit knowledge) before commencing a three-year 
apprenticeship of primarily practical studies geared at acquiring the required tacit 
medical knowledge. Medical exams consist of written components and also practical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 This is science as it is communicated (e.g. in textbooks). Scientists possess and rely heavily on their 
own tacit scientific knowledge. 
101 Kravitz, R. L., N. Duan and J. Braslow (2004).  
102 de Leon, J. M. D. (2012).  
103 This will be discussed later in the thesis. 
104 Goldman, G. M. (1990).  
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examinations whereby the student’s tacit knowledge is put to the test, and a doctor is 
competent only once they have adequate medical knowledge in all dimensions. 
	  
Tacit medical knowledge ranges from the skilful knowledge of the surgeon, to the 
judgement of the diagnostician, or the empathetic knowledge of a caring physician. An 
example of tacit medical knowledge used by Polanyi is the attainment of anatomical 
knowledge, which he believes is an ineffable process. 
	  
The medical student first learns a list of bones, arteries, nerves and viscera 
which constitutes systematic anatomy. This is hard on the memory, but mostly 
presents no difficulty to the understanding, for the characteristic parts of the 
body can usually be clearly identified by diagrams. The major difficulty in the 
understanding, and hence in the teaching of anatomy, arises in respect to the 
intricate three-dimensional network of organs closely packed inside the body, 
of which no diagram can give an adequate representation. Even dissection, 
which lays bare a region and its organs by removing the parts overlaying it, 
does not demonstrate more than one aspect of that region. It is left to the 
imagination to reconstruct from such experience the three-dimensional picture 
of the exposed area as it existed on the unopened body, and to explore mentally 
its connections with adjoining unexposed areas around it and below it. The kind 
of knowledge which an experienced surgeon possesses of the regions on which 
he operates is therefore ineffable knowledge.105 
	  
The ability to construct a mental, three-dimensional image of the body is but one of 
many such examples of tacit knowledge in medicine. In fact, due to the spectral nature 
of knowledge, all medical knowledge has at least some tacit component – just as tacit 
knowledge can be partially explicated. 
	  
The role of particular knowledge in medicine is also dominant in that, in practice, 
medicine is primarily about the application of its knowledge to the individual patient’s 
suffering. Chapter four will provide examples of functions of explicit, tacit, general and 
particular knowledge forms in medicine. 
	  
3.7 Knowledge in Suffering 
	  
Knowledge in suffering is very important in this thesis given that knowledge determines 
a rational practice (like medicine) and the amelioration of suffering is medicine’s 
primary goal. Suffering cannot be completely understood by science because scientific 
knowledge largely excludes tacit and particular knowledge and these knowledge forms 
(as well as explicit and general knowledge) are of utmost importance in the experience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 88-89 
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and therefore amelioration of suffering in persons.106 This means the knowledge that is 
important in medicine is broader than just scientific knowledge. Tacit knowledge in 
suffering has been implicitly referred to by Cassell in his characterisation of suffering as 
something that is holistic and often unknown,107 and also by Gillett when he discusses 
suffering where there are “no words to speak” of it.108 
	  
I know about myself and this knowledge may be explicated into language or require a 
tacit understanding, whether particular to me or shared by others. What causes me to 
suffer is my awareness of things, both focally and subsidiarily, that I perceive to 
threaten my personhood (i.e. my personal knowledge) and could include that “I have 
terminal cancer” (rather explicit) or that “I am sad, but don’t know why” (tacit). This 
knowledge may be generalised, for example death is widely considered to be bad for the 
person. It will also have particular aspects, such as cultural or personal beliefs of death. 
In this light, the holistic experience of suffering is a kind of knowledge in itself – the 
sufferer knows she suffers and may be aware of some salient and even inexpressible 
aspects of that.  
	  
The knowledge of those attending to suffering also varies. I need a physician with a 
thorough grasp of explicit-general medical knowledge of the bodily causes of suffering 
(i.e. disease), but also someone who can relate to me as a unique person at a level above 
the explicit content of our interactions (particular-tacit knowledge). Because the 
experience and amelioration of suffering depends on all the dimensions of knowledge it 
follows that to properly serve its goals, medicine must recognise and use all forms of 
knowledge. Medicine is not serving its ends by emphasising one kind of knowledge at 
the expense of others because a balance is required for effective practice. Through the 
lens of the medical telos, philosophies that encourage exclusion of knowledge about 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 This was alluded to in section 2.4. 
107 Cassell, E. J. (2004). p. 29-45 
108 Gillett, G. (2004). p. 83-89 
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3.8 Conclusions 
	  
The theory presented in this chapter presents two dimensions of knowledge: the 
explicit-tacit and general-particular. Over time, medicine has come to highly value 
scientific knowledge, possibly at the expense of seeing the patient as a unique person.109 
This has created a tension in that some thinkers have advocated the importance of 
“subjective aspects”110 of medical practice,111 but have had difficulty advocating their 
views due to the perception that medicine must maximise its use of knowledge and the 
best kind of knowledge is “objective” (and so explicit and general). This perception is 
largely the result of a “modernistic” hangover within a philosophically lay medical 
community where the paradigm is knowledge as an explicitly “justified, true belief”. 
The theory in this chapter unifies explicit and generalised knowledge forms with tacit 
and particular knowledge and therefore undermines the gap between “objective” 
(explicit-general) and “subjective” (tacit and particular) knowledge. This conception of 
medical knowledge is a step forward for medical practice, as it recognises the dual 
importance of “objective” clinical research as well as “subjective” factors pertaining to 
persons. 
	  
I propose that medicine, as a rational activity, maximise its ability to realise its telos by 
maximising its knowledge of this telos. That is, medicine will be optimally poised to 
attend to suffering when it recognises and uses all its knowledge of suffering (and not 
just “objective” forms). Before appraising whether EBM (a specific philosophy in 
medicine), aids us in achieving this goal, I will outline a framework of medical practice 
centred on the medical telos and the theory of knowledge outlined in this chapter.  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 See section 2.5. 
110 I reject concepts of “objectivity” and “subjectivity”. I would instead frame “subjective aspects” as 
knowledge that has tacit and/or particular components. 
111 Stewartet al. (2003). and Cassell, E. J. (2004). 
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Chapter 4: The Discourse of Medical Knowledge 
	  
Chapter four will apply ideas developed in previous chapters to develop a conceptual 
framework for clinical medicine. Medicine is diverse, and consists of activities that are 
quite apparently medical, such as general practice, as well as things that might not 
involve a physician-patient interaction, such as public health or community based 
activities.  
	  
4.1 Philosophies of Practice 
	  
Medicine is primarily practical however it remains important to have an understanding 
of the nature of its goals (i.e. its telos). Within medicine, there are distinct philosophies 
of practice that aim to inform this telos and also how medicine is carried out (e.g. 
Patient Centred Medicine).112 These philosophies are grounded in sets of “fundamental 
notions” related to diverse understandings of medicine’s goals and how they may be 
realised. For example, Patient Centred Medicine (PCM) is loosely based on the idea that 
the patient (as a person) is paramount in medicine. These “fundamental notions”113 are 
central to a philosophy of practice and underpin its specific assertions. They may be 
explicit, or implied by a philosophy’s assertions. 
	  
The foundations of a philosophy define it – a philosophy where physicians were the 
paramount participants in medicine could not be “patient centred”. In a philosophy of 
practice the fundamental notions can be so rigid that any changes to them results in a 
novel philosophy based on a “new idea”. Changes to a philosophy are permitted given 
they do not violate its fundamental assertions, for example if the consultation model for 
PCM changed slightly but clearly remained “patient centred”. Any changes that do 
violate a philosophy’s fundamental notions are implicit signals that it has altered its 
internal framework and is consequently an entirely new philosophy and should be 
recognised as such.114 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Stewart et al. (2003). 
113 Alternatively: “foundational theory”, “fundamental assertions” or “basic ideas”. 
114 “Philosophies of practice” are similar to “paradigms” in Kuhn’s - The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. Paradigms also have rigid sets of “fundamental notions”. Although parallels exist, Kuhn’s 
“paradigms” will be avoided (for now) to avoid connotations of incommensurability and the irrationality 
of science. 
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This chapter articulates a model for a philosophy of practice based on a critical 
discussion of medicine’s goals and the nature of medical knowledge. The fundamental 
assertions of this philosophy are: (i) medicine is about attending to patient suffering; (ii) 
medical knowledge is personal and varies in its explicit-tacitness and general-
particularity; and (iii) medicine has a discourse of knowledge created by those who 
participate in it. The framework developed here will be used to critique EBM, another 
philosophy of practice, following an elucidation of the foundations of EBM. 
	  
4.2 Medical Practice and Knowledge of Suffering 
	  
Because medicine is about addressing the suffering of individual patients,115 all medical 
knowledge is related to suffering in some way. Links between medical knowledge and 
suffering may be direct, or knowledge may affect suffering via an indefinite number of 
proxies (e.g. disease). When seen in terms of medicine’s goal, it is clear the value of 
knowledge is in its ability to assist medicine address the suffering of sick people. 
Something like the knowledge of effective medical record systems affects suffering in 
that this knowledge allows institutions to run efficiently, assisting those who practice 
within them to tend to patient suffering. 
	  
Medicine is rational and should strive to maximise its use of knowledge to guide 
practice and govern what is appropriate in the medical context. In an idealised system, 
knowledge would dictate the legitimacy of practices and could be seen as analogous to a 
currency of medical authority. Practices can be judged as “good” if they agree with 
current medical knowledge,116 but only if that knowledge is concerned with suffering 
and is not exclusively scientific. As a result of this, medical knowledge of suffering is 
the landscape within which those who practice medicine should navigate. 
	  
4.3 Knowers in Medicine 
	  
Clinical medicine is guided by medical knowledge that, because it is personal, is held 
by the people involved in medicine’s varied activities.117 In a model of practice framed 
by medical knowledge, the importance of those players who possess knowledge of 
suffering and its alleviation is therefore paramount. The people who practise medicine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 See chapter two. 
116 This is like for EBM however EBM exclusively recognises clinical research and excludes other forms 
of knowledge recognised by this thesis (tacit and particular knowledge). 
117 See chapter three. 
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are the experts who know medicine and should be recognised as such. In this study, the 
groups who participate in clinical medicine are patients, physicians, clinical authorities 
and biomedical science. Other players will not be discussed (e.g. medical educators) 
even though they “know” medical practice and its goals, and possess their own unique 
knowledge that reflects their role in practice. Commercial entities will be considered in 





The individual patient suffers so is the subject most acquainted with the reality central 
to medicine’s goal. Patients’ knowledge of their suffering is direct, to the point their 
knowledge of suffering is equivalent to their suffering - we know when we suffer but 
not always why.118 Patient’s knowledge of suffering tends to be particular but also 
includes general aspects that result from inter-subjectivity (e.g. cultural knowledge). It 
is also both explicit and tacit.  
	  
The patient gives an explicit account of their suffering when communicating their 
symptoms, social, medical and family histories to the physician. These accounts also 
convey tacit knowledge implicit in concerns, ideas and beliefs. The explication of tacit 
knowledge can present difficulties and may only be illuminated in the subtle 
interpretation of things like body language, highlighting the need for sensitivity and 
empathy from the physician.119 In suffering, the patient’s values and perspectives are 
important, just as explicit facts like smoking status are important considerations for the 
physician in terms of disease.120 The results of examinations and investigations are a 
kind of particular knowledge of the patient illuminated by the medical process. 
	  
The family and friends of a sick person are invariably involved with their care, so this 
framework also includes them, to the extent they are involved in patients’ suffering (and 
alleviation of it). 
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See section 3.7. 
119 Hamilton, M. and G. Gillett (2012). 
120  Tacit aspects are important in disease too, such as the physician’s appreciation of the patient’s overall 
state from their appearance. 
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4.3.2 Physicians 
	  
Physicians are those who care for patients, and primarily includes those who are 
medically trained, but there are others involved with patient care and form a part of the 
physician player in this framework (e.g. nurses, medical students, clinic receptionists). 
These people are relevant but for the purposes of brevity will not be explicitly 
discussed. 
	  
Physicians possess medical knowledge of all kinds including: general-explicit 
knowledge from science but also many other things. In the physician’s synthesis of the 
case the particulars are paramount, and accumulated general knowledge is used to gain 
particular knowledge of the patient. General-tacit knowledge of the physician includes 
clinical judgement, examination and procedural skills, and moral and interpersonal 
knowledge (e.g. empathy).  
	  
The physician’s particular knowledge of the individual patient includes explicit features 
(e.g. age, sex, occupation or previous diagnoses), and also tacit features like the 
patient’s overall state of health and how they are coping. The physician accumulates 
this knowledge by talking with the patient, by observing, and from the results of 
biomedical investigations. 
	  
4.3.3 Clinical Authorities121 
	  
Clinical authorities dictate what is appropriate in the medical context and exist at all 
levels of medicine. The World Health Organisation and health ministries in central 
government are clinical authorities at the general level. More particular levels include 
individual District Health Boards or governance within hospitals. 
	  
Clinical authorities make decisions about health policy and affect what is done at the 
patient-physician level. This may be by mandating or prohibiting certain practices (e.g. 
euthanasia is not allowed in New Zealand), or by manipulating the means to carry out 
practices through funding (e.g. drug subsidisation). Clinical authorities assimilate 
medical knowledge from different sources to make these decisions.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Note the distinction here between the group “clinical authorities” and the attribute of having “clinical 
authority”. This distinction will hold throughout this thesis. 
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Medical knowledge for clinical authorities varies in all dimensions and includes the 
general-explicit knowledge of both biomedical science and the economic costs inherent 
to providing care. The knowledge of population health needs exists globally and also at 
particular local levels. Decisions by clinical authorities have partially tacit ethical 
considerations, either generalised or related to local particularities (e.g. cultural beliefs). 
And any judgements at the local level made on the basis of generalised knowledge will 
necessarily consider particular local knowledge to be effective. Clinical authorities have 
social, economic and political agendas that run alongside their scientific aspirations. 
	  
Clinical authorities must recognise and utilise all knowledge as “legitimate knowledge” 
to accurately judge the legitimacy of aspects of medicine. Different kinds of knowledge 
are inherently related to different things, so an exclusion of some knowledge will lead to 
unbalanced representations and decisions that reflect this. Because knowledge is 
personal and tacit aspects cannot be explicitly communicated, expertise is central to 
clinical authorities. In this framework clinical authorities recognise all knowledge and 
make judgements accordingly. The affects of EBM on clinical authorities will be 
explored in chapter six. 
	  
4.3.4 Biomedical Science 
	  
Biomedical science is the group of scientific disciplines concerned with health. This 
includes the basic sciences of medicine (e.g. physiology, genetics etc.) and also clinical 
research on patients. The knowledge that biomedical scientists possess includes tacit 
knowledge of the practice of science; however the knowledge they transfer to other 
players in medicine is exclusively explicit. This is a characteristic of scientific 
knowledge. It is also generalised due to characteristics of popular investigational 
techniques.122 
	  
4.4 The Discourse of Knowledge 
	  
In this framework players partake in medicine by communicating and acting on medical 
knowledge. Patient’s see physicians and recount the story of their illness and the 
physician gleans clinical knowledge from this interaction. This relies on knowledge 
from biomedical science and actions are governed by the regulations communicated by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 See section 3.5 
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clinical authorities. The practice of medicine can be seen as a discourse of knowledge 
occurring within the players of medicine, resulting in the execution of that knowledge 
and outcomes. A two-way flow of medical knowledge can be visualised between each 
player. 
	  
Figure	  2:	  The	  Discourse	  of	  Knowledge	  
	  
4.4.1 Biomedical Science <–> Patient 
	  
The patient is a source of knowledge for biomedical science so it can learn about 
sickness and how it may be treated. In clinical research, biomedical science takes 
information (knowledge) from individual patients to make generalisations about health 
(explicit-general knowledge). 
	  
Patients also receive generalised knowledge from biomedical science. With the 
development of information technologies, patients are becoming more informed (and 
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4.4.2 Clinical Authorities <–> Patient 
	  
Knowledge from patients informs clinical authorities in terms of the interventions that 
receive funding as well as professional standards for physicians. Policy decisions are 
determined by the needs of the patients at global levels but also by particular aspects of 
localised populations. Patients speak explicitly to clinical authorities when communities 
of patients with specific disease advocate their need for attention to their suffering (e.g. 
the cancer society campaigning for cancer research). They also communicate their need 
for an appreciation of tacit elements of their suffering, such as when patients advocate 
their autonomy or an appreciation of their cultural identity.  
	  
Clinical authorities communicate with patients through health policy. This information 
is explicit, however tacit elements are communicated via the meanings and values 
attached to policy. For example, the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' 
Rights123 is a message to patients that clinical authorities value their rights, explicitly 
spelling out which aspects of the patient experience are perceived to be important. 
Similarly, the treatments clinical authorities legitimise and subsidise is a tacit message 
of signification.  
	  
4.4.3 Physicians <–> Biomedical Science 
	  
The activities of physicians are hugely influenced by biomedical science. Biomedical 
science is central in medical education and its influence continues as discoveries enter 
practice. Physicians are encouraged to seek the newest and best clinical research to 
inform their decisions. 
	  
Physicians also influence biomedical science and may undertake their own medical 
research. The physician’s knowledge of the patient-physician interaction helps to guide 
research and informs biomedical science of areas where research is needed.  
	  
4.4.4 Biomedical Science <–> Clinical Authorities 
	  
Explicit-general knowledge from biomedical science influences the treatments that 
clinical authorities see as “good medicine” and legitimises in policy. It is also used to 
choose between alternative options in funding allocation. It is important to recognise the 
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   44	  
political dimension that exists here, and that clinical authorities’ use of biomedical 
science might invoke motives other than alleviating suffering (e.g. restraining costs). 
	  
Clinical authorities influence the direction of biomedical science by selectively 
allocating research funding. What determines funding decisions will include knowledge 
from patients and physicians (e.g. via advocacy groups or social needs) as well as from 
science in terms of programmes that have been successful in the past. Prevailing views 
affect the allocation of funding (e.g. EBM advocating the superiority of RCTs over 
observational studies), and so do restrictions imposed by considerations in research 
ethics, which limit the questions biomedical science is able to ask and so answer.124 
	  
4.4.5 Clinical Authorities <–> Physician 
	  
Clinical authorities impart knowledge to physicians in policy, which is reflective of 
clinical authorities’ interpretations of medical knowledge in all dimensions, often 
received from other players in practice. The knowledge communicated to physicians in 
this way is explicit (but reflective of tacit elements). A tacit transfer of knowledge 
comes in the form of normative expectations, largely related to professional standards of 
behaviour. 
	  
Physicians and their knowledge of the clinic play a key role in clinical authorities, 
which may be made up of people who are also physicians. An example is the need to 
balance false positives and false negatives in diagnosis and treatment and the costs 
associated with this balance – both economic and human. 
	  
4.4.6 Patient <–> Physician 
	  
The discourse occurring between the physician and patient has been touched on. 
Simplified, the clinical consultation consists of the patient presenting with suffering and 
the physician attempts to learn about it. This involves discussing the patient’s history, 
examinations and biomedical investigations. The patient shares medical knowledge of 
themselves and the physician receives this critically to guide further investigation. The 
physician develops a differential diagnosis in the consultation and this is a dynamic 
process in that responses to questioning will affect the differential, and the differential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 This is one factor that limits scientific knowledge and so should be considered in its application in 
practice, especially if there is an imperative for scientific justification. 
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will affect the questions asked. In partnership with the patient, the physician makes 
connections using their tacit and explicit knowledge to make knowledgeable 
judgements. 
 
The patient receives medical knowledge from the physician consisting of information 
related to diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. During the interaction, the physician 
conveys what may help with the patient’s suffering. This could be a drug treatment, a 
surgical procedure or something not exclusively medical such as a lifestyle change. 
	  
The discourse occurring between the patient and physician is arguably the most 
significant in medicine and its goals. It follows that what is seen to be legitimate 
medical knowledge in this situation is also very important. Medical knowledge in the 
patient-physician discourse consists of much more than scientific knowledge. Non-
scientific knowledge can be extremely important in the patient-physician interaction 
(e.g. empathy), and can be rightly considered a kind of medical knowledge important in 
alleviating patient suffering. 
	  
4.5 The Discourse in Practice 
	  
An analogy to a real clinical situation may help elucidate this framework and its 
application to medical practice: 
	  
A patient presents to her local general practice complaining of headaches. The 
consultation begins as the physician initiates a discourse whereby he interviews 
her to learn about what is going on. The doctor asks questions related to the 
headaches and aspects of the patient’s social, medical and family history that 
might be relevant (particular-explicit knowledge). During the interview, the 
patient expresses her distress and concern that she has a brain tumour 
(particular-tacit knowledge).125 During this time the physician makes acute 
observations of the patient’s state that he may be unaware of (particular-tacit 
knowledge). The physician undertakes a neurological examination (dependent 
on his general-tacit knowledge) and orders a CT scan as a further investigation 
(an explicit result relying on tacit interpretation). 
 
On receiving the results the physician sees there is a mass lesion and calls the 
patient back in to discuss treatment options. The options he is able to offer 
depends on his explicit-general knowledge (from biomedical science), one of 
which involves a genetic test, which indicates whether an experimental 
immunological treatment might be effective for this patient (explicit-particular 
knowledge from biomedical science). Most of the treatment options are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 This knowledge is tacit as although the explicit consequences of cancer contribute to her suffering 
(e.g. that she might die), there will also be factors that the patient is unable to explicitly recognise or 
communicate. 
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publicly funded, however the immunological therapy is not and is very 
expensive (the availability of funding is determined by medical authorities and 
this knowledge is communicated to the physician). 
 
When the patient arrives at the practice, the physician informs her 
empathetically that she has a potentially fatal brain tumour. In doing this, the 
physician utilises his tacit-general knowledge of how to deliver bad news but 
also tacit-particular elements as the physician relates with aspects of the person 
in front of him. On hearing the news the patient is upset (a kind of tacit-
particular knowledge), but appreciates the concern for her wellbeing shown by 
the physician, paying attention as he communicates explicit aspects of her 
disease and treatment options. Due to her beliefs and experiences the patient is 
unwilling to undergo chemotherapy or surgery (tacit-particular knowledge), but 
is willing and fortunately able to pay for the immunological therapy. She takes 
the quick genetic verification test with a favourable result. At this time, the 
patient enters a discourse with the doctor about how this diagnosis and 
therapeutic regime is going to affect her life physically, but also emotionally 
and spiritually (noting tacit elements), and the physician refers the patient to 
further support systems. 
 
The patient undergoes the experimental treatment as part of a large clinical trial. 
Fortunately the treatment is successful and she returns to good health. The 
success of her treatment informs the clinical trial (biomedical science) which is 
analysed by clinical authorities who choose to fund this treatment. This 
decision is made on the basis of scientific results and also the social need this 
type of cancer patient presents. 
	  
This story illustrates knowledge of all kinds in the clinic and how it influences decisions 
and outcomes. This knowledge is not limited to the physician and patient, but involves 
biomedical science and clinical authorities. If some aspects of knowledge in this 
situation were removed (or ignored) the resultant clinical outcome could be very 
different. More importantly, the non-recognition of particular and tacit knowledge could 
have a drastic effect on how this instance of disease was experienced by the patient as 
suffering. The consequences of this diagnosis on the person and their knowledge of the 
situation are very particular and tacit. Therefore, recognition of these aspects as 
“legitimate knowledge” is paramount in attending to this patient’s suffering, even if 
treatment and outcomes of disease are identical. Philosophies of practice may influence 
what are seen as legitimate ways of doing medicine and some, like EBM, are 
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4.6 Conclusions 
	  
In medicine there are distinct “philosophies of practice”, with their own fundamental 
notions related to medicine’s goals and how they should be achieved. These 
philosophies represent different ways of “doing” medicine, and because their 
fundamental notions define them, any change to these notions results in a novel 
philosophy that is distinct from the original. According to this philosophy of practice 
and framework of clinical medicine, medicine is set against a background of medical 
knowledge that is inherently related to the relief of suffering (medicine’s telos). Medical 
knowledge is explicit and generalised and also tacit and particular. Because knowledge 
is personal, it cannot exist independently of the players who practice medicine and 
medicine “happens” by a discourse of knowledge between its players who are: the 
patient, the physician, biomedical science and clinical authorities. 
	  
The next chapter discusses Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) as a philosophy of 
practice that is distinct from medicine’s use of scientific knowledge. EBM’s 
fundamental notions about knowledge amount to an implicit theory of medical 
knowledge. EBM de-emphasizes subjective knowledge, however alongside EBM, 
philosophies emphasizing subjective factors in medical care have become popular.126 I 
conclude that an alternative model to EBM that is concerned with knowledge should be 
sought, such as the philosophy presented in the last three chapters.127 
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Stewart et al.(2003). and, Charon, R., P. Wyer and N. W. Grp (2008). 
127 Due to the nature of this project the framework that has been presented has been described 
simplistically. It could be expanded upon given its basic assertions of medical knowledge, practice, and 
the importance of the players that participate in it to provide a more complete framework. 
	  

















































	   	   49	  
Chapter 5: Evidence Based Medicine and Knowledge  
	  
This chapter discusses EBM and its conception of medical knowledge. EBM is 
concerned with clinical decision-making, and how this should be based in certain kinds 
of knowledge. EBM influences how medicine is practiced and is a “philosophy of 
practice” of the kind described in section 4.1. Following from this, EBM has 
“fundamental notions”, and those that are concerned with knowledge amount to a theory 
of medical knowledge that underpins EBM’s specific assertions. This theory will be 
explicated by analysing the original characterisation of EBM and compared to the 
theory of knowledge in chapter three. EBM’s specific goals will be discussed before 
attention turns to announced changes to EBM. These changes are responses to 
weaknesses in EBM’s original philosophy and whether they reflect genuine 
modifications to EBM theory is unclear. I will conclude that although it is right that 
medicine utilises scientific knowledge, EBM as a method for doing so is flawed, 
because it is philosophically incoherent. Chapter six will assess EBM in terms of 
medicine’s fundamental goal of relieving suffering. 
	  
5.1 EBM: Distinct to the Use of Science in Medicine 
	  
It is important first to distinguish EBM from biomedical science, or the use of scientific 
knowledge in medical practice. Here I will briefly trace the historical relationships 
between: medicine, science, and EBM, and then discuss how EBM only recognises a 
certain kind of scientific knowledge. I will then explain why EBM is not a science in 
itself but a philosophy of practice concerned with using scientific knowledge in 
medicine. 
	  
5.1.1 The History of Biomedical Science in Medicine 
	  
 EBM was first described in the early 1990s.128 Medicine, however, has been using 
scientific ideas and methods throughout its history. The Edwin Smith papyrus, for 
example, is a case-based text describing the diagnosis and treatment of trauma, 
considered one of the first scientific approaches to medicine dating back to 1600BC.129 
Some of the first uses of modern quantitative techniques appeared in medicine at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 EBMWG (1992). 
129 Moore, W. (2011). 
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end of the 17th century,130 and the first half of the 20th century saw the first modern 
randomised controlled trials.131 There were also developments that facilitated new 
investigative technologies, like the null hypothesis.132 Although such developments in 
investigational techniques may have precipitated the EBM movement, they existed 
independently of EBM.133 What this temporal separation shows is that medicine has and 
may continue to utilise scientific knowledge in the absence of EBM. EBM is not “the 
use of scientific knowledge medicine”, but rather, a specific “philosophy of practice” 
concerned with scientific knowledge in medicine.  
	  
5.1.2 EBM’s Emergence from Clinical Epidemiology  
	  
EBM is restrictive in the kinds of biomedical science it recognises. This is partially a 
result of EBM’s emergence from clinical epidemiology.134, 135 Clinical epidemiology is 
a scientific discipline largely attributed to Alvan Feinstein’s work in the mid 20th 
century.136,137 He argued there was more to medicine than a sound understanding of 
disease mechanisms and developed the use of statistical techniques to inform clinical 
decision-making.138, 139 Epidemiology is concerned with using statistical methods in 
health and at a population level. Clinical epidemiology is similar, but investigates health 
at the level of the patient in the clinical setting. It uses techniques like the RCT to study 
the efficacy of treatment, prognosis and other things investigable at the clinical level. 
	  
David Sackett, who published a book on clinical epidemiology, 140 helped to establish 
EBM and was influenced by Feinstein’s ideas. He worked with Feinstein at McMaster 
University while Feinstein was there from 1971-1973,141 and was the first chair of the 
university’s clinical epidemiology department.142 Gordon Guyatt, who coined the term 
“Evidence Based Medicine”, also worked in clinical epidemiology at McMaster.143  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 JA, V. H. (1662). 
131 Hampton, J. R. (2002). 
132 Fisher, R. A. S. (1935). 
133 A detailed account of the history leading up to EBM can be found in – Claridge, J. A. and T. C. Fabian 
(2005). 
134 Jensen, U. J. (2007). 
135 Charlton, B. G. (2009). 
136 Ibid. 
137 Cassell, E. J. (2004). p. 101 
138 Feinstein, A. R. (1967).  
139 Feinstein, A. R. (1985). 
140 Sackett, D. L. (1991). 
141 Spitzer, W. O. (2002). 
142 McMaster. "Faculty - David Sackett." 
143 McMaster. "Faculty - Gordon Guyatt." 
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EBM originated from clinical epidemiology and is similar in its appreciation of 
statistical investigations of health in clinical settings.144 As a specific discipline of 
biomedical science, the knowledge employed by clinical epidemiology does not include 
that from other disciplines, such as physiology (except in terms of study design and 
interpretation). As a scientific discipline, clinical epidemiology is not intrinsically 
concerned with how medicine is carried out (but medicine uses clinical epidemiology to 
inform practice). EBM is concerned with philosophical aspects of medical practice. The 
creators of EBM were very familiar with clinical epidemiology and the scientific 
knowledge EBM recognises comes strictly from clinical epidemiology – i.e. research 
involving patients in the clinical settings. EBM does not recognise knowledge from the 
other basic biomedical sciences.145 
	  
Studies in the laboratory and preliminary investigations in humans form the 
foundation of our knowledge about clinical problems and provide the 
groundwork for most diagnostic procedures and clinical interventions. To 
determine whether these interventions and insights do more good than harm, 
however, systematic studies of their application in clinical settings are 
needed.146 
	  
An example of the exclusion of the basic sciences by EBM would be that favourable 
results in studies on mice would not be sufficient “evidence” to justify prescribing a 
drug in pregnant human patients (I do not dispute this). The scientific knowledge used 
by EBM is limited to evaluative science – i.e. science involving patients evaluating 
interventions (or diagnostic techniques, prognostic markers etc.). Evaluative science’s 
counterpart is explorative science, excluded by EBM and comprised of the remainder of 
biomedical science (other than clinical epidemiology). Evaluative science is concerned 
with understanding processes of health and the development of new therapeutic 
technologies. The exclusion of explorative biomedical science as a valid guide to 
medical practice demonstrates the distinction between EBM and the use of science in 
medicine. This feature of EBM reflects its disapproval of reasoning by 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 There is a view that EBM took clinical epidemiology and oversimplified it, possibly to facilitate its 
dissemination - Charlton, B. G. (2009). 
145 La Caze, A. (2011).  
146 Haynes, R., D. Sackett, J. Gray, D. Cook and G. Guyatt (1996). 
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5.1.3 EBM as a Philosophy of Medical Practice 
	  
“’When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means 
just what I mean it to mean – neither more nor less.’”147 
	  
Elucidating the nature of EBM is difficult. It has been pointed out, that EBM is elusive 
because it has been defined ambiguously by its creators.148, 149 
	  
There is a tendency for some proponents of EBM to duck these questions 
[about EBM] and avoid this debate by defining "evidence-based medicine" 
such that it includes the best possible combination of basic science, clinical 
experience, and clinical trials. In so doing, the proponents of EBM come 
awfully close to simply defining EBM as the best way to practice medicine, 
whatever that may be.150 
	  
The ambiguity of EBM means it is necessary to look beyond explicit definitions to 
reveal their underlying meanings. Difficulties are confounded by changes announced to 
EBM by its creators. 151  The original version “de-emphasizes intuition, [and] 
unsystematic clinical experience”152 however, recent versions state there is “a central 
role for clinical expertise”.153 Much discussion of EBM is rhetorical, utilising colourful 
terminology such as EBM as a “zombie science”.154 This creates further difficulties in 
determining the nature of EBM, as arguments tend to be polarised and points 
exaggerated for persuasive appeal.  
	  
What can be said of EBM is that it was created with the intention of changing medical 
practice - “A NEW paradigm for medical practice is emerging”155 – and that it is 
concerned with the nature and evaluation of medical knowledge. The creators of EBM 
sought to introduce changes to practice that they claimed would result in “superior 
patient care”.156 In the absence of any “evidence” to support this claim,157 they must 
have had some reason (i.e. philosophy) to believe it. Presumably, these reasons would 
have included their (possibly incomplete) theories of the nature of medical knowledge, 
and how the application of these ideas would result in the achievement of specific goals. 
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So, EBM as a philosophy of practice158 must have fundamental notions, which provide 
the reasons why the EBMWG stake claims regarding the use of knowledge in medicine. 
These notions are set out in the original characterisation of EBM159 because this paper 
reflects the original theoretical reasoning of the EBMWG and the “basic ideas” upon 
which EBM is grounded. However, according to the EBMWG, EBM has changed over 
time in response to limitations of early models.160 This allows proponents of EMB to 
argue that certain arguments directed at EBM are now invalid because of these 
changes.161 In my view, this defence fails because the announced changes to EBM are 
superficial and do not represent genuine changes to its underlying philosophy. This is 
because the fundamental notions of a philosophy define that philosophy and must 
remain constant for the original philosophy to exist. For this reason I will describe EMB 
in terms of its original characterisation.162 The possibility that EBM has genuinely 
changed will also be discussed. 
	  
5.2 EBM: A Theory of Medical Knowledge 
	  
EBM advocates argue that all medicine should be “evidence based”, and hence the 
theory of knowledge intrinsic to EBM is not only a theory for EBM, but is implied to be 
a theory of knowledge for all of medicine.163 This is in contrast with a theory of 
knowledge implicit in, say, clinical epidemiology, which does not assert itself as 
essential to all of practice. Clinical epidemiology’s theory of knowledge would be a 
theory of things like RCTs or meta-reviews, but not a theory of knowledge for all of 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 EBM is also described by its creators as a “philosophy of medical practice” - EBMWG (1992). 
159 Ibid. 
160 Haynes, R. B. (2002). 
161 Buetow, S. (2009). 
162 Also announced changes have been low profile in comparison to the emergence of EBM so EBM in 
practise may reflect earlier versions. 
163 EBM has been described as “a school of medical epistemology” – i.e. a theory of medical knowledge - 
Tonelli, M. R. (1998). 
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EBM is distinct from science but highly influenced by scientific principles. The creators 
of EBM aimed to improve medicine by making it more “scientific”. This is reflected in 
EBM’s foundational theory. According to science, knowledge is a “justified, true 
belief” - the first fundamental notion of EBM: 
	  
1. For EBM, medical knowledge is a justified, true belief. 
	  
One mustn’t look further than the name “Evidence Based Medicine” to see this. EBM 
advocates the use of clinical research evidence to justify medical practice, and for EBM, 
evidence is the justification of medical knowledge. 164  For EBM, “evidence” is 
specifically clinical research and knowledge resides in the journal articles presenting 
clinical studies and not within the humans who read and interpret these articles. In this 
respect, EBM construes knowledge as abstract. Hence, EBM is an objectivist 
philosophy because it views knowledge as something independent to the mind and 
external to the knower. 
	  
The second fundamental notion of EBM is that different kinds of knowledge are more 
or less reliable: 
	  
2. For EBM, some medical knowledge is superior to other kinds.  
	  
That EBM places different value on different kinds of knowledge is evident in the 
“hierarchy of evidence”, a tool used by EBM to grade the quality of evidence.165 The 
hierarchy is graded based on how evidence is obtained. Randomised controlled trials 
and meta-reviews of these trials are typically at the top, followed by observational 
studies, with case studies and “expert opinion” at the bottom of the hierarchy. The 
hierarchy of evidence ranks methodologies according to their “epistemic strength”.166 
Following this is the third fundamental notion of EBM: 
	  
3. For EBM, rigorously justified medical knowledge is superior.167 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Knowledge as a justified, true belief was discussed in section 3.1. 
165 Guyatt et al. (1995). 
166 La Caze, A. (2008). and,  La Caze, A. (2011). 
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from clinical research -  
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For superior knowledge to exist, there must also be inferior knowledge. A logical 
consequence is that in practice, the use of superior knowledge should be encouraged 
and inferior knowledge should be de-emphasised.168 
	  
4. For EBM, medicine will be improved by using superior over inferior knowledge. 
	  
Maximising the use of “superior knowledge” is what the EBMWG advocated in their 
original EBM (i.e. that from clinical research). Two other kinds of reasoning were 
considered inferior: reasoning by pathophysiological principles, and reasoning by 
clinical experience - and were consequently de-emphasised.169 Later this assertion was 
revoked, either as a genuine change in EBM’s underlying philosophy, or as a superficial 
response to criticism. The four statements just presented represent how I understand 
EBM’s theory of medical knowledge. The next section will evaluate EBM’s theory of 
knowledge against the theory I set out in chapter three. Later I will explore specific 
goals of EBM’s theory in practice to reinforce the proposed theory of knowledge and 
also to highlight weaknesses of EBM that will be explored in chapter six. 
	  
5.3 EBM and the Four Dimensions of Knowledge  
	  
As discussed in chapter three, medical knowledge is dimensional and varies in its 
explicit-tacit(ness) and general-particular(ity). This conception of knowledge is 
incompatible with knowledge conceived simply as a “justified, true belief”. This is 
because tacit knowledge cannot be readily articulated (or abstracted) and so cannot be 
explicitly justified, and because particular knowledge does not need to be justified in the 
manner of general knowledge. The forms of epistemic justification required by EBM 
means tacit and particular knowledge are considered inferior and consequently their use 
is discouraged. The reasons tacit and particular knowledge are excluded by EBM are 
similar to the reasons they are excluded by biomedical science.170  
	  
Medical knowledge for EBM is abstract and exists independently of the knower. This is 
at odds with discussion in section 3.1.3, which holds that knowledge resides exclusively 
within the knower. When seen through the framework of EBM the deeply personal 
nature of tacit knowledge is troublesome, as is particular knowledge, which includes all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Loughlin, M. (2009). 
169 EBMWG (1992).  
170 See section 3.5. 
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the things I know about myself (regardless of whether I can say them). Thus, EBM’s 
medical knowledge only recognises the explicit and general dimensions of knowledge. 
However, even these dimensions are limited by EBM’s exclusion of exploratory 
biomedical science.171 
 
Figure	  3:	  The	  Dimensionality	  of	  EBM	  
Later versions of EBM emphasise the importance of clinical expertise, the patient’s 
preferences and actions, and the clinical state and circumstances.172 I consider these 
things as predominantly tacit and particular knowledge. According to this account of 
EBM’s theory of knowledge, tacit and particular aspects cannot be considered as 
“superior knowledge” and therefore their use in practice should not be encouraged. 
Consequences of this announced change to EBM (as a “philosophy of practice”) will be 
explored at the end of this chapter. 
	  
5.4 Goals of EBM 
	  
This section discusses EBM’s goals as set out in its original characterisation. This will 
reiterate EBM’s theory of knowledge and will allow me to address weaknesses in 
EBM’s philosophy that will be expanded on in chapter six. Three goals will be 
mentioned. The first was to improve medicine by increasing its rationality. The 
EBMWG aimed to do this by insisting medicine be based in a kind of knowledge that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 See section 5.1.2. 








	   	   57	  
they saw as superior. The second is to do with what the EBMWG saw as a 
misappropriation of clinical authority attributed to clinical experience. And the third 
goal was to make medicine safer by discouraging reasoning in pathophysiological 
principles. Other possible goals will not be discussed. 
	  
5.4.1 Superior Knowledge and Rationality 
	  
“All knowledge is equal, but some knowledge is more equal than others”173 
	  
EBM’s main goal was to improve medicine by increasing its rationality. Tied to this 
goal is the assumption that increasing rationality (i.e. the use of knowledge) results in 
better practice. I accept this claim but argue that “rational” knowledge is broader than 
EBM allows. EBM considers rigorously justified knowledge superior. A conclusion was 
that EBM could increase the rationality and therefore quality of medicine by 
encouraging the use of rigorously justified knowledge over knowledge that is not 
justified, or less so. 
	  
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical 
experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical 
decision-making and stresses the examination of evidence from clinical 
research.174 
	  
Through the lens of EBM’s theory of knowledge, reasoning by clinical experience and 
pathophysiological principles are inferior to reasoning by rigorous clinical research, so 
medicine will be improved by a focus on the latter. EBM does not out of hand reject 
reasoning by clinical experience or pathophysiological principles, but accepts that both 
are relevant to medical practice. However, the context of these claims is an argument 
where clinical research evidence is the sufficient and preferred guide to practice, while 
other forms of reasoning are insufficient and undesirable. Goals related to clinical 
experience and pathophysiological principles will be addressed in the proceeding 
sections. 
	  
In terms of the theory in chapter three, emphasising research evidence at the expense of 
other forms of reasoning erodes medicine’s rationality. These kinds of knowledge are 
inherently different, and emphasising one kind of knowledge cannot make up for a 
deficiency in another. Clinical research evidence is strictly explicit and generalised. 
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Clinical experience and pathophysiological principles contribute to tacit and particular 
components of a physician’s knowledge (and also explicit and general ones). EBM fails 
its goal of advocating for rationality in medicine, as it encourages a flat-world and 
exclusionary perspective of knowledge that impinges on medicine’s adequate use of 
it.175  
	  
5.4.2 Reasoning by Experience and Clinical Authority 
	  
A second aspiration of EBM was to democratise medical practice:176 
	  
“The new paradigm puts a much lower value on authority.”177 
	  
EBM was concerned with the authority attributed to clinical experience and the 
resultant power possessed by those considered experts. The EBMWG thought placing 
authority in “expert opinion” was a misappropriation of power that resulted in the 
silencing of less experienced physicians with equal access to research evidence, the 
ideal guide to practice. There are two reasons EBM objected to the use of clinical 
experience. The first was that it is not rigorously justified and can be demonstrated as 
wrong by systematic research. So, the use of clinical experience was seen to diminish 
medicine’s rationality. The second reason was that it varies from person to person, 
meaning there could be unresolvable conflict if arguments were justified by opposing 
clinical experience. The de-emphasis of clinical experience, in favour of the use of 
clinical research, was seen as a way EBM could fix problems of authority in medicine. 
	  
Clinical experience may be regarded as primarily a tacit form of knowledge, with 
explicit elements. One problem with EBM’s (original) de-emphasis of clinical 
experience in favour of explicit research evidence is that it ignores important 
differences between these two dimensions of knowledge. Overemphasis of clinical 
research is not healthy because even infinite clinical research cannot replace the tacit 
knowledge of the physician, which is accumulated by experience only. The authority 
attached to experts makes sense when tacit knowledge is considered.  Although junior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 In my account, rationality calls for a holistic balance of all kinds of knowledge in medicine, including 
that from clinical research. 
176 Hegemony in clinical authority was also an issue for Feinstein, the father of clinical epidemiology and 
an inspirational character for EBM. He was motivated by the dominance of laboratory medicine in 
clinical authority. New therapies and diagnostic techniques were emerging and Feinstein thought these 
were obscuring the truth, that clinical medicine was not adequately using science to provide evidence for 
the true purpose of medicine - addressing human illness and improving the treatment of sick people. He 
was, until his death, an avid critic of EBM for the same reasons - Jensen, U. J. (2007).  
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physicians have equal access to clinical research, they lack the tacit capacities of the 
“expert” doctor.178 The fact that clinical experience varies does not weaken its value.179 
A breadth of experience is valuable in unpredictable and diverse settings like healthcare. 
Although disagreements occur, healthy argument can generate solutions and new ideas 
(so long as individuals are not dogmatic; yet if they are then the individual is at fault not 
“experience” per se). 
	  
The EBMWG thought denouncing clinical experience would resolve issues of authority 
in medicine because power would be shifted from the “subjective” hands of experienced 
physicians into the “objective” statistics of research evidence. For the EBMWG, 
research evidence was knowledge that existed independently of people, so authority was 
moved away from those who could manipulate it for their ends. This goal of 
“democratising” practice was noble, but failed because clinical authority has not left the 
hands of people (nor has it been objectified). Rather it has shifted and moved from 
physicians, who share medicine’s goals (and possess a deep tacit medical knowledge), 
to those who control the direction of research evidence (which is communicated strictly 
explicitly). Some of these people do not hold human suffering as a paramount concern 
and are motivated by other things (e.g. profit). The ways that EBM is corrupting 
medicine’s humanistic goals through its allocation of clinical authority will be explored 
in chapter six. 
	  
5.4.3 Reasoning by Pathophysiological Principles and Clinical Safety 
	  
A third concern of EBM is clinical safety. Many medical therapies come with risks. 
Requiring that interventions undergo testing in patient populations is a way to identify 
practices that cause more harm than good. Although EBM recognises the relevance of 
pathophysiology in medicine, it discourages reasoning by pathophysiological principles, 
instead advocating research evidence. This is because sometimes pathophysiological 
reasoning can justify practices that are harmful. 
	  
Thus, the observation that patients with ventricular ectopic beats following 
myocardial infarction were at high risk of sudden death, coupled with the 
demonstration that these extra beats could be suppressed by specific drugs, 
formed a sufficient rationale for the wide-spread prescription of these drugs to 
post-infarction patients with unstable cardiac rhythms. However, subsequent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 It is important to note here that tenure does not necessarily equate to expertise. 
179 Unless you hold the perspective that “knowledge” refers exclusively to unshakable universal truths. 
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randomized controlled trials examined outcomes, not processes, and showed 
that several of these drugs increase, rather than decrease, the risk of death in 
such patients, and their routine use is now strongly discouraged.180 
	  
Reasoning by pathophysiological principles is not “sufficient grounds for clinical 
decision-making” for EBM. 181  The EBMWG does not outright denounce its 
importance, however when addressing concerns that EBM does not value 
pathophysiological knowledge, their response is: 
	  
The dearth of adequate evidence demands that clinical problem solving must 
rely on an understanding of underlying pathophysiology. Moreover, a good 
understanding of pathophysiology is necessary for interpreting clinical 
observations and for appropriate interpretation of evidence (especially in 
deciding on its generalizability).182 
	  
In other words, EBM values pathophysiological knowledge, but only where there is not 
research evidence, or when this knowledge is used to apply research evidence. This 
reflects the perceived superiority of knowledge from clinical research, but how does this 
fit in to EBM’s theory of knowledge, given that both pathophysiological and clinical 
research knowledge are rigorously justified? It has been mentioned that EBM requires 
research evidence on human patients, and that EMB recognises evaluative science but 
not explorative science.183 This means that EBM represents a strictly inductive approach 
to medical practice. The EBMWG recognises our lack of omniscience and that 
deductive approaches may go awry when important unknown factors are not considered 
(e.g. in the quoted example). Therefore, according to EBM, evaluative scientific 
knowledge that addresses outcomes, not processes, is what is required for the 
justification of medical practice.184 
	  
Against this view, it should be noted firstly that pathophysiological knowledge 
contributes to the overall “knowledge base” essential for medical practice, particularly 
for tacit functions such as diagnosis. Pathophysiological theory allows physicians to 
draw the conceptual dots between symptoms and disease, aetiology and prognosis and 
the risks of therapy. EBM does not deny this, however it sees this kind of knowledge as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Sackett, D. L. and W. M. Rosenberg (1995). 
181 EBMWG (1992). 
182 Ibid. 
183 See section 5.1.2. 
184 An example of a contradiction within EBM related to this is when it is claimed that basic sciences of 
medicine are in fact part of the knowledge recognized by EBM - “Clinically relevant research, often from 
the basic sciences of medicine…” - Sackett, D. L., W. M. Rosenberg, J. A. Gray, R. B. Haynes and W. S. 
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useful primarily in the absence of or as supplementary to research evidence. There are 
many medical situations where practice can be justified on the basis of reason alone 
(independently of clinical research). In emergency medicine, when a spinal fracture is 
stabilised to minimise damage to the spinal cord, or when oxygen is given to a hypoxic 
patient having a severe asthma attack, practice is justified in reason. When the physician 
informs the patient about a certain procedure, knowledge of outcome risks alone does 
not provide an adequate understanding. The processes involved are also important in 
these kinds of judgements. For example, I could not justify transfusion after informing a 
Jehovah’s Witness of the outcome (life vs. death), without him or her knowing the 
process (blood transfusion). 
	  
A further point concerns EBM’s requirement of clinical evidence to justify practices, 
stemming from the fact that some practices are harmful. In making this assertion EBM 
overlooks the possibility of rationalising risk and that some medical practices can be 
accurately judged as “riskier” than others–prior to evidential verification. In the 
example presented previously there were unexpected harms associated with the use of a 
drug in an acutely sick patient (based on deductive reasoning). This is unsurprising 
because drugs are typically risky. Because of our ability to make judgements of risk, 
there is a variation in the need for evidential justification that is related to the 
“riskiness” of the practice in question. For example surgery is riskier than physiotherapy 
(as a generalisation). Therefore to justify sending an arthritic patient to the surgeon, and 
not the physio, I would require a greater level of evidentiary support (if the patient’s 
problem was treatable by both). As a framework of medical decision-making, EBM 
overlooks the possibility of this kind of rationalisation. The consequences of this for 
medical practice will be discussed in chapter six. The next sections address changes to 
EBM that may or may not have occurred over its two-decade history. 
	  
5.5 The Devolution of EBM 
	  
The four foundational notions about knowledge described above define EBM as a 
philosophy of practice, so they must be stable for EBM to remain “EBM”. A substantial 
change to these ideas results in a new philosophy that is not EBM. Minor changes may 
be possible without violating EBM’s fundamental assertions. For example, if new 
investigative techniques were invented EBM could coherently adjust its hierarchy of 
evidence, so long as rigour of justification remained the ordering criteria. The 
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announced changes over EBM’s history are considerable enough however, to cast doubt 
on EBM’s current integrity. This section will evaluate the most recent characterisation 
of EBM against the original. There are two possibilities. The first is EBM’s original 
theory of knowledge remains intact. This would mean announced changes do not reflect 
modifications to EBM’s underlying philosophy, in which case arguments made against 
EBM’s original foundational construction are still relevant. The alternative is that 
EBM’s fundamental notions have changed. This would mean that EBM is no longer 
what it was when first announced, and that its name should change accordingly. The 
former possibility would suggest parallels between this thesis’s idea of “philosophies of 
practice” and Kuhn’s theory of “paradigms”.185 It will be argued that if EBM’s 
fundamental assertions have not changed, EBM is in “crisis” and is ripe for 
replacement. Both possibilities call for an end to “Evidence Based Medicine”. 
	  
5.5.1 Revised Versions of EBM 
	  
EBM has enjoyed a lot of attention from both critics and advocates, and definitions of 
EBM have changed over time. It has been suggested that there have been three distinct 
versions.186 In parallel to EBM, other philosophies of practice have risen in prominence, 
with many emphasising “subjective” factors in medicine.187 There have been increasing 
concerns in medicine about the patient’s right to be involved in his or her care, reflected 
by philosophies like Patient-Centred Medicine188 and Narrative Medicine189, and the 
attention given to patient autonomy in bioethics. The original model of EBM did not 
account for patient factors. In addition, EBM has been criticised for restricting 
physician autonomy.190 In its original form, EBM had little to say about the role of 
judgement in the physician, which is often acute and very important.191 With its original 
foundational theory, EBM finds it difficult to account for the significance of these 
factors because they are not rigorously justified. Patient, clinician and circumstantial 
factors are undeniably important co-factors to the use of research evidence in medicine. 
Against a burgeoning body of criticism EBM was forced to respond. This section 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Kuhn, T. S. (1996). 
186 Buetow, S. (2009). 
187 Even disease, possibly the peak of “objectivity” in medicine, is recognised to be affected heavily by 
“subjective” factors (e.g. a person’s desire to smoke) - Engel, G. L. (1977). 
188 Stewart et al. (2003). 
189 Charon, R., P. Wyer and N. W. Grp (2008). 
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191 e.g. knowing the difference between a child who has a self-limiting viral illness and one who has a 
potentially fatal meningococcal infection. 
	  
	   	   63	  
describes the latest version of EBM192 as described in two papers from the EBMWG in 
2002.193, 194 This will set the scene for an evaluation of whether EBM has changed.195 
	  
The concepts of evidence-based medicine are evolving as limitations of early 
models are addressed. In this editorial, we present a new model for evidence-
based clinical decision making based on patients’ circumstances, patients’ 
preferences and actions, and best research evidence, with a central role for 
clinical expertise to integrate these components.196 
	  
This version of EBM specifies four factors in medical decision-making (three clinical 
and one integrative). The clinical factors are: clinical state and circumstances, patients’ 
preferences and actions, and research evidence. They are considered as equally 
important and any one may take precedence in a particular case. The role of the fourth 
factor – clinical expertise – is to integrate the three clinical factors to guide clinical 
decisions.197  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Revised	  Model	  of	  EBM	  –	  from	  (Haynes	  2002)	  
On first examination, this version appears to address many of EBM’s original 
weaknesses. The importance of patient factors is recognised, as has the variability in the 
patient’s clinical state and the central role of clinical expertise.198 However hierarchies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 According to - Buetow, S. (2009). 
193 Haynes, R. B. (2002).  
194 Haynes, R. B., P. J. Devereaux and G. H. Guyatt (2002). 
195 Subsequent versions of EBM may be put forth by the EBMWG, however this does not affect the 
argument presented here as there have been sufficient changes to EBM’s presentation to make claims 
about its fundamental notions.  
196 Haynes, R. B., P. J. Devereaux and G. H. Guyatt (2002). 
197 Ibid. 
198 The fact that clinical expertise is the central integrating factor aligns EBM more closely with personal 
knowledge (as described in this thesis). It is not clear whether this change is recognition of the 
Clinical state and circumstances
Patients’ clinical state, the clinical setting, and the clinical circum-
stances they find themselves in when they seek medical attention
are key, and often dominant, factors in clinical decisions. For
example, a patient with an undiagnosed symptom cannot be
readily moved from a diagnostic decision to a therapeutic
decision. Furthermore, people who find themselves in remote
areas when beset by crushing retrosternal chest pain may have to
settle for aspirin, whereas those living close to a tertiary care
medical centre will probably have many more options — if they
recognise the symptoms and act promptly! Similarly, a patient
with atrial fibrillation and a high bleeding risk, as with the patient
described at the beginning of this editorial, may experience more
harm than good from anticoagulation treatment, whereas a
patient with a high risk for stroke and a low risk for bleeding may
have a substantial net benefit from such treatment. These states
and circumstances can often be modified, for example, by
improving the benefit : risk ratio by closer anticoagulant
monitoring; thus, an “evidence-based” decision about anti-
coagulation for a patient with atrial fibrillation is not only deter-
mined by the proven efficacy of anticoagulation and its potential
adverse effects,
7
but it will also vary from patient to patient
according to individual clinical circumstances.
Patients’ preferences and actions
Patients may have either no views or unshakable views on their
treatment options, depending on their condition, personal values
and experiences, degree of aversion to risk, healthcare insurance
and resources, family, willingness to take medicines, accurate or
misleading information at hand, and so on. For our patient with
NVAF, research evidence informs us about the differing
preferences of patients and their physicians for antithrombotic
treatment in atrial fibrillation when they weigh the competing
risks for stroke and bleeding.
8
On average, patients were willing to
accept 17 extra major bleeding events in 100 patients over a 2
year period if warfarin prevented 8 strokes among these 100
patients; however, physicians were only willing to accept 10 major
bleeding events for this benefit. Furthermore, considerable
variability existed among both patients and physicians, suggesting
that physicians would differ in their decisions concerning the
same patient. This underscores the specification of the model that
individual patient preferences must be taken into account.
Regardless of what their preferences may be, patients’ actions
may differ from both their preferences and their clinicians’
advice.
9
For example, a patient may prefer to lose weight,
quit smoking, and take her medications as prescribed, but
her actions may fall short of achieving any of these objectives.
Alternatively, she may follow the treatment as prescribed, even if
she resents its imposition, adverse effects, and costs. Unfortu-
nately, clinicians’ estimates of their patients’ adherence to
prescribed treatments have accuracy no better than chance.
10
Thus, physicians’ decisions for care will better meet the model’s
specifications if they are able to assess whether their patients will
follow or are following their prescriptions.
10
Research evidence
We title this component of clinical decisions “research evidence”
to distinguish it from other forms of information that have
always been part of clinical decisions, such as the patient's
history, physical findings, diagnostic tests, circumstances, and
stated preferences. Research evidence includes systematic
observations from the laboratory, preliminary pathophysiologi-
cal studies in humans, and more advanced applied clinical
research, such as randomised controlled trials with outcomes
that are immediately important to patients. Evidence-based
medicine recognises that such evidence is not “created equal”
and pr vides detailed guides for finding the most rigorous and
pertinent evidence for a specific clinical decision.
11
Because of the sustained investment in basic and applied
health research, and the advances in applied health research
methodology, an ever increasing amount of research evidence
of direct relevance to patient care is available; however, much of
the innovation is of marginal advantage at best, is often expen-
sive, and often invokes risk for the patient even as it conveys
benefit. Furthermore, an increasing number of alternatives with
differing benefit and risk profiles exist for many conditions. For
example, a systematic review of trials of anticoagulant and
antiplatelet interventions for NVAF
7
documents a 62% relative
risk reduction for stroke from warfarin, offset by a 50% relative
risk increase for major bleeding. Aspirin reduces the relative risk
for stroke by 22%, but without a statistically significant increase
in the risk for bleeding.
These figures are averages derived from randomised controlled
trials. Within these trials it is possible to identify subgroups of
patients for whom the risk for stroke varies according to several
factors, including age, history of hypertension, diabetes, and pre-
vious stroke or transient ischaemic attack.
12
For the patient in our
scenario, the risk for stroke in the first year after onset of NVAF
would be about 6%. The risk for bleeding while receiving warfarin
also varies according to individual patient characteristics, includ-
ing age, history of stroke and gastrointestinal bleeding, and pres-
ence of various comorbid conditions.
13
For our patient, the 1 year
risk for bleeding while receiving warfarin treatment would be
about 8%, which is higher than his untreated risk for stroke. “Per-
sonalising” the evidence to fit a specific patient’s circumstances is
a key area for development in evidence-based medicine. Notably,
research evidence is often available to assist with the quantitative
interpretation of the patient’s clinical circumstances — in this case,
the way in which the patient’s hypertension and previous history
of gastrointestinal bleeding affect his potential benefit and harm
from anticoagulation and antiplatelet treatment.
The expanded role of clinical expertise
Clinical expertise includes the general basic skills of clinical
practice as well as the experience of the individual practitioner.
Clinical expertise must encompass and balance the patient’s
clinical state and circumstances, relevant research evidence, and
the patient’s preferences and actions if a successful and satisfy-
ing result is to occur. Accomplishing this goal often involves
Figure 2 An updated model for evidence-based clinical decisions.
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of evidence are still employed by EBM, as this model maintains the notion of superior 
evidence, and superiority is still related to rigour: 
	  
Evidence-based medicine recognises that such evidence is not “created equal” 
and provides detailed guides for finding the most rigorous and pertinent 
evidence for a specific clinical decision.199 
	  
There is an important junction here that depends on the distinction for EBM between 
“evidence” and “knowledge”. In the first model of EBM, it was proposed that medical 
decisions should be based in evidence and not other things. Rigorous evidence was 
equated to “superior knowledge” and “inferior knowledge” was de-emphasised. The 
revised model still holds that there is “superior evidence” (framed by rigor), but also 
emphasises non-rigorous factors in medical decisions. Whether the new model of EBM 
equates “evidence” to “knowledge” is unclear, and depends on whether it considers 
factors that are not rigorously justified as “knowledge”, or as “not-knowledge but 
nonetheless important in decisions”.200 
	  
5.5.2 EBM as a Philosophy in Crisis 
	  
This section assumes EBM’s foundational ideas about knowledge have not changed 
following new definitions, and that clinical expertise, the clinical state and 
circumstances, and the patient’s preferences and actions are not considered medical 
“knowledge” by EBM. There are similarities between the idea of “philosophies of 
practice” in this thesis and the concept of “paradigms” presented by Kuhn.201 Kuhn 
believed that paradigms are defined by sets of rigid fundamental notions that determine 
acceptable and unacceptable ways of solving problems within the paradigm. The reason 
science is thought by Kuhn to progress via revolution is that if a problem cannot be 
explained by one set of foundational theory a change in theory is required. And because 
paradigms are defined by these “basic ideas”, this requires the establishment of a new 
paradigm, which happens by scientific revolution. Such change is difficult and is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“personality” of knowledge by EBM (requiring a fundamental shift), or is a superficial attempt to align 
the original EBM with clinical reality. 
199 Haynes, R. B. (2002). 
200 The theory of knowledge in this thesis considers all four of the factors described in the new model of 
EBM as kinds of medical knowledge. 
201 Kuhn, T. S. (1996). 
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usually resisted by the established paradigm, which ceases to exist following 
revolution.202  
	  
In referring to Kuhn’s theory, I am not adopting the idea that science is an irrational 
activity.203 It has been suggested that Polanyi heavily influenced Kuhn, and that Kuhn’s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions can be considered an argument for anti-realism in 
science. In contrast to Kuhn, Polanyi is a realist as he argues that the scientist’s 
commitment to “intellectual beauty” ensures her theories make contact with some 
external truth.  
	  
We accept it in the hope of making contact with reality; so that, being really 
true, our theory may yet show forth its truth through future centuries in ways 
undreamed of by its authors.204 
	  
Polanyi would agree with Kuhn that science progresses by revolution but disagree that 
this is an argument for anti-realism.205 My claim is simply that EBM is a philosophy in 
“crisis”, and that it is possible to select an alternative philosophy if it more completely 
accounts for the reality of medical practice. 206 
	  
“A NEW paradigm for medical practice is emerging.” 207, 208 
	  
EBM was first introduced as a Kuhnian paradigm shift.209 Though this has been 
criticised,210, 211 there are good reasons to regard EBM as a paradigm.212 Moreover, 
Kuhn’s philosophy could shed light on EBM as a philosophy of practice somewhere on 
the cycle of “normal science – crisis – scientific revolution – normal science”. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Ibid. p.7 
203 The notion of irrationality stems from the idea that “incommensurability” means the merits of 
alternative paradigms cannot be evaluated “objectively”.  
204 Polanyi, M. (1958). p. 5 
205 Kennedy, T. (2011). 
206 It is possible to make this judgment but not by any objective criteria. 
207 EBMWG (1992). 
208 This was a very bold proclamation by the EBMWG, considering scientific revolutions can only be 
seen after they occur, not before. It also interesting the EBMWG chose Kuhn as a philosophical supporter 
of their “paradigm”, given it a philosophy based on “objective” ideals, and Kuhn was explicitly opposed 
to these ideals.   
209 EBMWG (1992). 
210 Sehon, S. R. and D. E. Stanley (2003). 
211 Tonelli, M. R. (1998). 
212 Solomon, M. (2011). 
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According to Kuhn, a paradigm is essential to enquiry and consists of a community of 
researchers who practice according to a set of fundamental theories.213 For EBM these 
include the fundamental notions within the theory of knowledge presented in section 
5.2, but also other “basic ideas”. 
	  
“Paradigms may be prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of 
rules for research that could be unequivocally abstracted from them.”214 
	  
After the introduction of a paradigm (e.g. EBM), there is a period of “normal science”. 
Kuhn describes this as a problem solving activity where researchers attempt to describe 
nature to fit within the conceptual constraints the fundamental theory provides. For 
EBM this would be the development of the “hierarchy of evidence” and establishment 
of journals to disseminate knowledge according to EBM principles, which are activities 
reflecting EBM’s theory that rigorously justified knowledge is superior. Because the 
fundamental theories of a paradigm restrict the acceptable solutions to a problem (they 
cannot be violated within the paradigm), there will be some problems that cannot be 
explained by the paradigm. These are anomalies through the lens of a paradigm’s 
theory. For EBM an anomaly would be observations that important clinical factors exist 
that are not rigorously justified (e.g. patient preferences). Kuhn stipulates that as 
“normal science” progresses, anomalous observations build up, leading to doubt within 
the paradigm as certain problems refuse to be accounted for by its fundamental notions. 
This is “crisis”. As anomalies accumulate researchers become aware of crisis and 
attempt to invent novel theory to account for them: 
	   	  	  
“Failure of existing rules is a preclude to a search for new ones.”215  
	  
Observed discrepancies from theory and fact are the core of crisis.216 In response to 
crisis, scientists generally do not abandon the paradigm and ad hoc modifications to 
theory are made to align the paradigm with observed results. This is done by adding 
corollary theory that does not modify the “fundamental notions”. For EBM, announced 
modifications that are meant to align EBM more closely with observed clinical reality 
can be seen as a response to “crisis”. This crisis has come about partially due to 
observations from philosophies such as Patient Centred Medicine. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Kuhn, T. S. (1996). p. 16-17 
214 Ibid. p. 46 
215 Ibid. p. 68 
216 Ibid. p. 69 
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If EBM is a Kuhnian paradigm, modifications are ad hoc theory modification, leaving 
the fundamental notions of EBM unchanged. The recognition of factors that are not 
rigorously justified in medical decisions violates EBM’s fundamental notions if these 
factors are considered medical “knowledge”. However EBM skirts around this 
inconsistency by regarding these not as “knowledge”, but as corollary factors that 
influence the use of “knowledge” in exceptional217 circumstances. According to this 
view, research evidence would determine what is “objectively” true and clinical 
expertise and patient preferences determine decisions in particular instances. A reason 
to suspect this may be the case is how EBM views the “medical condition”. For this 
thesis the medical condition is the suffering of the sick person because this is what 
medicine attempts to alleviate (not just disease).218 What should be done in a medical 
situation is determined wholly by medical knowledge, which consists of research 
evidence and other factors that are tacit and particular (e.g. patients preferences). The 
consideration of all of this “knowledge” is what determines “what is best for the 
patient’s condition”. The following excerpt implies that, although clinical expertise and 
patient preferences are important and can override research evidence in exceptional 
circumstances, “what is best for the patient’s condition” is determined independently of 
the individual patient, who’s “condition” is governed by research evidence alone.  
	  
It is important to note that clinical expertise and patient preferences may 
override the other components of the model for a given decision. For example, 
clinical expertise must prevail if the clinician decides that the patient is too frail 
to have a surgical procedure that is otherwise best for his condition, and the 
patient's preference will dominate when she declines a treatment that clinical 
circumstances and research evidence indicate is best for her condition.219  
	  
The above excerpt is from the 2nd version of EBM.220, 221 If clinical expertise and patient 
preferences were considered as “medical knowledge” by EBM and therefore worthy of 
dictating “what is best for a patient’s condition”, the quoted passage would read: 
	  
…clinical expertise must prevail if the clinician decides that the patient is too 
frail to have a surgical procedure because this is best for his condition, and 
the patient's preference will dominate when she declines a treatment because 
this is best for her condition… 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Exceptional because these factors cause exceptions and change the outcome of decisions that would 
otherwise be governed as “right” or “wrong” according to medical knowledge – i.e. clinical research.  
218 See chapter two. 
219 Haynes, R., D. Sackett, J. Gray, D. Cook and G. Guyatt (1996). 
220 Buetow, S. (2009). 
221 Although not from the most recent version, the announced changed to EBM that are being discussed 
have occurred at this point. 
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The above passage suggests that for EBM the patient’s condition is defined by 
variations in biomedical variables (e.g. blood pressure). In my view, the patient’s 
“condition” is broader than this and includes biomedical variables and all those other 
factors excluded by a reductive disease framework (e.g. a patient’s desire to see their 
family). Non-recognition of these factors as “knowledge” is aligned with EBM as a 
paradigmatic philosophy of practice in crisis. As just discussed, in response to crisis one 
of three things can happen: normal science is able to account for the problems and crisis 
is resolved; the problem resists explanation and it is recognised but set aside for future 
researchers; or a new candidate for a paradigm emerges which will undergo an authority 
struggle with the existing paradigm.222 I hold that if EBM is a paradigm with the 
foundational theory of knowledge outlined in section 5.2, and factors like clinical 
expertise and patient preferences are medical knowledge (with tacit and particular 
elements) - EBM is in intractable crisis, because it is not possible to consider tacit and 
particular aspects of knowledge “superior” and so worthy of guiding practice, if 
rigorous justification defines superiority.  
	  
Paradigm shifts are a “reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals that changes 
some of the field’s most elementary theoretical generalisations”.223 Recognition of tacit 
and particular knowledge by EBM would require a paradigm shift because it would 
fundamentally change its views of the nature of medical knowledge. I suggest the 
“philosophy of practice” presented in this thesis as a superior start point for an 
alternative, as it’s fundamental assertions (e.g. the existence of explicit-tacit and 
general-particular dimensions, and the personal nature of knowledge) account for a 
broader range of knowledge phenomena that does not exclude knowledge that is 
observably important in medical practice.224 To suffice, this philosophy of practice 
needs development as it has been presented simplistically here. 225 This may happen in 
future work and ideas can be built upon so long as the fundamental assertions of this 
philosophy remain intact. I have argued that tacit and particular aspects of knowledge 
are essential for medical practice and the alleviation of suffering.226 If EBM is in crisis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Kuhn, T. S. (1996). p. 75-85 
223 Ibid. p. 85 
224 The theory of knowledge in this thesis does not necessarily deny the value of epistemic considerations 
regarding rigor, but only when applied strictly to explicit-general knowledge. 
225 For example Polanyi’s account of tacit knowledge is much more complete than this account and he 
presents arguments for its verification - Polanyi, M. (1958). 
226 See chapter three. 
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and does not recognise these things as “knowledge” then EBM is not adequate as a 
philosophy of medical practice and there are harms that could arise as a result of the 
application of this incomplete philosophy in practice (these will be discussed in chapter 
six). 
	  
5.5.3 EBM as a Misnomer 
	  
The previous section assumed EBM is a paradigm with rigid fundamental notions and 
as a result, EBM cannot coherently consider non-rigorously justified factors as 
(superior) “knowledge”. This section assumes EBM has changed following 
announcements, which would require substantial alterations to EBM’s fundamental 
notions (as outlined in section 5.2). Because “philosophies of practice” are defined by 
their fundamental notions and a change in these notions results in a novel philosophy, 
the announced modifications to EBM (which require such a change) means, EBM now 
is not the same thing as it was when originally presented. So it is not accurate to refer to 
“current EBM” as EBM and it needs a new name. If changes to EBM are genuine, and 
all factors are considered equal, it is not clear why this model’s title is based in 
“evidence” and not any of the other three mentioned bases. “Clinical-Expertise Based 
Medicine” may be more descriptive as “clinical expertise”, not research evidence, is 
supposedly the integrating and guiding factor in EBM’s revised model of practice.  It 
makes little sense to single out “evidence” if this is just one part of the picture, and not 
the single most important one. 
	  
An argument that does not rely on the existence of “fundamental notions” is that the 
EBM debate is highly polarised and rhetorical. Each side makes arguments according to 
differing definitions; critics hold EBM is what it was when first introduced (with its 
weaknesses), and advocates point out that EBM has changed since then. A change in 
EBM’s name would realign this debate. Secondary to this, the ambiguous nature of 
EBM, and the fact that physicians (and other players) may not be up to date with EBM 
literature, means there is a disjunction between EBM as defined and as it is practiced. 
Although EBM currently stipulates medical decisions should be made by considering 
three equally important clinical factors (as integrated by clinical expertise), EBM has 
very little to say of these factors other than clinical research.227 This suggests EBM 
values clinical research as superior in spite of claims to the contrary. Surely a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 For example there is a hierarchy of evidence but no equivalent hierarchy of patient preferences. 
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philosophy named “Evidence Based Medicine” distinguishes research evidence as 
superior in some way. It would be a good idea for EBM to adopt a different name as 
there are meanings associated with its title regarding the superiority of clinical research 
evidence that are no longer true of EBM (if it has changed). Surprisingly, this 
conclusion has already been arrived at by the EBMWG (although in over 10 years 
nothing has been done about it). 
	  
The term evidence based medicine was developed to encourage practitioners 
and patients to pay due respect—no more, no less—to current best evidence in 
making decisions. An alternative term that some may find more appealing is 
research enhanced health care.228 
	  
Evidence Based Medicine is a normative term suggesting that all medicine should be 
practiced in a certain way. Moreover, interpretations of EBM are not necessarily 
equivalent to recent characterisations that address its original downfalls. A simple, 
albeit highly recognised, renouncement of “EBM” with a shift to an alternative term 
such as “clinical epidemiology” could be a solution to these problems, resolving the 
tension EBM is causing in medical philosophy. EBM may well have principles that 
assist the critical appraisal of clinical research. However, some of these principles (e.g. 
the superiority of rigorous justification) lead to the exclusion of other important 
knowledge forms in medical practice (e.g. tacit knowledge). The main issue is that 
EBM claims to be (or will become) a comprehensive model of clinical practice. Others 
have recognised that EBM makes important contributions to medicine’s use of research 
evidence, but argue it fails as a philosophy of practice.229 , 230 EBM as “clinical 
epidemiology” would be reflective of EBM as something that knows some-things about 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Haynes, R. B., P. J. Devereaux and G. H. Guyatt (2002). 
229 Wyer, P. C. and S. A. Silva (2009). 
230 Tonelli, M. R. (1998). 
231 This change could also be beneficial to EBM, as it would be able to focus on what it is good at – 
clinical epidemiology. Leaving the task of devising models and theories of medical practice to 
philosophers – a group its creators do not belong to - Wyer, P. C. and S. A. Silva (2009). 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter explored philosophical aspects of EBM as a philosophy of practice distinct 
from the use of scientific knowledge in medicine. Four fundamental notions were 
proposed that equated to a theory of knowledge for the original version of EBM, with 
the exploration of specific goals. Whether or not these fundamental notions still hold is 
unclear, as EBM has changed significantly according to its creators. There are two ways 
of interpreting these announced changes. Either, they are superficial and EBM’s original 
foundational theory remains intact, and hence it is a philosophy in crisis. This means the 
situation is ripe for “revolution”, seeing the introduction of an alternative philosophy, 
and also that arguments made on the basis of the original EBM are relevant in spite of 
announced changes. Alternatively, EBM has changed with announcements, in which 
case EBM has changed its theoretical construction and is no longer EBM. There are also 
connotations of the superiority of research evidence implicit in the term “EBM”. If 
EBM has changed, it makes sense for EBM to change its name. Both of these 
possibilities require the removal of “Evidence Based Medicine” from medical 
terminology. The principle cause of EBM’s philosophical inadequacy is its failure to 
recognise tacit and particular forms of knowledge. This has practical consequences. The 
next chapter investigates EBM as it is enacted in practice through the framework of 
clinical medicine from chapter four. This will involve discussing EBM’s three goals of 
increasing medical rationality, “democratising” practice and increasing safety by 
empiricism, and bring together arguments presented in the first five chapters, so as to 
finally evaluate EBM in the light of medicine’s goal of attending to the suffering of its 
patients. 
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Chapter 6: Evidence Based Medicine in Practice 
	  
This chapter discusses how EBM is enacted in practice by a variety of mechanisms 
affecting the discourse of knowledge occurring between patients, physicians, 
biomedical science and clinical authorities in medicine. The effects on these four 
players will be covered individually to highlight EBM’s weaknesses. EBM is restricted 
by features of biomedical science that limit what it can tell us, which may lead to a 
distorted picture of medicine if they are not mitigated. Physicians are affected by EBM 
but are autonomous and able to bypass some of its failings. This is limited however, by 
restrictions imposed by clinical authorities, who are less able to account for 
circumstantial factors in policy. EBM’s affect on patients and their suffering is the final 
measure of its adequacy in practice. This chapter makes an evaluation of EBM in terms 
of medicine’s telos, concluding that it does not always help medicine in its goal of 
attending to suffering. 
	  
The previous chapter discussed EBM, as a dominant philosophy of practice that claims 
rigorously justified knowledge is superior to other knowledge. An implication is 
legitimate medical knowledge is conceived as abstract, explicit and general, with the 
exclusion of particular and tacit knowing. Although EBM may have genuinely changed 
to recognise forms of reasoning other than research evidence, this would imply EBM 
ended with these changes (and should so be renamed). As is suggested by the term 
“Evidence Based Medicine”, this chapter assumes EBM does prioritise rigorously 
justified knowledge (i.e. clinical research evidence).  
	  
6.1 EBM’s Effect on Clinical Practice 
	  
Chapter two concluded that medicine is about the suffering of sick people. That medical 
knowledge is personal and has tacit, explicit, particular and general features was 
discussed in chapter three. Chapter four combined these ideas and presented a 
framework of clinical medicine as a discourse of knowledge between patients, 
physicians, biomedical scientists and clinical authorities. (Note the subtle but important 
distinction here between the group that is “clinical authorities” and the attribute of 
having clinical authority.) EBM has risen in prominence and has become an authority in 
medicine. Aspects of medicine aligned with EBM are considered “best practice” and 
“evidence” bears a kind of clinical currency whereby it is a requirement for the 
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legitimation of practices. Evidence, and therefore knowledge for EBM, is restricted to 
explicit-general evaluative science. This results in the exclusion of tacit and particular 
forms of knowledge and also exploratory biomedical science from the medical 
discourse. 
 
Figure	  5:	  EBM	  through	  the	  Discourse	  of	  Knowledge	  
If EBM were a true representation of clinical medicine, the above diagram would 
encapsulate how the players in medicine navigate the realm of suffering to address it in 
patients. It is clear medicine could not function in this manner. Tacit components of 
knowledge are essential to almost all aspects of practice (e.g. surgical procedures, 
diagnosis, interpersonal interactions and suffering), as are particular functions, because 
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desires, and hopes). Thus, tacit and particular aspects of knowledge cannot be 
practically excluded from clinical medicine. The following sections will discuss how 
EBM distorts practice for each of the players in medicine, providing an argument for its 
inadequacy that ties together what has been discussed in the first five chapters. 
	  
6.2 Biomedical Science 
	  
Biomedical scientists procure the evidence recognised by EBM. There are limitations 
intrinsic to science. Many exist independently of EBM, and yet in resting clinical 
authority on research evidence, EBM does not recognise many of these limitations and 
may exacerbate them. This limits medicine’s capacity to adequately care for sick 
persons. 
	  
EBM excludes explorative biomedical science, which provides the conceptual 
knowledge for understanding and pathophysiological reasoning (e.g. rationalising risks 
and benefits).232 This is in contrast with evaluative science, which has little conceptual 
content and is mainly concerned with the odds of specific outcomes in patients. 
Exploratory science is important in hypothesis formation and choosing the questions 
that are worth asking. Thus, it has been suggested that its de-emphasis by EBM stifles 
scientific discovery and innovation.233, 234 
	  
Although EBM recognises evidence from all levels of the “hierarchy of evidence”, its 
existence sends a message to biomedical science regarding the value of different kinds 
of research. One effect is an incentive to utilise study designs at the top of the hierarchy 
at the expense of those that are not (e.g. qualitative studies). RCTs are near the top 
because they utilise methods aiming to maximise epistemic strength (e.g. randomisation 
and blinding). Not only can these methods be practically difficult but also they are 
expensive. The opportunity cost of a single large RCT would be many studies at lower 
levels of the hierarchy. Although RCTs are highly internally valid, it has been observed 
that they perform no better than studies that are further down the hierarchy,235, 236 
indicating the opportunity cost of epistemic rigor is not worthwhile. At a theoretical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 See section 5.1.2. 
233 Vandenbroucke, J. P. (2008). 
234 Freddi, G. and J. L. Roman-Pumar (2011).  
235 Benson, K. and A. J. Hartz (2000).  
236 Concato, J., N. Shah and R. I. Horwitz ibid. 
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level the “hierarchy” makes sense, as increasing epistemic strength would be expected 
to result in more reliable knowledge, however it appears this is not the case in practice.  
	  
Epistemic rigor and internal validity are closely related. A consequence of maximising 
internal validity is a sacrifice in external validity, which in medicine, is the applicability 
of research knowledge to real patients.237, 238 It is possible that EBM’s emphasis of 
epistemic rigor leads to a misbalance in this trade-off and is causing biomedical science 
(and consequently medicine) to be falsely assured of the applicability of research 
knowledge in the clinic. The next sections discuss limits resulting from reductive 
causation and positivism in biomedical science, before elaborating on aspects of the 
external-internal validity trade-off, and how EBM shifts clinical authority away from 
medicine and its goal of attending to suffering. 
	  
6.2.1 Reductive Causation239 
	  
Evaluative biomedical science utilises a reductionist approach based on the theory that 
by investigating all the combinations of variables separately, you can build a picture of 
the relationships as a whole. While this makes things easier, assimilating the pieces into 
a complete whole relies on the assumption that causative pathways in medicine are 
simple (e.g. A causes B) and hold independently of their entanglement in complex 
systems, but medicine is extremely complex and these assumptions may be unrealistic. 
Diseases typically do not have singular and essential causes. Disease results from 
combination of a multitude of factors, some unknowable. For example streptococcal 
infection is a cause of rheumatic heart disease, however these bacteria are commonly 
present in healthy individuals.240 Many other factors are important, some outside the 
body (e.g. the increased risk of rheumatic fever associated with social deprivation). 241, 
242 We cannot predict when disease will manifest itself, even when we know about the 
factors we have established as important.243 The reality of causation in medicine is non-
linear where causative chains have branches and feedback loops that affect each other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Cartwright, N. (2007). 
238 Knottnerus, J. A. and G. J. Dinant (1997).  
239 A supplementary perspective of reductive causation is provided in the appendix. 
240 Levy, R. M., J. J. Leyden and D. J. Margolis (2005). 
241 Zaman et al. (1997). 
242 Engel, G. L. (1977). 
243 i.e. it is not possible to determine exactly which individuals who harbor streptococcal bacteria will go 
on to develop pharyngitis and subsequently rheumatic heart disease, even if personal histories and 
contributing variables such as household income are completely known. 
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dynamically and reciprocally. Though it is possible in certain cases of disease to learn 
about strong relationships using a reductionist approach to causality (e.g. the aetiology 
of tuberculosis), that is not always possible with extremely complex systems such as the 
whole human person (mind + body).244 Developing scientific domains that focus on 
non-linear and complex relationships, such as chaos theory, may improve our ability to 
understand the processes that occur within and outside of us. But for know our scientific 
knowledge is limited by the ways we gather it and there is much that science as it is 
cannot know. 
	  
6.2.2 Positivism – A Bias in Science 
	  
Positivism is central to biomedical science. It is the notion that changes occur when they 
are seen or measured – if nothing is seen, nothing has happened. 245  Therefore 
measurement is central in quantitative science. But there are many factors pertinent to 
health and suffering that cannot be measured in the same way as concrete variables like 
blood pressure and oxygen saturation. Happiness, clinical judgement and pain are 
examples of things that are difficult to measure. Likert-style rating systems present 
tempting tools to “measure” these variables, however they are likely artifice, as these 
measures are highly simplified and cannot represent the reality of complex (and 
possibly tacit) variables in suffering that cannot be totally abstracted. Some variables 
can be concrete but difficult to quantify for pragmatic reasons. And some of these (e.g. 
dietary energy intake) are well known (even if not experimentally) to have dramatic 
effects on health. Because of this differential in the accuracy and ease of quantification, 
there is an inherent bias in biomedical science away from the investigation and later 
verification of these things (because science relies on measurement). The consequence 
is a proliferation of evidence for “hard” therapies and outcomes (e.g. the effects of 
drugs on blood pressure) at the expense of hard to quantify variables, such as diet, 
exercise, cultural competence or happiness. This bias is not a result of these variables 
being less important in the determination of suffering, which means there are effective 
practices in medicine that will not be demonstrated as effective by science - possibly 
one of EBM’s greatest downfalls. Qualitative studies may provide biomedical science 
with an avenue for investigating non-quantifiable aspects of health, however these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 This problem is exasperated as disease modality shifts from infective disease, strongly influenced by 
the presence of infective organisms, to chronic disease, the causes of which are more subtle and complex. 
245 Positivism is also central to EBM, whereby the presence of evidence is a requirement for the 
justification of knowledge. 
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methodologies are not at the top of the “hierarchy of evidence” so are de-emphasised. 
Positivism results in a bias in medicine towards practices that are difficult to quantify 
and this occurs through clinical authorities’ policy creation. This will be discussed in 
section 6.4.3. 
	  
“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can 
be counted.”246 
	  
6.2.3 External Validity - The Snark and the Boojum 
	  
In 1950 Frank Beach published The Snark was a Boojum.247 He was concerned by the 
overwhelming lack of diversity in the species and kinds of behaviours studied in 
comparative psychology. To illustrate his point, Beach quoted a passage from Lewis 
Carroll’s - The Hunting of the Snark: 
	  
If your Snark be a Snark, that is right 
Fetch it home by all means – you may serve it 
With greens 
And it’s handy for striking a light 
 
But oh, beamish nephew, beware of the day, 
If your Snark be a Boojum! For then, 
You will softly and suddenly vanish away, 
And never be met with again!248 
	  
In this metaphor the Snark hunter was the comparative psychologist, who happened 
upon a Boojum and “vanished away” due to his very narrow conception of animals and 
animal behaviour. Beach was an influential ethologist, which is the study of animal 
behaviour in natural conditions. This is in contrast to “scientific” comparative 
psychology, which focused on behaviour in the laboratory setting. Ethology could be 
considered a holistic approach to animal behaviour, with other approaches tending to be 
reductionist.249 Beach observed that at the time, articles in comparative psychology 
predominately focused on a single species (the Norway rat) and a single kind of 
behaviour (conditioning and learning). This was in the interest of reproducibility and 
objectivity of results, but Beach was worried that it would lead to a distorted picture of 
animal behaviour in the natural world.250 The problem for Beach was the sacrifice in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Attributed to Albert Einstein, source unknown. 
247 Beach, F. A. (1950). 
248 Carroll, L. (1898).  
249 Marler, P. (2005). 
250 Beach, F. A. (1950). 
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external validity that comes with improvements in internal validity by using rigorous 
methodologies. Usually animals do not encounter artificial laboratory conditions, it is a 
leap to assume that their behaviour would not be affected by this unnatural setting.  
	  
It is a similar leap to assume that our scientific interpretations of health are not affected 
by the ways we undertake medical research. It is possible that the biomedical sciences’ 
desire for epistemic rigour (as encouraged by EBM) is distorting biomedicine in the 
same way Beach speculated for comparative psychology. In real life, patients are not 
idealised and their therapies are not standardised, and the “natural” patient would never 
encounter situations like those imposed in experiments. An example is double blinding 
in RCTs, done so neither patients nor the physicians treating them know whether active 
treatment has been given. This is done to minimise bias in results caused by the 
“placebo effect”.251 The placebo effect can approach the strength of therapies that would 
be deemed efficacious if it were ignored, even in surgical interventions.252, 253 In 
determining efficacy it is important to consider the placebo effect, however in real 
clinical situations all parties are aware whether something “medical” has happened, so 
there will be a therapeutic placebo effect otherwise cancelled out. Because they aim to 
remove the placebo effect, a focus on rigorous investigative techniques may encourage 
medicine to view the “placebo” as something that causes bias and so is a bad thing. This 
is in contrast to an alternative view, that the placebo effect can be useful, is part of self-
healing, and is a phenomenon mediated by the patient’s mind yet with effects that are 
measurable at a physiological level.254 
	  
EBM has been criticised for encouraging a model of population-based care that can be 
harmful for individual patients. 255 A feature of RCTs is that they cannot detect variation 
in outcomes between individual patients. A major assumption of the RCT is 
homogeneity of treatment effects.256 RCT results are presented as averages – the effect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 I prefer the term “meaning response” and its interpretation according to - Moerman, D. E. and W. B. 
Jonas (2002). 
252 Dimond, E. G., C. F. Kittle and J. E. Crockett (1960). 
253 Cobb, L. A., G. I. Thomas, D. H. Dillard, K. A. Merendino and R. A. Bruce (1959). 
254 There is evidence that “placebo” therapies can elicit measurable physiological responses - Scott, D. J. 
(2007). - This suggests a person’s knowledge (alternatively cognitive processes) can affect physiological 
mechanisms important in disease. This is an example of “top-down” causation and is a striking anomaly 
in terms of current reductionist biomedical models. This observation is relevant to discussion in the 
appendix. 
255 Tonelli, M. R. (1998). 
256 Cartwright, N. (2007). 
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on an “ideal” patient. In reality, patients are not the same and outcomes are affected by: 
risk without treatment, responsiveness to treatment, vulnerability to side effects and 
utilities for different outcomes. All of these vary between individuals and RCTs cannot 
detect differences in this variation.257 This is due to randomisation, and also that many 
important clinical variables resist quantification.258 As a result, in a clinical trial 
showing a significant positive outcome, there may be some patients who are harmed 
(and others with greater than average benefits).259 This presents a major practical (and 
moral) difficulty for EBM in the application of research evidence to individual patients 
(i.e. external validity) who may be directly harmed by “best practice”. Other designs 
exist, (e.g. N of 1 trial) that can detect patient-to-patient variations. However their use is 
not widespread and they are methodologically complex, which may lead to further 
deterioration in external validity. 
	  
If biomedicine’s quest for epistemic rigour is in fact a Snark hunt, then there is the very 
real possibility that the Snark might be a Boojum. In which case the claim that 
rigorously justified knowledge is superior would “softly and suddenly vanish away”.260 
And the doctor using this knowledge, falsely confident that they are equipped to deal 
with the uncontrollable range of diverse conditions encountered in the jungle of modern 
medical practice, might also vanish away. 
	  
6.2.4 The Direction of Biomedical Research – A Shift in Clinical Authority 
	  
In a practice influenced by EBM, medicine is deemed “good” if evidence based and 
“questionable” if not. Therefore, decisions of the direction of clinical research (in the 
creation of evidence) have a bearing on clinical authority. Biomedical research is 
expensive,261 and the knowledge generated by it has little intrinsic financial value until 
it is applied.  For these reasons biomedical science relies heavily on external funding. 
One source is (the group) clinical authorities, who direct funds towards biomedical 
science and consequently have a say in what is researched and later verified.262 This 
does not necessarily pose a problem for the teleological integrity of medical practice, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Kravitz, R. L., N. Duan and J. Braslow (2004).  
258 Tonelli, M. R. (1998). 
259 Kravitz, R. L., N. Duan and J. Braslow (2004). 
260 Carroll, L. (1898). 
261 This is especially true for highly rigorous biomedical research. 
262 See section 4.4.4. 
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clinical authorities are internal to medicine so are intrinsically concerned with suffering, 
and the allocation of funding will (ideally) reflect this.  
Players external to medicine also decide what is researched. Some, such as 
philanthropists and charities, do not threaten the integrity of medicine because they 
share medicine’s goals. Commercial entities (e.g. pharmaceutical companies), on the 
other hand, typically have a different priority, viz. profit. For clinical drug trials in the 
USA, 70% of research expenditure is private,263 suggesting that commercial interests 
may play a larger role in the direction of biomedical research than clinical authorities. 
Furthermore, this research is biased in favour of commercial interests.264 Commercial 
entities possess clinical authority because of their role in funding allocation and in 
contrast to the role played by clinical authorities, commercial entities do undermine the 
integrity of medicine because profitable and humanistic aspirations are often at odds. 
An example is the fall in funding for antibiotic development despite mounting issues 
with resistance,265 which could result in a medical calamity if funding models do not 
change. Sometimes commercial and medical interests align, but only when there is a 
profit to be made. 
	  
Commercial entities also play a role in research evidence’s presentation and can 
manipulate this to serve their own ends. Speilmans and Parry discuss this, following an 
analysis of internal documents in the pharmaceutical industry.266 They suggest that 
publically available evidence may not represent the true data, observing that 
suppression and spinning of negative data, along with ghost writing, were used to 
manipulate journal publications to increase drug sales. They also provide evidence of 
disease mongering and market segmentation of physicians, another way the 
pharmaceutical industry manipulates medicine to maximise its profits.267 This quite 
seriously questions the integrity of research from commercial entities (including in 
reputable journals) and demonstrates how commercial entities can corrupt medical 
practice. A contributing cause of this manipulation is the authority that is placed on 
research evidence by EBM. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Bodenheimer, T. (2000). 
264 Landefeld, C. S. (2004). 
265 (2013). "IDSA: antibiotic development woefully inadequate." 
266 Spielmans, G. I. and P. I. Parry (2010). 
267 Ibid. 
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A goal of EBM was to “democratise” medicine by separating clinical authority and 
clinical experience. 268  Because clinical authority has shifted from physicians to 
commercial entities that are external to medicine, EBM’s goal to resolve issues of 
clinical authority has failed. Due to the authority placed in evidence, medicine may be 
in a position where “best practice” is determined largely by profit not suffering 
(externally, and increasingly internally), and EBM can be considered “bad” for 
medicine because of this. This confounds positivistic considerations of “soft” medicine, 
as it is difficult to market and sell “lifestyle choices” for example, and questions the 
actual utility of basing clinical decisions in “best evidence” instead of clinical 
experience and expertise (even if it is “mere opinion”). The physicians with this 
expertise have the interests of medicine at heart (in contrast to commercial entities), and 
the accumulated wealth of personal knowledge in the subtleties of health (i.e. non-
measurable variables) that are inaccessible to the instruments of biomedical science.269 




EBM has affected physicians considerably since its inception and many doctors would 
consider themselves EBM advocates. Recent versions of EBM claim to equally value 
clinical research and other factors, however notions of the superiority of rigorous 
justification and the rhetorical nature of the EBM debate may mean EBM is not 
understood this way in practice. This may cause physicians to value research evidence 
at the expense of other aspects of care. In addition to this, EBM encourages physicians 
to keep up to date with evaluative research, which may mean a sacrifice in physicians’ 
knowledge of exploratory science. In addition to outcome knowledge, conceptual 
knowledge of processes is essential for clinical reasoning. EBM’s emphasis on 
rigorously controlled clinical research may impinge on physicians’ ability to rationalise 
in the clinic and may encourage a kind of “cookbook medicine”, contrary to heated 
assertion.270  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 This was an intended consequence of EBM’s de-emphasis of clinical expertise in medical decisions. 
See section 5.4.2. 
269 This is not to deny the value of clinical research in the investigation of “hard” medicine, e.g. 
pharmaceuticals. However because of this bias it is not possible to compare “hard” and “soft” medicine 
on the basis of research evidence alone. 
270 Sackett, D. L., W. M. Rosenberg, J. A. Gray, R. B. Haynes and W. S. Richardson (1996). 
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In spite of these considerations, negative effects of EBM on physicians are probably 
minimal because physicians are rational and can act autonomously, being able to follow 
“best evidence” when they see fit and depart from it according to their judgement. 
	  
6.3.1 Physician Autonomy 
	  
The reason physicians can practice using tacit and particular knowledge whilst 
subscribing to a philosophy that does not recognise them as such is that they are 
essential to practice. Physicians do not have to be explicitly aware they use tacit 
knowledge, and even if particular knowledge is not seen as “knowledge”, but as a 
person’s name, opinion or something of the like, it is still used to guide physicians’ 
actions. Issues arise in practice when the legitimacy of these factors is questioned 
because they are not considered “knowledge” and are consequently de-emphasised. 
	  
Doctors act autonomously according to their perception of what are “good things to do” 
but with a caveat in that they are restricted in their actions by clinical authorities. In line 
with recent characterisations of EBM, the physician is able to integrate clinical research 
with other factors. However, this integration requires judgment about the individual 
patient and the treatment that will work best for them, a judgement that can be eclipsed 
by “objective” prescription protocols. Physicians are likely to be hesitant to break 
guidelines and policy, even when they think it is the right thing to do, for fear of 
untoward consequences from clinical authorities. Even if policy comes in the form of 
“recommendations”, the physician is coerced to adhere unless explicitly certain, as they 
will be forced to “justify” themselves if their departure from policy is accompanied by a 
unfavourable outcome. This justification may be impossible for tacit judgements and 
such an outcome would be a normal “casualty” where rules were followed (even if 
caused by the rules themselves). Physicians justify medical decisions by referring to 
tacit and particular knowledge as well as explicit and general knowledge, but clinical 
authorities may not be so flexible in their ability to recognise the legitimacy of these 
knowledge forms. The most imposing effects of EBM on physicians (and clinical 
medicine) are exerted through clinical authorities. The next section will discuss the 
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6.4 Clinical Authorities 
 
Clinical authorities restrict physician practice by mandating or prohibiting practices in 
policy and guidelines, and also via the allocation of resources that determine treatment 
options and timeframes. These measures are typically explicit and generalised. EBM is 
useful for clinical authorities as it offers a framework for answering difficult questions. 
Instead of basing policy in the opinions of experts and resolving doubts and disputes via 
extended discussion, basing policy decisions in “best evidence” can provide concrete 
answers, simplifying the process with the perceived advantage of increasing policy’s 
“objectivity”. Although there have been modifications to EBM (genuine or not), its 
application by clinical authorities is severely limited as it is not possible to ascertain the 
patient’s clinical state and circumstances, or preferences and actions, from the 
boardroom where policy is made.  
	  
As with physicians, there remains a degree of freedom in clinical authorities’ ability to 
depart from EBM and consider important factors other than research evidence (e.g. 
social needs). However because circumstantial factors cannot be evaluated outside the 
clinic, EBM for clinical authorities requires the use of research evidence in the 
justification of policy decisions. This has the possible consequence that tacit and 
particular forms of knowledge are not seen as legitimate. Clinical authorities value 
objectivity and EBM creates the temptation to look for “objective” solutions on the 
basis of “best evidence”, which can affect physician autonomy. Furthermore, policy 
may not reflect tacit and particular forms of knowledge and a reliance on research 
evidence results in a bias in policy towards measures that are readily investigable by 
science. 
	  
6.4.1 Personal Knowledge in the Clinic – The Loss of Clinical Autonomy 
	  
She told me she was not going to continue with psychiatry. She remarked that 
she did not go into psychiatry to classify people as having this or that disease 
and then dispense the approved remedies according to current practice 
guidelines, which, she said, are like a recipe book.271 
	  
Clinical authorities practice external to the clinic where patient and circumstantial 
factors cannot be directly considered. EBM emphasises the use of clinical research in 
policy creation, which can result in a loss of clinical autonomy for physicians because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Gillett, G. (2010). 
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research evidence cannot consider tacit and particular knowledge that may vary from 
case to case. Physicians practise according to this knowledge (along with explicit-
general knowledge), meaning their holistic judgement of what is “the right thing to do” 
in particular circumstances may be at odds with policy. Chapters three and four 
discussed that much of medicine depends on factors that cannot be explicated or 
generalised, so the generation of “objective” policy may hinder the physician’s ability to 
practice according to the “best of their knowledge”.  
	  
Some such policies, such as the requirement of safety checklists in surgery, have lead to 
dramatic improvements in patient outcomes.272 The value in these kinds of policies is in 
the prevention of accidents, as physicians are not infallible and may make errors from 
time to time. This can be rationalised in that surgical checklists contain items such as, 
“ensure all equipment used is present (and not in the patient) before closing the wound”. 
Leaving equipment in the body is an explicit accident that is going to generally be bad 
for the patient, and is therefore a mishap that is likely to be prevented by explicit-
generalised checklists. Safeguards can improve practice, however it is important to 
realise there is a limit here, and over mandating time consuming and possibly menial 
procedures in the name of safety or completeness can negate intentions. This is 
especially true when an element of interpretation and judgement is required. The failure 
of explicit policy may be illustrated by the recent scrapping of the Liverpool Care 
Pathway in the UK, an explicit process aimed at improving the care of the dying 
patient.273 I would argue that the “pathway” failed because it attempted to explicate a 
usually tacit process into predefined steps and that the particulars are essential to the 
provision of care.274 
	  
According to the framework of knowledge in chapter three, knowledge is personal. It 
cannot exist independently of the knower (i.e. in clinical research), and resides in those 
individuals who comprehend research. Seen in this way, clinical expertise is medical 
knowledge and due credit should go to the physician who has accumulated this 
expertise. A large amount of this expertise is accumulated through the study of clinical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Walker, I. A., S. Reshamwalla and I. H. Wilson (2012). 
273 Mitchell, O. J. L. (2013). 
274 There are parallels here to the breakdown of a skillful performance when attention shifts away from 
the holistic performance and to individual aspects of it. The pathway failed because it caused those who 
provide care to focus on individual actions that are important to care, as opposed to being focused on the 
care itself. 
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research but also a myriad of other things, like exploratory research, ethical reflections 
and the experience of practice. This is not a denial, but an expansion of EBM’s 
framework of knowledge, as unlike research evidence, clinical expertise includes 
knowledge of the nature of suffering. This is not to say that physicians cannot be wrong, 
or that clinical expertise is uniform, but if medicine is ever going to bridge the gap 
between what is true and what can be known by science, it will be through the 
physician’s tacit and particular capacities.  
	  
Originally EBM proposed that variations in practice caused by personal physician 
factors (e.g. clinical experience) were a significant problem in medicine because they 
were at odds with research evidence.275 I suggest this variation is beneficial given that 
clinical research is presented as average effect where individual patients may fall above 
or below this average, and the tacit and particular capacities of the physician provide a 
potential avenue for optimising outcome differentials that occur due to this variation. As 
a result of this consideration, I advocate for a greater degree of physician autonomy in 
their application of personal knowledge and a reversal of prevailing notions of the 
inferiority of “physician factors” related to this knowledge. This comes with a 
significant proviso, that the presence of personal knowledge is not a guarantee of the 
quality of that knowledge. I acknowledge that there are going to be doctors that are sub 
par, but downplaying the crucial role of personal knowledge serves to hinder the 
majority, who are good doctors and are capable of exercising judgement (and other tacit 
and particular capacities). The answer is not to distort practice to make it “standardised” 
and “objective”, but to reinforce the traditional methods of oversight and good training, 
re-legitimating what was always done and what continues to be done to some extent. An 
objective is to recognise situations where tacit and particular knowledge is important 
(and also where explicit-generalised knowledge can be used). Attempting to squeeze 
things that don’t fit into the box of “objectivity” and science does not further the cause 
but is rather a step backwards. As ideas of personal knowledge develop, we will devise 
ways to ensure it is present in practitioners, but for now, let us recognise its existence 
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6.4.2 Expert Knowledge in Clinical Authorities 
	  
The previous section picked up on the personal nature of knowledge and implications 
of this in the clinic regarding treatment guidelines and physicians’ need for a degree of 
clinical freedom. Health policy also includes other things, such as resource allocation, 
where it may not be possible to allow for such freedom (e.g. physicians cannot request 
an MRI if the machine does not exist). A problem with EBM is that it implies that 
anyone with access to the relevant research evidence should be capable of providing 
competent care – or making decisions about care.276 Currently, those making important 
policy and funding decisions do not necessarily possess clinical expertise. This is 
indicated by the increasing prevalence of managed care programs, where business 
orientated “chief executives” who lack clinical knowledge are appointed to direct 
institutions. These individuals may rely on research evidence in policy decisions. It was 
mentioned in section 6.4 that the measures undertaken by clinical authorities are explicit 
and generalised, and also that because clinical authorities are external to the clinic they 
are unable to assess circumstantial factors. Clinical expertise277 is important not only in 
the clinic, but also in the policy created by clinical authorities. Depending on the nature 
of the policy, this expertise is possessed by physicians and also others (e.g. patients). 
Ensuring all forms of knowledge are represented in clinical authorities could result in 
resource allocation and policy that more accurately reflects clinical reality and could 
translate into improvements in patient suffering. 
	  	  
6.4.3 Positivism in EBM, Bias and the Rationalisation of Policy 
	  
For clinical authorities practicing EBM, the presence of research evidence is often a 
requirement for the endorsement of practices in the clinic. EBM encourages thinking 
along the lines of “where is the evidence?” and treatments can be denied when there is 
none: 
	  
The ministry [of health] said in order to meet the criteria the treatment needed 
to have “proven efficacy through appropriate clinical trials and preferably has 
also been established as effective when applied in general practice”. It hadn’t so 
tough.278 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 This is not so because there are forms of knowledge other than the general-explicit. 
277 Again, this relies on the premise that experts are experts because they know a lot, as opposed to 
because they claim to know a lot. 
278 Pearson, A. (2013). 
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Positivism in biomedical science results in a bias in research evidence in favour of 
practices that are easily measured.279 Because in practice, an absence of the “right kind” 
of research evidence can be enough to deny treatments, there is a corresponding 
systematic exclusion in policy of treatments and practices that are difficult to quantify 
regardless of their efficacy. This means clinical authorities are more likely to write 
policy in favour of “hard” biomedical treatments (e.g. drug therapies) at the expense of 
hard to quantify treatments, like lifestyle changes. Because many aspects of suffering 
are unquantifiable (compared to factors of disease), this also directly results in policy 
geared primarily towards the treatment of disease in patients, and not suffering. As these 
two things are not equivalent, this may undermine the medical telos, and is a reason 
EBM may be considered as “bad” for practice.280 
	  
The need for empirical evidence can be justified on the basis that unproven treatments 
may be harmful and are a waste of resources if ineffective. Although legitimate 
concerns, EBM overlooks our capacity to rationalise and that this creates a differential 
in the requirement for evidential justification.281 Some practices are inherently more 
dangerous than others and this risk may be evaluated rationally (e.g. drug intervention is 
generally more “risky” than diet modification). It is also possible to rationalise efficacy. 
For example I am probably justified in the claim that an unproven cancer therapy 
developed by established researchers, using understood immune pathways, is more 
likely to be effective in cancer treatment than a “quantum booster”282 with very little 
theoretical support.283 I am not guaranteed in this claim, as it may be falsified by 
empirical research.  However this should not discount reason as a valid and useful way 
of guiding the improvement of medical practice, especially when reason is used to 
combat limitations of clinical research knowledge. 
	  
When weighing up the comparative merits of different options on the basis of research 
evidence, clinical authorities must recognise the bias existing in favour of measurable 
and commercially lucrative practices. Because of this bias, a lack of evidence should not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 See section 6.2.2. 
280 The use of clinical research for the treatment of disease is not a “bad” thing for medicine in of itself (I 
also advocate it), but this is a “bad” thing when it results in the exclusion of the consideration of suffering 
because clinical research is the only legitimate justification. 
281 This follows on from discussion of pathophysiological reasoning in section 5.4.3. 
282 Alexander, M. (1999). 
283 However this could also mean that the immune therapy is more likely to cause direct harm, as it is 
known to manipulate processes within the body (unlike the quantum booster, which is likely to do 
nothing). 
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be a reason to doubt “soft” interventions that are cheap,284 and probably safe and 
effective.285 It could be better for medicine to assume that such practices are efficacious 
until demonstrated otherwise, than to rely on research evidence with the limitations of 
its bias. The consideration of research evidence is useful where it exists, but its presence 
should only be required for practices that are reasoned as risky or would pose an 
unacceptable sacrifice of resources if ineffective. For example most drug therapies 
would require evidential backing, but programs aimed at increasing the cultural 
competence of physicians would not.286 EBM makes it difficult to advocate for practices 
that are not scientifically justifiable (or justified) but nonetheless viable, and as a result 




EBM was introduced with the aim of increasing medical rationality and has failed this 
goal because its framework cannot account for tacit and particular elements of 
knowledge that are essential to practice. In terms of the medical telos, patients are 
arguably the most important players in clinical medicine. The creators of EBM said 
that: 
	   	  
“The proof of the pudding of evidence-based medicine lies in whether patients 
cared for in this fashion enjoy better health.” 287 
	  
EBM advocates the use of evidence to justify practices in medicine. Interestingly, as 
critics have pointed out, there is a lack of evidence to support that EBM improves 
patient care.288 Considering the difficulties that would be involved, this lack of evidence 
is not surprising and does not pose a problem for EBM in terms of the discussion in the 
last section. However the question remains, “is Evidence Based Medicine good for 
patients?” Given that this question is unlikely to be answered empirically, this thesis 
attempts to address it rationally. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Cost includes explicit economic costs and also other costs, such as time and inconvenience, personal 
costs to the patient, or side effects. 
285 Some of these practices may be uninvestigable by science. 
286 Cultural competence is a possible intervention to improve inequities for Maori in New Zealand, 
however its acceptance in practice is limited by a paucity of favourable (or negative) evidence around its 
outcome effectiveness despite it making sense theoretically - McHugh, H. (2013). 
287 EBMWG (1992). 
288 Miles, A., M. Loughlin and A. Polychronis (2008). 
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EBM emphasises evaluative biomedical science at the expense of explorative science 
and a consequence is a possible lag in physicians’ theoretical knowledge. 289 
Understanding disease is important for patients, not only for informed consent, but also 
in the experience of suffering. Knowing about what is happening helps patients to 
cognise and come to terms with their disease. This kind of understanding also affects 
disease itself in that knowing about the mechanisms and purposes of prescribed drugs 
affects how patients view taking them and adherence.290 When a patient understands the 
reasons they take, for example, a diuretic, they are more likely to accept inconvenient 
side effects like getting up for the toilet, than if they do not understand why they are 
given drugs. This understanding may mean the difference between their recognition that 
urinary frequency is good and indicates the diuretic is working, as opposed to an 
alternative negative connotation. These beliefs may tip the balance as to whether the 
patient thinks drugs are worth taking, and could have dramatic consequences on their 
disease, especially when accumulated over years of chronic illness. 
	  
Probably the biggest danger of EBM is it encourages the viewpoint discussed in chapter 
two - that suffering and disease are equivalent and medicine can adequately address 
suffering by focussing on disease. EBM causes medicine to lose sight of its true purpose 
by encouraging a reductive perspective whereby its goals are framed in terms of 
disease, leaving the holistic consideration of humanistic features of illness as noise in a 
statistical analysis. Because suffering cannot be illuminated by science in the same way 
as disease, EBM’s insistence that research evidence “is what counts” in medicine has 
the consequence that for those who practice EBM, disease is what counts - not 
suffering. This reductive perspective is exemplified in the paper: Medication 
nonadherence: A diagnosable and treatable medical condition.291 This paper claims 
that non-adherence is a disease entity akin to a lymphoma or blocked artery, and that 
there is “something wrong” with people who chose not to take their medicine for 
whatever reason. Although this idea may be useful as an abstraction for scientific 
investigation, the equation – non-adherence = disease – encourages notions that all 
difficulties in medicine can be overcome with the appropriate scientific “treatment”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 See section 6.3. 
290 McDonald, H. P., A. X. Garg and R. B. Haynes (2002). 
291 Marcum, Z. A., M. Sevick and S. M. Handler (2013). 
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Non-adherence292 is an important problem in health, but advising physicians they need 
be on the lookout for this new “sickness”, is not going to help them recognise their 
patient as a person worthy of dignified treatment (and not as a disease requiring swift 
extermination). The real reasons people are non-adherent are human. Sometimes people 
forget and sometimes they don’t trust “doctors orders”. Medicine’s treatment of non-
adherence (and suffering in general) as a disease serves only to expand the disjunction 
that exists between medicine and real people. Patients are primarily concerned with how 
they are treated, and not necessarily the treatments they get. This is illustrated by the 
popular rise of alternative medicines, which often have very little scientific foundation. 
The recognition of human suffering is missing in a medical care that is “evidence 
based” and preoccupied with disease. 
	  
I believe there are two things that continue to hold back an appreciation of 
suffering and its relief. The first is a continuing failure to accord subjective 
knowledge and subjectivity the same status as objective knowledge and 
objectivity. The second is an increasing denial of the inevitable uncertainties in 
medicine and a quest for certainty.293 
	  
Interestingly the EBMWG refers to Cassell in their introduction of EBM.294 They do 
this but concurrently set out to install the antithesis of Cassell’s message into medicine. 
EBM seeks to enshrine principles of “objectivity”, directly resulting in the inability to 
see the “subjective” nature of suffering. Because of this, EBM is not aligned with 
medicine’s end – the care of suffering persons. Instead it is a framework that in its 
original form, meant the only way to legitimately illuminate suffering was through the 
scientific investigation of disease, a reduction that is not accurately possible. It has been 
claimed that EBM has changed over its lifetime. This may be true, but if it is then EBM 
is no longer EBM. Because it causes medicine to lose sight of its telos, EBM is not an 
adequate guide or model for medical practice. 
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 I believe even the term itself is unhelpful and obscures the true nature of non-adherence in way that 
overcomplicates the problem. A more accurate term would be “patients not eating their pills”. When 
viewed in this way and not as a disease one can begin to understand why patients might not eat their pills, 
e.g. they don’t think they work. 
293 Cassell, E. J. (2004). p. xii 
294 “Another traditional skill required of the evidence-based physician is a sensitivity to patients' 
emotional needs. Understanding patients' suffering and how that suffering can be ameliorated by the 
caring and compassionate physician are fundamental requirements for medical practice.” - EBMWG 
(1992). 
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6.6 Conclusions 
	  
EBM represents a framework of medical knowledge that not only fails to account for 
the importance of routinely observed phenomena, but also creates and worsens 
problems related to the use of knowledge in practice. EBM affects practice via all its 
players and its major downfalls have to do with pushing the emphasis of knowledge too 
far in the general-explicit direction. 
	  
Biomedical science is inherently limited in its capacity to “know things” that are 
particular and tacit. EBM encourages biomedical science to strive for epistemic rigor 
and in doing so, exacerbates issues related to its limited ability to know about things 
that are highly complex and difficult to quantify – e.g. suffering. EBM may also result 
in a distortion of clinical reality brought about by highly internally valid, but not 
externally valid methodologies, and it also causes a shift of clinical authority outside the 
clinic where medicine’s goals may be subjugated by considerations of profit. Physicians 
use knowledge from science but also rely on many other knowledge forms, even if they 
are not aware of this. The rationality and largely autonomous nature of individual 
physicians means they are able to side skirt many of EBM’s weaknesses. However this 
is limited by restrictions imposed by clinical authorities, who may not be able to 
practice EBM so flexibly. Clinical authorities, attracted by the perceived “objectivity” 
of the “evidence based” method, create policy that may be limited in terms of its ability 
to allow for variations in patient and circumstantial factors. Furthermore evidence based 
policy is intrinsically geared towards the legitimation of measures that are readily 
quantified due to requirements of biomedical science. Expertise is required within 
clinical authorities to ensure representation of all knowledge forms. 
	  
The final measure of EBM’s adequacy is its effect on patients. It fails them because it 
encourages medicine to view their condition as just disease, leaving aspects of their 
suffering by the wayside. For this reason, EBM is not an adequate philosophy of 
practice for medicine and should so be left behind. Curing humanity of disease is an 
unattainable goal in medicine, and its philosophy should recognise this and focus on the 
more worldly aspiration of improving the human condition by ameliorating suffering. 
This will be realised through the use of explicit-general knowledge and also other forms 
of knowledge able to illuminate things outside the gaze of science.	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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
	  
Evidence Based Medicine is not a “good” thing for medicine as it results in the 
systematic exclusion of aspects of suffering from the discourse of knowledge occurring 
in medical practice. This conclusion briefly summarises my argument before leaving 
you with a few broad considerations to make your own judgement on the adequacy of 
EBM in medicine.   
	  
7.1 Thesis Argument 
	  
To know whether practice is effective, we must first know what it is trying to achieve. 
The therapeutic success of biomedical science has led to an impression that medicine’s 
goals may one day be solved by the extensive application of the scientific method to 
aspects of practice. Because science depends on abstractions, the treatment of disease 
(one particular abstraction) has come to be seen as the endpoint that determines the 
adequacy of practices. This is not true and there is much in medicine that cannot be 
understood through the lens of disease (e.g. palliative care). Suffering is an alternative 
endpoint that encapsulates disease as well as other important factors in the experience of 
sickness for the patient. Suffering is about unique persons who cannot be properly 
understood in a scientific manner. Medicine as the “practice of ameliorating suffering” 
appears to account for much more of what occurs in the clinic and this thesis frames 
medicine’s goals through the lens of suffering. 
	  
Appropriate practice is determined by what we know about it. As a result the nature of 
knowledge in medicine is central to the evaluation of practice. Notions that knowledge 
is a “justified, true belief” may lead to the impression that to be knowledge, something 
must be explicitly justified and that highly justified knowledge is more reliable. This 
account of knowledge fails to acknowledge that certain forms of knowledge are tacit - 
they are known, but not necessarily articulable. Knowledge can also be particular where 
there is a lesser requirement for justification than for knowledge that relies on 
generalisations. These two, dimensional features of knowledge are encountered 
regularly in the clinic and have a bearing on suffering (they are also closely related to 
the treatment of disease). A consequence of there being knowledge where there are no 
words is that this knowledge cannot be recorded external to the knower. Because of this, 
knowledge is personal and exists within those who use it to pursue their ends. 
	  
	   	   94	  
Because knowledge and the knower are inseparable, and our knowledge of suffering 
determines appropriate practices in medicine, medicine can be seen as a discourse of 
knowledge occurring within those who participate within it. Medical activities involve 
patients, physicians, clinical authorities as well as biomedical science, and these groups 
are in possession of knowledge that is tacit, particular, explicit and general. A 
philosophy of practice can be derived from these fundamental assertions and this 
philosophy may be used to evaluate other frameworks. 
	  
Evidence Based Medicine is an alternative philosophy that also aims to improve 
medicine by maximising its use of knowledge in practice. The original characterisation 
of EBM was founded on a theory that considered justification an essential component of 
knowledge and that knowledge’s merits can be evaluated by the epistemic rigor of its 
justification. This framework excludes tacit and particular knowledge forms that exist in 
practice, instead advocating that medicine should be founded chiefly in explicit-general 
research evidence. Criticisms related to this exclusion led to revisions in EBM to align 
it more with observations of knowledge in the clinic. These changes appear to 
contradict the fundamental notions of EBM which means that: either EBM is a 
philosophy in crisis and is attempting to realign itself with reality by the ad hoc addition 
of corollary theory; or since its fundamental notions define it and have changed, EBM 
ceased to exist as a result of announced changes. Both of these possibilities suggest the 
status of “Evidence Based Medicine” must be reframed. 
	  
EBM influences medical practice and all those who participate within it. Features of 
biomedical science limit the things it can know, particularly things that are highly 
complex or difficult to quantify. The emphasis of epistemic rigor by EBM may be 
diminishing the external applicability of scientific knowledge in the clinic and 
furthermore, the clinical authority placed in “evidence” by EBM may mean that power 
in medicine has shifted to commercial entities who know how to manipulate science and 
are motivated by profit, not suffering. Physicians use scientific knowledge as well as 
other knowledge forms that are not legitimised by EBM. Because they are autonomous, 
they are able to avoid many of EBM’s weaknesses, however physicians are restricted by 
clinical authorities who cannot evaluate particular circumstantial factors in policy, 
which may be founded in explicit-general “evidence”. This highlights the need for 
clinical expertise in clinical authorities to facilitate the consideration of tacit and 
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particular knowledge forms in policy creation (in addition to research evidence). A 
second factor to consider is that because research evidence is biased in favour of 
measures that are lucrative and easily quantifiable, there is a corresponding bias in 
policy for clinical authorities using EBM. The final inadequacy of EBM is that it 
alienates patients as unique persons, instead encouraging the radical perspective that 
patients are fundamentally diseases that need to be treated. This viewpoint obscures 
medicine from its purpose of attending to the suffering of these persons and because 
EBM encourages medicine to seek an alternative endpoint that can be divergent to 




EBM is potentially harmful within all of medicine, but especially medical education. 
Students should learn clinical epidemiology and this adds value to medicine, however 
EBM’s flaws carry with it normative ideals that are at odds with philosophies that 
implicitly advocate the personality of knowledge and the importance of particular (and 
tacit) forms (e.g. Patient Centred Medicine)295.296 Medical philosophy should not be 
taught in a confusing way that expects students to put together a mismatched patchwork 
of EBM, Patient Centred Medicine and other marginally compatible philosophies. To 
ensure the holistic integrity of medical students’ world-view, they require an internally 
coherent philosophy (of knowledge in practice) that encapsulates holistically what it is 
to practice medicine and navigate suffering from both scientistic and humanistic 
viewpoints. A simple removal of “EBM” and a replacement with a non-normative term 
like “clinical epidemiology” in medical education (and policy) may help to resolve 
many of the issues presented in this thesis. This would be in conjunction with courses 
teaching students about the purposes of medicine (e.g. suffering) and the dimensional 
nature of knowledge (highlighting limitations of science). Medicine’s use of science and 
technology is perpetually held back by the results of the next RCT, or the invention of 
new technology. Practice is not limited in the same way by non-scientific knowledge 
(our particular and tacit functions). Medicine does not need invention to optimise what 
it already has – the compassionate and rational physician – and to improve the ability of 
such a person to attend to the suffering of sick people. Although it may be adjunctive, 
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296 In advocating the centrality of the patient, Patient Centered Medicine implicitly recognises that 
patient’s posses their own personal, particular (and tacit) knowledge that has a bearing on their condition 
and so should be considered in decisions related to it. 
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no amount of technology will replace the care that the doctor - as a person - can 
provide. 
	  
What I advocate is a medical philosophy of knowledge that recognises the 
dimensionality of knowledge and that medicine is about suffering, not disease. This 
thesis lays down the fundamental assertions for such a “philosophy of practice”, namely 
that: i) medicine is about attending to patient suffering; ii) medical knowledge is 
personal and varies in its explicit-tacitness and general-particularity; and iii) medicine 
has a discourse of knowledge created by those who participate in it. The use of research 
evidence will remain part of this philosophy, however this must be tempered against 
science’s limitations. This framework recognises Personal Knowledge297 and that the 
physician is in a gifted position to evaluate particular and tacit features of the patient 
and their circumstances that are outside the grasp of clinical research. Furthermore, we 
should not discount our capacity for intelligent reason on things like safety and efficacy, 
even if this means we make the occasional error. Surely this would be more fruitful than 
ignoring our rationality and blindly following the (illusionary) concrete answers of rigid 
and technologically driven empiricism.  
	  
This thesis provides a starting point for an alternative philosophy, however more work 
is needed in understanding the dimensionality of medical knowledge and how these 
dimensions may be expanded and capitalised upon in practice. This thesis, in 
advocating for personal knowledge, emphasises the importance of expertise. Work is 
also needed to determine what expertise is and how it may be evaluated in ways that are 
not exclusively explicit, recognising that explicit evaluation of tacit knowledge forms 
may not be possible. Additionally there are considerations of the politico-economic 
machineries that exist around knowledge in practice, particularly in terms of clinical 
authority and the role of private interests in manipulating medicine for profit. The de-
throning of research evidence as the legitimate form of knowledge, and the blunting of 
clinical authority placed in evidence as a result of this, may be a way to return power to 
those who practice medicine and share its goals. However the issue of 
commercialisation in medicine is broad and although medicine can advocate for 
changes, reform is needed at the global political level. There are currently many who 
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suffer needlessly, especially in the developing world, because profit is not an adequate 
motivator to place health resources where they are needed most. 
	  
I have not provided compelling empirical evidence in this argument for the inadequacy 
of EBM. What I have provided is what I know is a convincing argument pointing out, as 
many others have done before me, the many inadequacies of EBM as a philosophy of 
medicine. EBM may well have come at a time where with the rapid development of 
information technology, medicine needed a way of coping with the growing corpus of 
clinical research.298 Two decades have passed since then and it is now clear, even to the 
EBMWG, that EBM in its original form was inadequate. Rather than attempting to fix 
what is already broken, it is perhaps appropriate that medicine moves on to what will 
become the next “NEW paradigm for medical practice”. 299  This paradigm will 
eventually be replaced in the same revolutionary process that will see the end of EBM. 
However as it stands, EBM is either in intractable crisis or has already ceased to be as a 
paradigm of normal science, and a new philosophy is required. Whether you are 
convinced by this argument is now out of my hands, but as a player in medicine 
yourself, you surely have a role to play in the climate of professional practice and 
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Appendix I 
	  
The Irreducible Nature of Suffering 
 
This appendix provides an argument for the irreducibility of suffering and supplements 
discussion in section 2.4. Although this argument is intended to apply specifically to the 
reduction of suffering into disease, it is broadly relevant to reduction in biomedical 
science. 
 
The Pursuit of Exactitude in Biomedical Science 
 
There is a spectrum of science in terms of its subject matter and the degree it may be 
explicated concisely and accurately. This variation has an effect on the exactitude of 
different sciences. 
 
Exact sciences (e.g. physics) deal predominantly with natural kinds like electrons, 
nuclear forces and carbon atoms, whose properties remain constant and obey natural 
laws. Instances of natural kinds are identical in essence because that essence is an 
abstracted set of properties that can be exactly specified (and any variations occur at an 
unobservable level). In these “exact” sciences things can be explicitly and completely 
characterised and measured to establish predictions that hold consistently and often 
come in the form of mathematical formula (e.g. e = mc2).1 
 
In the inexact sciences (e.g. biomedical science) the subject matter is more vague than 
the fundamental natural kinds of the exact sciences. Their complexity means that 
abstractions must be made in terms of things that are not observably identical. An 
example of such an abstraction would be “a diagnosis of depression”. Patients with 
depression will vary according to any number of observable variables (e.g. occupation, 
interests, feelings of sadness, etc.). This undermines the predictive accuracy of the 
inexact sciences as things may affect the subject matter in unpredictable ways and be 
more difficult to measure.2 This is not to say that abstractions in the non-exact sciences 
are false; however the resultant scientific knowledge would be better characterised as a 
probabilistic generalisation, as opposed to an exact natural law. 
 
“Exactness” is desirable for science and therefore for biomedical science, which is not 
surprising considering medicine’s aim to devise regimens it is “certain” will be good for 
the patient. One result is the allure of framing the scientific investigation of 
macroscopic health phenomena in terms of the microscopic entities studied by the exact 
sciences. At that level, variations between individual people do not exist (or are not 
observable), so there is the impression of greater accuracy and certainty, a process 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Quantum	  mechanics	  is	  a	  sub-­‐discipline	  of	  physics	  that	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  this	  observation,	  however	  
for	  classical	  physics	  this	  observation	  holds	  and	  it	  is	  the	  ideal	  of	  classical	  physics	  that	  biomedical	  
science	  pursues	  (the	  point	  of	  this	  argument).	  
2	  For	  example,	  measuring	  temperature	  in	  a	  physical	  system	  compared	  to	  “sadness”	  in	  depression.	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Life’s Irreducible Nature 
 
“Reductionism” refers to the tendency of science to reduce systems into their 
constitutive parts.  Polanyi argues that reductionism does not provide an accurate 
representation of things, specifically in biology.3 He explains that mechanisms (of 
machines and bodies) are governed by boundary conditions4 that exist at multiple levels 
(e.g. molecule <–> cell <–> organ <–> body <-> consciousness), and that these 
boundary conditions are under dual control, in that causation occurs from the “bottom-
up” and also the “top-down”. This is possible because “principles governing the isolated 
particulars of a lower level leave indeterminate conditions to be controlled by a higher 
principle”5 and “consequently the operations of a higher level cannot be accounted for 
by the laws governing its particulars on the next lower level”.6  For example, there are 
laws governing the levels of literary composition (letters <-> words <-> sentences <-> 
composition of text), each of these levels leaves options open for the levels above and 
you cannot determine the rules or composition of levels above by looking at levels 
below, i.e. you cannot derive a complete text from a vocabulary but the vocabulary 
determines what can be in a text.7 
 
Polanyi applies this observation to biological systems: 
 
The theory of boundary conditions recognises the higher levels of life as 
forming a hierarchy, each level of which relies for its workings on the 
principles of the levels below it, even while it itself is irreducible to these lower 
principles.8  
 
In biological systems there is a hierarchy represented by phenomena occurring at 
different levels of boundary conditions, with biochemistry near the bottom and 
consciousness near the top. Biomedical science makes use of reduction very widely, for 
example to characterise depression as something determined by malfunctions in 
neurotransmitters. Polanyi would argue it is not possible to sufficiently understand 
depression from the level of biochemistry, as it is a phenomenon governed by rules at 
the higher level of consciousness. This is not to imply any violation of “biochemical 
laws”; however changes in biochemistry in depression would be argued as only part of 
depression (and possibly not the causal part), which would be presented as something  
that is determined primarily at the level of consciousness, 9  “the mind harnesses 
neurophysiological mechanisms and is not determined by them”.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Polanyi,	  M.	  (1968).	  
4	  Boundary	  conditions	  occur	  when	  systems	  (mechanical,	  physical	  or	  otherwise)	  and	  the	  restrictive	  
laws	  that	  govern	  them	  are	  pushed	  to	  their	  limits	  producing	  phenomena	  that	  can	  be	  useful.	  They	  can	  
be	  looked	  at	  i)	  intrinsically	  -­‐	  how	  they	  restrict	  the	  entities	  at	  the	  level	  the	  system’s	  laws	  refer	  to	  e.g.	  
an	  experimenter	  imposes	  boundary	  conditions	  by	  supercooling	  a	  liquid	  in	  order	  to	  learn	  about	  its	  
thermodynamic	  properties	  or	  ii)	  instrumentally	  -­‐	  how	  they	  can	  be	  manipulated	  in	  order	  to	  create	  
phenomena	  at	  the	  level	  above	  e.g.	  the	  engineer	  imposes	  mechanical	  boundary	  conditions	  by	  
maximising	  the	  load	  on	  a	  cable	  to	  build	  a	  bridge.	  




9	  A	  logical	  conclusion	  here	  would	  be	  that	  attempts	  to	  correct	  depression	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
consciousness	  by	  correcting	  biochemistry	  at	  the	  molecular	  level	  presents	  an	  indirect	  intervention	  
and	  it	  could	  be	  more	  fruitful	  to	  approach	  the	  problem	  from	  the	  level	  of	  the	  phenomena,	  i.e.	  
consciousness.	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Polanyi’s critique of reductionism is similar in structure to his argument for tacit 
knowledge. He argues that when attempting to learn about one level and the focus shifts 
(or is reduced) to the lower level, there is a loss in ability to fully understand the higher 
level - akin to the breakdown of a skill when focus shifts.11 However focussing on the 
higher level does not have to result in the exclusion of lower ones. When investigating a 
phenomenon in science, the focus on the highest level must be borne in mind, whilst 
keeping note of important factors at lower levels, as both need to be understood.12 
 
The claims made following the discovery of DNA, to the effect that all study of 
life could be reduced eventually to molecular biology, have shown once more 
that the Laplacean idea of universal knowledge is still the theoretical ideal of 
the natural sciences.13 
 
Because mechanisms utilise boundary conditions, DNA is irreducible to physical laws 
just as higher levels, like consciousness are irreducible to DNA. An analogy would be 
that although governed by physical laws, a study of physics would not illuminate the 
nature of road rules, just as a study of road rules would not reveal the nature of road 
rage. Essentially what Polanyi is arguing is that reductionism represents an exclusively 
“bottom-up” account of causation, which is passionately favoured by science because it 
offers greater exactness and perceived “objectivity”. He recognises that study at all 
levels is interesting but for phenomena that manifest themselves at higher levels, a 
“bottom-up” (reductive) approach wipes out any possibility of a proper understanding 
of higher levels of causation and a “top-down” approach may be more fruitful. 
Therefore for depression, a study rooted in phenomenology could be as enlightening as 
one based in biochemistry.14 
 
The Irreducible Nature of Suffering 
 
Polanyi’s critique of reductionism can be applied to biomedical science’s reduction of 
suffering into disease. Suffering exists at a level above disease and has its own set of 
“rules” that can be lost sight of. For science, sickness is about blood pressure, body 
temperature and biochemical markers. This excludes aspects existing at the higher 
experiential level of sickness (e.g. the fear of death), which may be more “real” and 
causally dominant at the level of suffering. This reduction is a “moral inversion” 
because it erodes our ability to learn of the nature of suffering and attending to suffering 
is the primary moral objective of medicine. This is not to undermine the value of 
knowing about disease, as this knowledge can inform us about suffering (like knowing 
mechanics can inform appropriate road speed limits). However it must be recognised 
that suffering and disease exist at different levels and that focussing on disease at the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Polanyi,	  M.	  (1968).	  
11	  See	  section	  3.2.1	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Appendix II 
 
“Personal Knowledge” in Medicine and the Epistemic Shortcomings of 
Scientism – Hugh McHugh and Simon Walker 
 
First published in the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, Issue 12(4), Symposium on 
Scientism, December 2015 
 




In this paper, we outline a framework for understanding the different kinds of 
knowledge required for medical practice and use this framework to show how scientism 
undermines aspects of this knowledge. The framework is based on Michael Polanyi’s 
claim that knowledge is primarily the product of the contemplations and convictions of 
persons and yet at the same time carries a sense of universality because it grasps at 
reality. Building on Polanyi’s ideas, we propose that knowledge can be described along 
two intersecting “dimensions”: the tacit–explicit and the particular–general. These 
dimensions supersede the familiar “objective−subjective” dichotomy, as they more 
accurately describe the relationship between medical science and medical practice. 
Scientism, we argue, excludes tacit and particular knowledge and thereby distorts 




Medical “scientism” is the imperative to define and achieve all medical goals through 
science. This imperative manifests in numerous ways and is particularly evident in the 
“objective−subjective” dichotomy, whereby “objective” knowledge is viewed as 
superior and “subjective” knowledge is regarded as inherently suspect. In this paper, we 
argue that medical scientism is flawed because it only recognizes what we call general 
and explicit knowledge and excludes what we call tacit and particular knowledge. This 
exclusion is epistemic, in that tacit and particular knowledge may be implicitly 
recognized by scientism, though not as genuine knowledge but as some modulating 
“factor” in the application of scientific knowledge (from a Kuhnian perspective [Kuhn 
1996]; this is because recognizing tacit and particular knowledge as valid “knowledge” 
would undermine the foundational assumption of the scientistic paradigm that the 
quality of knowledge is related to the extent and rigour of its justification). Such factors, 
which are invoked through terms like “clinical expertise” or “patient preferences,” we 
suggest are more accurately described as valid and necessary forms of medical 
knowledge, with features that distinguish it from the knowledge science delivers. We 
argue that the exclusion of tacit and particular knowledge impairs our ability to achieve 
medicine’s goals, primarily because these knowledge forms are essential to doing 
medicine and secondarily because the overemphasis of general-explicit knowledge 
distorts our perceptions of what legitimate medicine should be. These impairments 
relate to a range of domains of medical practice, from the reasons supporting one 
treatment over another through to health policy and even to the legitimacy of different 
kinds of ethical arguments. 
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The framework for understanding medical knowledge put forward in this paper draws 
from Michael Polanyi’s (1958) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy. As indicated, it consists of two polar but complementary “dimensions”: the 
tacit−explicit dimension and the particular−general dimension. Although the poles of 
each dimension are opposite in nature, they operate together and should not be 
prioritized as superior or inferior. All knowledge is made up of a dynamic combination 
of these components—the tacit, explicit, particular, and general—and the relative 
involvement of each may change according to how given knowledge is used. 
Distinguishing these dimensions helps to clarify why different forms of knowledge, 
such as knowledge of physiology or knowledge of a given patient’s personal history, are 
necessary for medicine to succeed and shows how the grounds upon which we 
determine “truth” differ according to how knowledge is situated within this framework. 
 
There are similarities between Polanyi’s ideas and other accounts of medical knowledge 
that emphasize the importance of practical reasoning (particularly the Aristotelian 
concept of phronesis or “practical wisdom”) and have been central to previous 
criticisms of scientism (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1981; Montgomery 2006). Henry 
(2006), for example, agrees that medical philosophy should focus on the clinical 
encounter, but he observes that some of the better-known arguments that advocate this 
are situated within “modern” epistemologies that fail to “account for how physicians, 
patients, and philosophers of medicine actually practice and use knowledge as 
embodied human beings” and argues that Polanyi’s epistemology offers a suitable 
corrective (Henry 2006, 196). Here we will provide an introduction to Polanyi’s 
philosophy before discussing the tacit–explicit and particular−general dimensions of 
knowledge and what these distinctions reveal about the problems of scientism. 
 
Michael Polanyi’s Theory of Personal Knowledge 
 
In his book Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, Michael Polanyi 
(1958) sets out a theory of knowing that rejects objectivist conceptions that aspire to 
what he terms “impersonal” knowledge. He argues that knowledge originates from the 
inquisitive mind and cannot be considered “objective” in the mind-independent sense 
because it always depends on an act of appraisal and commitment by the knower. 
However, he also argues that knowledge can have a universal quality because it 
“grasps” at reality—the grasping of which implies its existence. In this light, his notion 
of “personal knowledge” can be seen as a unification of the “idealist” and “realist” 
traditions. 
 
Objectivity is a fundamental aspiration of modern science. The scientific method is 
traditionally thought to lead to the illumination of “objective” truths that are considered 
present in nature and awaiting discovery. Alongside this is a corresponding notion that 
human “subjectivity” leads to false belief. These ideas lie behind the ideal of scientific 
detachment and the utilization of methodologies designed to remove human, i.e., 
“subjective,” factors (e.g., blinding in clinical trials). This overall approach can be 
related to a classical conception of knowledge attributed to Plato: knowledge as a 
justified, true belief (Fine 2003). According to this conception, a subject is entitled to 
claim knowledge only if that claim can be justified. In science, scientific knowledge is 
justified by scientific evidence. However, the conception of knowledge as a “justified, 
true belief” does not in itself specify at what point a conviction is rightly justified. For 
the objectivist this is a problem because human judgement is always necessary for this 
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appraisal. This requirement for explicit justification may also be related to epistemic 
“positivism.” Scientific claims are justified by scientific observations—if nothing is 
observed, nothing scientific has happened. Added to this is the expectation that 
scientific observation will involve a measurement of some kind. (Though qualitative 
techniques are becoming more legitimate in medicine, it is unlikely they will have the 
legitimacy of more “rigorous” methods such as the randomized controlled trial within a 
scientistic framework.) 
 
The link between observation, measurement, and judgement is developed in Polanyi’s 
understanding of the relationship between the “knower” and the justification of 
knowledge. He examines Popper’s (1972) assertion that scientific theories must be 
falsifiable because no number of positive observations can prove a generalized 
statement, though a single negative one may disprove it. If falsification is a requirement, 
then, accurately speaking, science is only able to make positive assertions using the 
“null hypothesis.” This is based on the prior assumption that there is no relationship 
between the objects in question and that any pattern discovered in the variables is the 
result of chance (Fisher 1935). This is because if one is able to falsify the null 
hypothesis, the opposite is true—that there is a relationship. However, the null 
hypothesis cannot be absolutely falsified, and the scientist is required to make a 
judgement as to whether a given result is coincidental, usually on the basis of the “p-
value,” for which there is no universal cut-off point representing certainty.15 This means 
that, rather than being based on strict contradiction, positive assertion in science is 
statistical. For this reason Polanyi describes scientific knowledge as at best only known 
with a very high probability to be true rather than absolutely proven (Polanyi 1958). The 
implication is that the scientist must appraise an experimental result against her existing 
understanding of the object being studied and so judge whether that data counts as 
knowledge. Given this judgement partly depends on the characteristics and individual 
understanding of that person, and that these are subjective under a subjective−objective 
framework, science cannot be considered truly “objective.”16 Yet despite all of this, 
within our day-to-day understanding, scientific claims are regularly presented as 
positive truths and theories are asserted as “scientifically proven.” Such positive 
assertions are commonplace in medicine (e.g., that ACE inhibitors reduce blood 
pressure is generally accepted). 
 
Polanyi goes on to argue that all knowledge depends on a kind of personal affirmation. 
This claim is ultimately founded on the capacity of people to self-appraise their beliefs 
and the inherent drive to seek out a clearer vision of an underlying reality (Polanyi 
1958). The knower, Polanyi points out, judges what is true by universal standards that 
he sets for himself. However, this does not render the knower free to arbitrarily “know” 
what he pleases, as the judgements of the knower are constrained by what Polanyi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  In the appraisal of a result using the null hypothesis, a low “p-value” suggests a true relationship and a 
high value suggests a result caused by chance. The degree of justification (in terms of p-value) required to 
qualify a result as knowledge is not an “objective” truth but is assigned conventionally (p < 0.05 in most 
situations).	  
16	  The inherent uncertainty of science—and resultant need for judgement—is also reinforced by the 
theory-laden nature of observation. Although intersubjective agreement might rationally strengthen a 
claim to truth (as happens with peer review), this does not lead to mind independent “objectivity,” as this 
agreement is still conditional on each individual’s judgement. 
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describes as the “personal co-efficient,” which for him reflects the essential and 
determinative link between the knower and that which is known: 
 
[All] knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal co-efficient, which 
shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between 
subjectivity and objectivity. It implies the claim that man can transcend his own 
subjectivity by striving passionately to fulfil his personal obligations to 
universal standards (Polanyi 1958, 17). 
 
In other words, the personal co-efficient is the idea that knowledge depends on an act of 
commitment by the knower. In proclaiming something as true, the knower makes her 
judgement under a set of tacitly known criteria. These criteria are established by the 
knower’s relationship to the reality that she is striving to grasp and involve both the 
nature of the knower and the nature of that which is known. Thus, they are not arbitrary 
and do not wholly belong to the “subjective” perspective of the knower. The criteria 
also involve the prior knowledge of the knower and the logical and social structures 
through which the thoughts are formed, including certain normative and ontological 
assumptions. An example is Einstein’s rejection of quantum mechanics because he 
could not reconcile the probabilistic wave function with his personal conviction that 
“[God] does not play dice” (Calaprice 2000, 245). This conviction arises from the 
ontological assumption that there is no coincidence and that nature always operates in a 
law-like manner (or that the universe is deterministic). In recognizing the personal co-
efficient, we authorize ourselves to make correct judgements, and yet we also accept the 
possibility of being mistaken (the persistence of, and developments within, quantum 
mechanics would suggest that Einstein was mistaken on this occasion, as the 
unspecifiability of the wave function suggests that God does play dice). However, the 
commitment itself cannot be false, only the grounds upon which it is made (much like 
the deceiver is committed to his deception but not to the truth of his deception). The 
sense of universality implied by the personal commitment “lies precisely in [the 
knower’s] foreknowledge of a host of yet hidden implications which his discovery will 
reveal in later days to other eyes” (Polanyi 1958, 64). For example, although Newton 
may have seen the relevance of the falling apple to the heavenly orbits, it took Einstein, 
centuries later, to piece together gravity with the nature of space and time and thereby 
explain (amongst other things) how a watch runs slightly slower on a speeding train. 
 
In summary, Polanyi’s philosophy conceives knowledge as fundamentally personal but 
as grounded in a relationship between the knower and the reality that is known. This 
relationship is tacitly implied in any act of knowing and always involves elements that 
are particular to the individual knower. At the same time, it entails the idea of 
universality, which may be explicated through various forms of justification and which 
may in turn be assessed, corrected, or corroborated by other knowers. “Personal 
knowledge” encompasses all four aspects of knowledge we describe here: the explicit, 
the tacit, the general, and the particular. In the following sections, we will explain what 
these dimensional aspects of knowledge involve and then outline how they relate to 
medicine. 
 
The Tacit−Explicit Dimension of Knowledge 
 
The tacit–explicit dimension of knowledge represents the varying degrees to which 
knowledge can be articulated and communicated. Where knowledge is situated within 
this dimension is related to how knowledge is used. Explicit knowledge is knowledge 
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that can be easily communicated, such as the correct dosage of a drug. Tacit knowledge 
is knowledge that cannot be easily articulated, which is highlighted by the knowledge of 
how to identify and characterize heart murmurs. Medicine requires both tacit and 
explicit knowledge, and yet because medical science can only deliver explicit 
knowledge, scientism excludes tacit knowledge. Scientific knowledge must be justified 
by scientific evidence, and for this reason science as it is communicated and 
disseminated (in journal articles, conference presentations, and so on) is purely explicit. 
This at least is how science is presented, though, as we will elaborate, both the 
understanding and practice of science depend heavily on tacit knowledge. Several 
authors have discussed the importance of tacit knowledge in medicine and have called 
for further study in the area (Henry 2010, 2006; Braude 2012; Henry, Zaner, and Dittus 
2007; Sturmberg and Martin 2008). 
 
Tacit knowledge is not merely the residual unspecifiable aspects of knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge is foundational to all knowledge (Grene 1977). The various faculties 
required for identifying and utilizing explicit knowledge are tacit, as are the skills or 
“know-how” required for our many kinds of activities. As Polanyi notes, though skills 
are not acquired through an explicit transfer of ideas, they are nevertheless acquired and 
hence may be known or not known. Moreover, any attempt to make this knowledge 
explicit tends to disrupt its function. Consider, for example, how difficult it can be to 
walk while thinking about your leg movements—the explicit thought tends to disrupt 
the exercise of the skill (Polanyi 1958). The same is evident in the use of tools. When 
the surgeon uses a scalpel, she is generally focally aware of only the act itself, and yet 
there is a vast amount of sensory input that she relies upon that is in “the background,” 
e.g., feeling fine pressure changes in the fingertips and seeing the compliance of the 
tissue as she cuts it. The capacity to perceive and respond appropriately to this 
background information is essential to the successful performance of the task and as 
such is an aspect of the knowledge required for its execution. Polanyi describes these 
aspects of knowledge as the “subsidiary awareness” of the “parts that make up the 
whole,” which enables us when using a tool to effectively assimilate the tool as an 
extension of our body (subsidiary awareness refers to things we perceive [or know] that 
contribute to awareness but are not manifest [or articulable] at the focal level). Shifting 
awareness away from the “whole” to any of the “parts” deteriorates a skill, and hence it 
is impossible for the skilled person to completely communicate these parts (like a skill, 
judgement has a tacit component in that the judge is subsidiarily aware of the criteria 
against which she makes a judgement and cannot be totally aware of them) (Polanyi 
1958). Thus, the unification of these unspecifiable components in the mind of the 
knower is a form of tacit knowledge. 
 
Related to the distinction of focal and subsidiary awareness is Polanyi’s from−to 
structure of knowledge (Polanyi 1975), which Grene asserts is inherent to all cognitive 
processes (Grene 1977). Polanyi claims that when we use knowledge to attend to 
something, say if we want to interpret a chest X-ray, we do this by attending from our 
prior knowledge of radiology and lung pathology along with many other things, like 
visual sensory input, of which we may be only subsidiarily aware. Even reading explicit 
text requires tacit faculties, whereby the explicit part of language falls into subsidiary 
awareness, contributing to our focal awareness of meaning. For example, when reading 
this you are tacitly attending to the meaning of the text by attending from the letters that 
make its words (which your eyes see). The from−to structure of knowledge 
demonstrates how the explicit and tacit components of knowledge are entwined. It also 
	  
	   	   114	  
demonstrates the importance of the context when assessing how knowledge is being 
used in terms of its tacit and explicit features. While the surgeon is using her scalpel, 
she might come up with some instructions to teach a student and so make part of her 
tacit knowledge explicit. The observation that tacit knowledge can be made partially 
explicit may incline one to support a purely explicit epistemology (like scientism). It is 
not possible however to make tacit knowledge completely explicit, partly because 
language is functionally limited but also because tacit knowledge is pervasive and 
necessary for every kind of task, even those that would be considered highly explicit in 
nature (this is at the basis of a common misinterpretation of Polanyi that is related to 
seeing tacit knowledge as merely residual unspecifiability [Grene 1977]). An example is 
mathematical knowledge, which might superficially appear to be the paradigm of 
explicit knowledge but which in fact depends heavily on tacit knowing and the personal 
faculties of the mathematician (Polanyi 1958). The tacit knowledge of mathematics 
partly is in the understanding of mathematical symbols and their operational rules but 
also is in the knower’s personal capacity to conceive novel solutions to difficult 
problems. If mathematical knowledge were purely explicit, then it would follow that 
anyone who could read the symbols could in doing so grasp the theories they describe 
(even the most difficult). This is clearly not the case, and even genius mathematicians 
struggle with problems outside their specialty. 
 
Returning to the scientistic imperative to make knowledge explicit, we must be cautious 
when attempting to model doctors’ “clinical judgement” on purely explicit means. 
Doctors rely on both tacit and explicit knowledge, and although a probability flowchart 
might be useful to a beginner diagnostician to assess a patient for, say, a pulmonary 
embolism, a consultant physician with consolidated knowledge might tacitly reach a 
diagnosis long before she could explain her reasoning. Explicit models can be useful 
tools, but in so far as they overlook tacit knowledge, they do not fully represent how 
decisions are made in practice. Furthermore, tacit knowledge is most efficiently used 
tacitly, and the unnecessary explication of prior tacit knowledge can be cumbersome 
and may create dangers in the clinical setting. 
 
In summary, even in the most explicit realms of thought, tacit elements are required for 
knowledge to have any meaning or practical usage. While explication may sometimes 
shed light on tacit knowledge (e.g., the surgeon instructing the student on how to hold 
the scalpel), the attempt to make all of knowledge explicit is futile, because language is 
limited and—more importantly—because we are not explicitly aware of everything we 
know. In this way, the tacit–explicit dimension of knowledge reveals a problem of 
scientism, for if it is maintained that knowledge must always be explicitly, and indeed 
“scientifically,” justified (and so reduced to words and numbers), then unspecifiable 
tacit knowledge that is important in guiding actions and performing tasks will be 
denigrated or (at best) overlooked. 
 
The Particular−General Dimension of Knowledge 
 
The particular–general dimension of knowledge signifies the fact that knowledge varies 
in degrees of application. Knowledge is “general” to the extent that it encompasses or 
can be applied to a group of some kind. Conversely, knowledge is “particular” to the 
extent that it is specific to a single individual/thing. Like the tacit−explicit dimension, 
particular and general knowledge are both required in medicine and are used together. 
For example, when treating a patient with cancer, a doctor might discuss features of 
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malignancy in general while also addressing features of the particular patient’s 
malignancy (and other aspects of his or her illness) that are unique to that individual. 
The longstanding tension between generalized and particular knowledge is recognized 
by Montgomery, who argues that a core feature of medical reasoning is the process of 
particularization, whereby the generalized knowledge of science can be applied to the 
individual patient (Montgomery 2006). Here we explore differences in the justification 
of particular and general knowledge and suggest that particular knowledge often does 
not require scientific justification. 
 
Though Polanyi does not directly address this distinction between generalized and 
particular knowledge in Personal Knowledge, setting it alongside the tacit−explicit 
dimension strengthens the critique of scientism, as both explicit and tacit forms of 
particular knowledge are obscured under a scientistic paradigm that focuses on 
generalized (and explicit) knowledge. This is because scientism upholds the idea that 
the quality of knowledge is related to the extent or “rigorousness” of its justification 
(e.g., by randomized controlled trial). The particular−general dimension reframes this 
imperative and recognizes the particular “everyday” information we rely on as valid 
knowledge, as particular knowledge is often justified self-evidently and not 
scientifically. This way of understanding knowledge incorporates generalized scientific 
knowledge and the reasoning behind the methods used to justify it, but maintains that 
knowledge should not be prioritized by the rigour of its justification, because not all 
knowledge needs to be justified scientifically to be relied upon. Although knowledge of 
particulars is taken-for-granted by scientism, it is essential to medicine and so should be 
recognized as a legitimate aspect of medical knowledge. 
 
Much of the knowledge used in clinical life is particular in that it is highly specific to 
the practitioners and their individual environment. For example, a doctor typically has a 
list of names of particular patients under his care, he knows where the radiology unit is 
located in his particular hospital, and there is a particular number he must page to 
contact the team’s house surgeon, and so on. The fact that this knowledge is highly 
personal does not render it “subjective,” i.e., in the sense of being merely a product of 
one’s individual perspective and goals. Patients do have names, there really is a 
radiology department, etc., and this knowledge may be verified in many ways. Other 
kinds of particular knowledge could be considered more deeply concerned with the 
individual person, such as a patient’s love of psychedelic music, but even this kind of 
knowledge is not wholly arbitrary. Knowledge of the nature of a particular being 
(including oneself) is still knowledge, and it is still possible for such knowledge to be 
either true or false (or perhaps more-or-less accurate). 
 
General knowledge is also used routinely in medicine (and indeed in all forms of 
everyday life). For instance, when going into the drug room to get IV fluids, it does not 
matter which particular bag one collects, so long as it is an instance of the right kind of 
fluid (e.g., Hartmann’s solution). This is an example of general knowledge: knowledge 
of the kinds of things that can be acquired from a particular place. Another example is 
in the way we interpret and respond to other peoples’ behaviour. Though every patient 
is unique, patients also all behave in ways that more-or-less accord with general patterns 
of human behaviour. We know, for example, that if a patient is confused or distressed, 
then she is less likely to attend to and understand what is said to her. Such knowledge of 
how people in general act is vital in maintaining our clinical, professional, and social 
interactions. 
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Similar to the tacit–explicit dimension, the particular–general dimension also 
demonstrates a from–to structure. The above examples demonstrate how we attend to 
particular situations from knowledge of their general features (and also from their 
particulars). We can also form general knowledge by attending to particular instances—
this is one goal of empirical science. An example is how a drug’s efficacy is determined 
by making generalizations from a sample of individual patients. The methodological 
constraints and statistical analyses in science have to do largely with inferring an 
accurate generalization rather than determining what really occurred within the sample. 
So one might have perfectly accurate data from within the sample, and this would be 
true particular knowledge of the sample, but there may be aspects of the sample or 
methods that weaken the generalizability of this knowledge, which makes it less reliable 
(e.g., the sample did not represent the population). This demonstrates how the 
particular–generality of knowledge is dynamic and depends on the usage of the 
knowledge claim. This is illustrated best in the difference between saying “all patients 
are unwell” and “this patient is unwell.” 
 
The assumptions of inference that are inherent in most empirical generalizations mean 
that the level of justification required to assert a knowledge claim as true is related to 
the extent it is generalized. In science, where there is a high degree of generalization, 
justification is very important and maxims exist that stipulate standards of rigour and 
evidence. Particular knowledge is different in that it usually does not require the same 
kind of justification as scientific knowledge and may be adequately justified simply by 
attending to personal experience (which might be an observation that something works). 
For example, it is reasonable to ascertain knowledge of a (competent) patient’s 
preference for treatment by discussing options with her and asking for her informed 
choice. Though rigorous methods such as N of 1 trials are able to detect important 
patient-to-patient variations, including in the study of patient preferences (Duan, 
Kravitz, and Schmid 2013), the justification of particular knowledge is often self-
evident and rooted in “real-life.” Rigorous methodologies to justify such knowledge are 
often impractical and not needed. 
 
The last point further highlights the problem with a “scientistic” privileging of 
knowledge that is based on scientific justification. Scientism leads to the relegation of 
correct particular knowledge. This is not a criticism of science, as the scientist’s aim is 
to generate generalizable knowledge. It is a criticism of the idea that all knowledge 
must be generated or verified by such means. The relegation of particular knowledge is 
dangerous in medicine because it has, along with tacit knowledge, a significant role in 
determining correct medical action. 
 
Medical Knowledge Through the Lens of Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge 
 
As well as the explicit–general knowledge of medical science that is essential to 
medicine, certain kinds of tacit and particular knowledge are equally essential. One 
cannot become a doctor just by memorizing medical textbooks, because the explicit and 
general knowledge conveyed by textbooks cannot generate the tacit knowledge required 
for executing medical tasks or instil the ability to gather particular clinical knowledge 
about individual patients. 
 
When recounting a clinical history, patients share particular knowledge of themselves 
with clinicians, who in turn rely tacitly on their examination and diagnostic skills to 
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formulate a diagnosis. This diagnosis will be informed by the explicit–general 
knowledge of biomedical science, and the clinician’s conduct will be guided by both 
explicit and tacit professional standards set by clinical authorities. Thus, the participants 
of medical practice communicate their varied forms of personal knowledge as they 
perform their roles, which of course extend beyond the clinical encounter (e.g., 
handover meetings). If medicine somehow eliminated the particular knowledge of the 
individual patient and the tacit knowledge of the experienced doctor, it would be unable 
to achieve its purpose, just as it would if it could not access general–explicit scientific 
knowledge. 
 
In an effort to clarify and reinvigorate the role of the doctor following the epistemic and 
social changes of the twentieth century, Eric Cassell reasserted the ancient purpose of 
medicine as being the relief of suffering. He argued that “the test of a system of 
medicine should be its adequacy in the face of suffering” (Cassell 2004, v).17 A person, 
he said, is caused to suffer by her perception of certain things as a threat to her 
personhood (Cassell 2004). This perception may be either focal or subsidiary. Suffering 
is therefore holistic in nature: it concerns the unitary self and its multiple relations to 
other things. Thus, suffering itself calls for a kind of knowledge: knowledge of who the 
sufferer is and how she is relating to other things. Though the sufferer knows she 
suffers, she may be only more-or-less aware of why she does (Hamilton and Gillett 
2012). In attempting to articulate the cause of her suffering, the patient is trying to make 
explicit the knowledge that she has, so that others may help her. However, there may be 
aspects of a person’s suffering that cannot be made explicit and which are at best only 
ever tacit. Equally, knowledge of suffering may have both general and particular 
features, involving science, culture, and personal experiences. The dimensionality of 
knowledge and suffering is further reflected in those who care for patients. Physicians 
must have a thorough grasp of the explicit–general knowledge of disease but also the 
tacit and particular knowledge that allows them to relate to patients as unique persons at 
a level above the explicit content of their interactions. 
 
Cassell regarded medicine’s failure to accord “subjective” knowledge the same status as 
“objective” knowledge as a major factor holding back its understanding of suffering 
(Cassell 2004). In order to do this, it is necessary to understand how the knowledge 
Cassell is describing as “subjective” is acquired and validated and why it is not merely a 
matter of perspective or opinion. Understanding the role of tacit and particular forms of 
knowledge, and how these differ from explicit and general knowledge, is a step toward 
this. At every point, the participants of medicine call on knowledge that is both tacit and 
explicit, particular and general. All forms of knowledge are involved in understanding 
suffering and how it can be relieved. This is an inescapable clinical reality that is prior 
to the various frameworks through which we rationalize how knowledge is and should 
be used in practice. Scientism impairs medical practice because it distorts perceptions of 
“clinical reality” and limits the kinds of knowledge that can be used to justify clinical 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Polanyi, who trained as a doctor before becoming a physical chemist and philosopher, also claimed 
that medicine’s purpose is to attend to suffering (Polanyi 1965).	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The Consequences of Scientism in Medical Practice 
 
Medicine has been informed by scientific principles throughout its history. However, 
perhaps partly because of the success of modern medical science, scientific knowledge 
is often elevated above other forms of knowledge, such that it might be expected that all 
medical knowledge should be scientifically justified. This expectation is reinforced by 
the widespread adoption of “evidence-based medicine” (Evidence Based Medicine 
Working Group 1992), whereby the idea of “best practice” is governed primarily by the 
results of scientific research.18 As outlined earlier, science as it is communicated in 
appraisable forms consists solely of explicit–general knowledge, and so scientism 
results in the prioritization of explicit–general knowledge over tacit and particular 
knowing.19 
 
A key practical problem of scientism in medicine is that it leads to a bias in clinical 
reality. This occurs through science’s positivistic requirement for measurability, 
because aspects of treatment or practice that are difficult to measure do not generate 
scientific evidence and consequently come to be considered less important. This results 
in a prioritization of so-called “hard medicine,” like pharmaceuticals, over “softer” 
aspects of health (e.g., a person’s state of mind or doctors’ cultural competence) and is a 
reason why Polanyi’s philosophy advocates qualitative research (Henry 2006). This bias 
is further compounded by the commercial manipulation of science to suit profitable 
ends (by the fact that companies are unlikely to research aspects of health that are 
difficult to commercialize—e.g., exercise and a balanced diet compared to a novel drug 
or patentable surgical instrument) (Spielmans and Parry 2010). Bias resulting from 
scientism also occurs where things are not uniform or easily replicable, creating 
difficulties where therapies and outcomes are highly personalized and also rare 
conditions where sample sizes are limited. This is a “bias” because something can be 
effective and yet difficult to prove, a point represented in the subtle but important 
distinction between “a lack of evidence” and “an evidence of lack.” 
 
Clinical authorities shape medical practice through policy and resource allocation. In so 
far as clinical authorities are influenced by medical scientism, they will evaluate health 
policy and resource allocation alternatives on the basis of scientific knowledge. This 
might exacerbate the bias discussed above, further increasing and promoting “hard” 
interventions and outcomes at the expense of those that are difficult to measure (or 
replicate). Scientism might also support the attractiveness of health systems where 
policy is enacted by economically trained or otherwise non-medical “executives,” based 
on the assumption that access to the relevant scientific evidence is the only knowledge 
they require—leaving clinicians “free” to care for patients. However, if health policy 
does not take account of the tacit and particular knowledge gained through clinical 
experience, then it may become “out of touch” with clinical realities, to the detriment of 
patient care. Just as it takes a scientist to interpret the broader implications of a 
scientific discovery, experienced clinicians are needed to anticipate and assess the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  There have been more recent iterations of evidence-based medicine that claim to equally acknowledge 
other forms of knowledge (e.g., patient preferences and clinical judgement) (Buetow 2009). However, 
this rhetoric is at odds with evidence-based medicine’s fundamental tenets, as if other knowledge is 
equally important it is unclear why medicine must be “evidence-based” and not “preference-based” or 
“judgement-based,” etc. For a detailed argument, see McHugh (2013).	  
19 Others have argued that there is a fundamental incompatibility between evidence-based medicine and 
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge (Henry 2006; Braude 2012). 
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practical effects of a proposed health policy, alongside the knowledge delivered by the 
relevant science. 
 
As well as framing what is considered clinically correct, medical authority has a bearing 
on what is deemed morally correct. The scientistic requirement for explicit–general 
knowledge partly underlies the appeal of highly explicit ethical frameworks like 
utilitarianism, whereby harms and benefits can be listed in a way that allows a quasi-
mathematical appraisal (e.g., cost-benefit analysis), and highly generalized theories such 
as libertarianism, which operate in terms of abstract principles. Scientism in bioethics 
ultimately leads to an incomplete vision of ethical life, which involves complex kinds of 
tacit and particular knowing. This is demonstrated in a physician’s tacit awareness that a 
patient is suffering: the awareness that something is “wrong” for this person, which 
comes before any explanation is or can be offered, and in the knowledge that is attained 
through careful attention to who this particular person is and what is happening to him. 
 
The kind of superficial morality just described may be illustrated through imagining 
what it might be like to receive medical care from a diagnostic supercomputer that 
inputs variables to diagnose disease and determine appropriate treatment. Because it 
works by executing a specified program that follows pre-established rules and 
inferences that rely on categorization, this computer could be said to deliver only 
explicit and general knowledge.20 Thus, it could not have a “sense” of what it is like to 
be affected by illness and has no capacity to know the person it is communicating with 
(so to speak). It could never independently discern, for example, when and how to 
communicate the news of terminal diagnosis or convey the support and empathy that 
many need at such times. This indicates what is arguably the greatest danger of 
scientism: the reduction of “what matters” in medicine to the explicit–general and a 




In this paper, we have discussed a dimensional framework of knowledge based on 
Polanyi’s account of Personal Knowledge (Polanyi 1958). Articulating the different 
forms of knowledge operant in medicine in terms of tacit, explicit, particular, and 
general, instead of simply objective or subjective, allows us to recognize the different 
roles and grounding that medical knowledge can have, without presuming any one to be 
superior or inferior to others. This framework is not anti-science (in contrast to 
scientism’s devaluation of tacit and particular knowledge) but rather indicates science’s 
range and scope. This approach is echoed in the growing recognition of non-scientific 
fields of enquiry in medicine, and while the distinctions comprising the framework 
could be restated via an alternative, more comprehensive epistemology, it may serve as 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Whether such a computer could be said to have “knowledge” at all (i.e., whether it could be artificially 
intelligent) is a different question that is outside the scope of this paper. Polanyi’s philosophy is certainly 
relevant to this debate (Blum 2010), and it would seem that as long as computers are unable to grasp the 
tacit element (and see meaning), true artificial intelligence will be elusive.	  
	  
	   	   120	  
Bibliography 
Blum, P.R. 2010. The immortality of the intellect revived: Michael Polanyi and his 
debate with Alan M. Turing. In Knowing and being: Perspectives on the 
philosophy of Michael Polanyi, edited by T. Margitay, 173–184. Newcastle 
upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
 
Braude, H.D. 2012. Intuition in medicine: A philosophical defense of clinical reasoning. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Buetow, S. 2009. EBM and the strawman: A commentary on Devisch and Murray 
(2009). “We hold these truths to be self-evident”: Deconstructing “evidence-
based” medical practice. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 15(6): 957–
959. 
 
Calaprice, A. ed. 2000. The expanded quotable Einstein. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Cassell, E.J. 2004. The nature of suffering and the goals of medicine, 2nd ed. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Duan, N., R.L. Kravitz, and C.H. Schmid. 2013. Single-patient (n-of-1) trials: A 
pragmatic clinical decision methodology for patient-centered comparative 
effectiveness research. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 66(8): S21–S28. 
 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group. 1992. Evidence-based medicine. A new 
approach to teaching the practice of medicine. The Journal of the American 
Medical Association 268(17): 2420–2425. 
 
Fine, G. 2003. Plato on knowledge and forms: Selected essays. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
 
Fisher, Sir R.A. 1935. The design of experiments. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd. 
 
Grene, M. 1977. Tacit knowing: Grounds for a revolution in philosophy. Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology 8(3): 164–171. 
 
Hamilton, M., and G. Gillett. 2012. Suffering and the sleeplessness of physicians. In 
Perspectives on Human Suffering, edited by J. Malpas and N. Lickiss, 287–305. 
Heidelberg, London, and New York: Springer Dordrecht. 
 
Henry, S.G. 2006. Recognizing tacit knowledge in medical epistemology. Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics 27(3): 187–213. 
 
Henry, S.G. 2010. Polanyi’s tacit knowing and the relevance of epistemology to clinical 
medicine. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16(2): 292–297. 
 
Henry, S.G., R.M. Zaner, and R.S. Dittus. 2007. Viewpoint: Moving beyond evidence-
based medicine. Academic Medicine 82(3): 292–297. 
 
	  
	   	   121	  
Kuhn, T.S. 1996. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
McHugh, H. 2013. Suffering and the dimensionality of medical knowledge: A critique of 
evidence based medicine. Dunedin: Bioethics Centre, University of Otago. 
 
Montgomery, K. 2006. How doctors think: Clinical judgement and the practice of 
medicine. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Pellegrino, E.D., and D.C. Thomasma. 1981. A philosophical basis of medical practice: 
Towards a philosophy and ethic of the healing professions. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Polanyi, M. 1958. Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Polanyi, M. 1965. On the modern mind. Encounter 24(5): 12–20. 
 
Polanyi, M. 1975. Meaning. Edited by H. Prosch. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Popper, K.R. 1972. The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson. 
 
Spielmans, G.I., and P.I. Parry. 2010. From evidence-based medicine to marketing-
based medicine: Evidence from internal industry documents. Journal of 
Bioethical Inquiry 7(1): 13–29. 
 
Sturmberg, J.P., and C.M. Martin. 2008. Knowing—in medicine. Journal of Evaluation 
in Clinical Practice 14(5): 767–770.  
 
 
 
